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ABSTRACT
SHADOWS OVER GOSHEN: PLAIN WHITES,
PROGRESSIVES AND PATERNALISM IN THE DEPRESSION SOUTH
by
Fred C. Smith

This dissertation is about poverty and rural Southerners and the beginnings of
America's rational assault on poverty. By 1932, a sense of emergency and
desperation permeated American economic and political thinking. The apparent
collapse of the industrial economy and credit markets created an environment in
which politicians allowed and the public demanded bold experimentation. The
period, 1933-1937, in which most of America approved or tolerated progressive
notions, offered an opportunity for progressives to demonstrate their solutions to
persistent southern poverty.
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH), an agency of the
Department of Interior, created communities that combined subsistence gardening
with part-time wage work. The Resettlement Administration (RA) developed the
New Deal's most progressive efforts to cure southern poverty, entire towns populated
by subsistence yeoman farmers. However, other progressives, especially liberal
churchmen and the Socialist Party of America envisioned a more radical solution for
rural southern poverty.
This study of three communitarian projects reveals that the clients of those
communities, representing the lower and lower middle class, were intensely
concerned with mamtaining or achieving a specific class status. A subordinate thesis
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of this dissertation, evidenced by the words of the clients, suggests that the
dispossessed (for whatever reasons) rural Southerners made a distinction between
"poor whites" and "plain whites." All of the clients of the communities in this study
were poor; not all of them were plain. "Plain whites," as employed in this study,
refers to poor rural southerners without access to financial or political power. Three
projects typify the approach by progressive liberals of the 1930s. Success for all
three projects would be determined, in large part, by the willingness of their clients to
forego voluntarily some of the privileges and rights associated with American
individualism. In all three projects success depended on the economic cooperation of
the clients. The Tupelo Homesteads were designed to meet the requirements of a
"pleasure economy" and a radically different manufacturing world. Dyess Colony
was an attempt to create in flesh and blood what had often been an American myth, a
robust class of independent and disinterested yeoman farmers. Delta Cooperative
Farm was supposed to give the means of production to the people and to turn the
hearts of man to God. To say, categorically, that these projects failed is to ignore the
primary purpose of experimentation.
All three projects promised dignity, self-determination, and refuge for those at
the bottom of the economic pyramid. Activists associated with New Deal in general
and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Division of Subsistence
Homesteads, Works Progress Administration, Resettlement Administration, and Farm
Security Administration in particular encouraged their clients to be satisfied with
subsistence. The Socialist Party of America joined with a coterie of liberal
churchmen and promised social and economic justice and control of the means of
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production. Despite the powerful influence of such notables as Rexford G. Tugwell,
M. L. Wilson, Lawrence Westbrook, Harry Hopkins, Sherwood Eddy, and most
famously, Reinhold Niebuhr, the clients refused to abandon their notions of dignity
and their aspirations to upward mobility.
Arguably, the greatest benefit from experimentation is falsification of theory.
Two of the experiments, Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony were certain to be
failures from the very beginning. The failure of Delta Cooperative Farm was selfinflicted by its liberal leaders. The various "wars" on poverty since the Great
Depression have been shaped, in part, by the first attempts of liberal progressives to
take advantage of the crises and opportunities of the Great Depression.
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INTRODUCTION

Mrs. Joe Alexander was not satisfied that the application blank she had just
completed was sufficient. The blanks asked only for the stark facts relative to her
family's shame; there was no provision for explaining the exceptional circumstances that
had caused the family to fall from respectability to poverty. In her mind, at least, poverty
and respectability were, with some exceptions, mutually exclusive. The application
blanks were stark and sterile; there was no place to explain how and why they had fallen
into poverty. Her letter of 8 October 1934 endeavored to give Mr. Dyess "a few facts"
and to demonstrate - in a way that facts derived from blanks could not - that her family
deserved a place at Arkansas Colonization Project No. 1. Her letter is interesting, if for
no other reason, because it reveals that the Alexander family had experienced almost
every one of the depression-era phenomena that characterized rural southern families.1
According to the almost embarrassingly transparent revelations in her letter, the
Alexander family had survived the boll weevil and the Delta floods of 1912-1913.
They had struggled by until the cotton boom in 1916 brought them a crop big enough and
rich enough to pay off their old debts. In the years between the "overflows" and the 1916
cotton crop the Alexanders had been forced to accept furnish and financing from the local
furnishing merchant/cotton factor. Several times since their marriage in 1910, they had
deposited significant sums in the Blytheville bank. Beginning with 160 acres of Delta
land in Mississippi County, Arkansas, bequeathed by her father, they owned a succession
1

Letter to William R. Dyess from Mrs. Joe Alexander, Blytheville, AR, 8 October 1934,
in the University of Arkansas Special Collections, Works Progress Ad^ninistration File,
MS UN3, hereinafter "WPA Administration File." Colonization Project No. 1. was
renamed Dyess Colony in Honor of its chief founder, William R. Dyess.

of farms, always upgrading their property and banking the profits. In the process of
buying and selling they spent one crop year as tenants on a large plantation near Osceola,
for them a satisfactory year. They had three industrious non-drinking boys; the oldest
was twenty-three and still living at home. Their twenty-year-old son was "working his
way through college on football," and their seventeen-year old was a graduating senior in
high school. They had an ample work force. The family had, in one year, raised and sold
756 Rhode Island Red chicks and the family had always kept at least two Jersey cows for
domestic and commercial use. Malaria and the desire to move the boys closer to a town
school motivated their move to Blytheville. The Alexander family was a fine example of
small farmers, of southern yeomanry.2
Just as the family sold its latest farm, banked the proceeds from its sale, and was
"about to invest in a farm close enough to town for the boys to attend the city schools,"
the bank failed. The savings of twenty-eight years of hard work and frugality had
vanished. For the past four years, Joe Alexander had worked less than sixteen weeks a
year at the rate of $18.00 a week. After narrating these facts, the now penniless
Alexander, in her letter neatly summarized the family's embarrassed condition, "So you
see we cannot save any money for future needs." No doubt, Mrs. Alexander thought that
the series of "exceptional circumstances" would somehow differentiate her family from
others seeking the same kind of opportunity. It did not. Accounts of the boll weevil,
floods, drought, tenancy, ruinous prices, ill-health, and diminishing agricultural
opportunities were ubiquitous in the letters of desperate southerners to the "government
men" that ran the huge relief/rehabilitation efforts of the New Deal. The Alexander

2

Ibid.

3
experiences were so common that the family was an almost perfect physical
manifestation of the rural southern stereotype. They were living cliches. Indeed, in
comparison to other letters of the same genre, there is nothing noteworthy or remarkable
in the family's circumstances. There was ample justification for FDR's assertion that
they, and thousands of others for whom the Andersons were stereotypical, constituted
"America's number one economic problem."
In 1933, Americans were still generous and compassionate toward the deserving
and working poor. Americans were also near despair. The combination of native
compassion, desperation, and the thaumaturgy of newly elected President Franklin D.
Roosevelt created a social and political environment that encouraged, even demanded,
bold experimentation. The FDR administration fulfilled the new President's pledge to
"take action and take action now." The New Deal that emerged from the confluence of
despair, compassion, and politics was, despite the characterization of many commentators
and scholars, not solely given over to liberal or progressive experimentation. The New
Deal was, necessarily, Janus-faced. The dominant policy makers within the Agricultural

3

Ibid. "WPA Management File" contains over 300 similar letters. Other letters of the
same genre are located in Record Group 69, National Archives and Records
Administration II (NARAII), WPA Central Office Records, hereinafter "WPA Central
Office Records," and in Record Group 96, Box 182, NARA II, hereinafter RG 96.
"Government men" is a term that appears often in the letters from applicants. Clients
most often used the term to designate administrators and managers of the various
relief/rehabilitation efforts. The term "boss" also used in this dissertation appears in the
letters and most often refers to project supervisors and social workers. The terms
"government men" and "bosses" are terms ubiquitous in the letters of those seeking
information or positions. Writers used "Government men" to designate relief and project
administrators; the term "boss" is, likewise, applied to clerical personnel, social workers,
etc. For New Deal archival sources, for example see: Letters, budgets, etc, WPA
Administrative File, UM3 Series 1, Box 4, Folder 3, Special Collections, University of
Arkansas Libraries.
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Adjustment Administration, created by the Agricultural Adjustment Act (both AAA), and
particularly the Cotton Section of that agency, ensured that policies satisfied the sole
purpose of supporting and mamtaining the economic health and social dominance of
large agricultural producers, even when such policies inflicted devastating wounds to the
majority of southern cotton growers. The progressive and liberal elements of the New
Deal recognized the economic necessity and embraced the moral imperative to relieve,
rehabilitate, and redeem poverty-stricken southern agrarians. From that source and via a
succession of New Deal agencies, liberals created within the vast New Deal rural
rehabilitation and relief efforts over 100 communities in which the government offered an
opportunity for carefully selected participants. The Tupelo Homesteads, engendered by
the slightly less progressive first New Deal (1933-1935), and Dyess Colony operated
under notions propagated by policy makers of the more progressive second New Deal
(1935-1939), are two of the three communities under consideration in this dissertation.
Some of the same phenomena that created an environment tolerant of and
conducive to bold experimentation within FDR's administration pricked the souls and
consciences (and perhaps, the political avarice) of a progressive coalition positioned far
to the left of the liberals in the New Deal. Liberal and progressive professional
Christians, ostensibly under the intellectual and moral tutelage of, arguably, America's
most famous contemporary intellectual, Reinhold Niebuhr, joined forces with the
Socialist Party of America and its agents to create the most radical and bold experiment
ever conducted on behalf of America's least powerful, most destitute, and thoroughly
terrified citizens, southern sharecroppers. That experiment, The Delta Cooperative Farm,

5
near Hill House, Mississippi, completes the trio of agrarian communities under
consideration.
Sometimes cliches are harmless and even useful. Such is the case of the Joe
Alexander family with regard to the vicissitudes experienced by cotton growers in the
depression-era South. Most often, however, thoughtless cliches are socially acceptable
ways of expressing disdain or contempt. Writers H.L. Mencken and Erskine Caldwell,
purveyors of gratuitous ridicule and slander, conducted wholesale character assassination
to the approval of a large portion of the American reading public, and thus perverted the
image of millions of American Southerners, black and white.4
As non-satisfying, unproductive, and degrading as are the polemics of Mencken
and the rancid caricatures of Caldwell, perhaps even a greater obstacle to understanding
and analysis of America's number one economic problem comes from people of
progressive notions and vibrant compassion. James Agee and Walker Evans, to great
acclaim and praise from high places, introduced a more nuanced and sympathetic image
of rural southern agrarians. Unlike Caldwell and Mencken, Let Us Now Praise Famous
Men is subject to the constraints imposed by good scholarship and common decency. It
speaks well of American society that many chose and choose to view the subjects with
compassion and generosity. However, such right-minded thinking and compassion also
has, in some cases, added to the impedimenta obscuring contemporary views of the

4

Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (New York: Grosett and Dunlap, 1932), passim. For a
representative sample of Mencken's work see: Charles Angoff and H.L. Mencken, "The
Worst American State," American Mercury, 24 (1931), 1-16,175-88, 355-71, and
anything he wrote about the Scopes Trial from Dayton, Tennessee in 1925. For a
scholarly and objective account of that trial see, Edward J. Larsen, Summer for the Gods,
The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 199$), passim.
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realities of destitute southern agrarians of the depression. As a consequence of good, if
limited, scholarship and the attendant desire to show respect and give dignity to this
population, certain cliches and stereotypes have emerged that are even more injurious to
understanding and analysis. It is these other cliches and stereotypes, propagated for the
most part by people of right minds and good hearts that serves as the fulcrum for the
thesis of this dissertation. The southern agrarian victims of the depressions are often
portrayed as innocent, heroic, noble, and helpless. They were, according to that
perspective, foils, and objects only of the designs and actions of their elite bosses.
Consideration of the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and Delta Cooperative Farm
allows that some of them were noble and heroic; they were not without options and they
were not powerless. They made calculated and considered choices; certainly not all of
them were innocent.
The conditions of southern sharecroppers and hardscrabble cotton farmers and the
opportunity and choices presented in the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and Delta
Cooperative Farm is somewhat analogous to the Children of Israel and the Land of
Goshen. About 3,000 years ago, the "Land of Goshen" was a place of refuge for the
Children of Israel, a place where they could escape the imminent starvation that faced
them. In the "best of the land of Egypt," they could prosper under the benevolent
paternalism of Brother Joseph and the Pharaoh. Their God promised to nourish and
protect them and the Pharaoh would supply furnish for a flat twenty percent of the crop "on fifths" as a Delta cropper might phrase it. All three of the communities provided a
twentieth century parallel to the Land of Goshen, each of them offered a place of refuge
and a chance to achieve a life, if not of surfeit, at least of subsistence. The twentieth

7
century Goshens at Tupelo, Dyess, and Hill House held at least one attribute in common
with the Egyptian model, "every form of refuge has its price."5
This dissertation argues that the clients of the three progressive depression-era
communities, although weak in economic and political power, abused by the elite and
their institutions, and oppressed in spirit and fearful of their futures were not mere foils;
they did not abandon their right and obligation to consider, judge, and act within the
limits that their circumstances allowed. The menu of choices available to the clients was
limited, but all the clients had choices and they exercised choices, and bore the
consequences, good and bad, of those choices. In the end, this study explores the
beginnings of the Federal government's rational assault on poverty. By 1932, a sense of
emergency and desperation permeated American economic and political thinking. The
apparent collapse of the industrial economy and credit markets created an environment in
which politicians allowed and the public demanded bold experimentation. The relatively
brief period, 1933-1937, in which most of America approved or tolerated progressive
notions, offered an opportunity for progressive experimentation. The various "wars" on
poverty since the Great Depression have been shaped, in part, by the first attempts of
liberal progressives to take advantage of the crises and opportunities of the Great
Depression.

Works of Paul Conkin and Donald Holley form the historiographical base for this
study. Conkin's masterful and authoritative Tomorrow A New World is a necessarily
brief administrative history of one hundred such New Deal communities. The scope of
5

Glenn Frye and Don Henley, "Lying Eyes," One of These Nights, Asylum Records
Benchmark Music/Kicking Bear Music, ASCAP, 1975.
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that work did not allow Conkin to consider individual communities from the perspective
of their clients, nor did his study consider efforts outside the New Deal. Donald Holley's
Uncle Sam's Farmers focuses more sharply on the creation, management, and
administration of Region VI (Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana) of the Resettlement
Administration (RA). Holley gives significant attention to Dyess Colony but he, like
Conkin, does not include a view from the clients. Uncle Sam's Farmers gives brief
administrative information concerning the Interior Department's Division of Subsistence
Housing (DSH) and in that exercise mentions the Tupelo Homesteads and highlights the
brief history of its sister project, The Eleanor Roosevelt (McComb, Mississippi)
Homesteads.6
There exists very little published scholarship on the Tupelo Homesteads and the
Delta Cooperative Farm. The paucity of published material on The Tupelo Homesteads
and the Delta Cooperative Farm combined with the broad and "top-down" view of the
scholarship of Conkin and Holley leaves room for consideration of these projects.
"Shadows Over Goshen" takes a more intimate look at these communities and pays
attention to the clients and their attitudes and actions.7
Each of the three communities drew its clients from the strata of lower and lowermiddle class whites. In two of the communities, theorists chose the clientele with
specific and assumed class differentiation as a primary qualifier. One project, Delta

6

Paul W. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1959). Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers: The New Deal
in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975).

7

Fred C. Smith, "The Tupelo Homesteads: New Deal Agrarian Experimentation,"
Journal of Mississippi History, 68, (2), (Summer 2006): 85-112. For a more complete
bibliography, see Chapter 6, footnote 7.
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Cooperative Farm, did not select clients; the dispossessed came because they had no
other choice.
Three depression-spawned communities, whether a part of or estranged from the
larger community, were products, to some degree, of the history of that larger
community. Even the one community that became an immediate town with an instant
history, Dyess Colony, drew on reservoirs of shared but sometimes divergent cultural
preferences and social mores. In two cases, Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm,
the peculiar economic and cultural constraints imposed by the Delta required that the
clients produce cotton. In the other community, the Tupelo Homesteads, the lack of such
crop and organization imperatives hastened the end of the experiment. The Tupelo
community was a product of the First New Deal; Dyess Colony, technically organized
under the aegis of the "first" New Deal, reorganized and operated under the "second"
New Deal. Delta Cooperative Farm, the last and most romantic-radical of all, was the
issue of the union of the Socialists and churchmen.
At Tupelo, according to historian Donald Holley, Mississippi's best example of a
New South city, lower middle-class whites who were providentially and temporarily in
straightened circumstances due to forces mostly beyond their control were invited to
place a portion of their personal sovereignty on the altar of cooperation as sacrifice in
exchange for a lower middle-class, life-long indenture. The New Deal offered middleclass white folks a chance to own a subsistence homestead.8
At Dyess, Arkansas, the Second New Deal offered a slightly reduced reward for
those who were willing to trade a measure of independence and a generous helping of

Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 54.
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deference for the security of life-long subsistence yeomanry. The Second New Deal
included in its objectives rehabilitation of the dispossessed, not merely their relief. The
$4.8 billion appropriation that funded the Works Progress Administration (WPA) also
funded, and by Executive Order established, a dedicated assault on rural poverty, the
Resettlement Administration (RA). The typical Colonist at the Dyess Colony, according
to the preferences of Second New Deal bosses, was demonstrably lower class - preferably
of the upper lower class. The "blanks" or forms used by the government men that
granted entrance to the colony endeavored to ensure that Dyess Colonists be among the
very best of the failures. If a prospective family survived the winnowing of blanks and
government men, they were assumed to be of a cooperative spirit. Dyess Colony offered
failed farmers a chance to own a subsistence farm.
At Delta Cooperative Farm, the alliance of Christians and Socialists received
those that would come; those who did were the most abjectly poor and terrified white and
black people in the country. The sacrifice demanded of the Cooperators was more
sacrificial; taxes and oblations are always most severe for the very poor.
The larger canvass - the more enthralling and problematic observation - is that of
the people who were the Homesteaders, the Colonists, the Cooperators. About 18 million
people lived in the non-urban South; of those 5.5 million whites and almost 3 million
African Americans cultivated someone else's land — mostly cotton land. Fully one-half
of the Southern farmers were tenant farmers; half of those tenants were sharecroppers.
This dissertation has the main eye on the dispossessed whites of the South. In literature
they are ignored, for the most part, in favor of white elites and black sharecroppers; they
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are almost invisible in the scholarly literature of the 1920s. Such literary attention as they
receive portrays them as degraded, pitiful, and amoral.9
Not all of the South's dispossessed whites were tenants, or even farmers. Some
who became tenants and cultivators as a function of the depression that began at least as
early as 1920 cultivated cotton or truck patches because it was their only option. Some
college educated, technically trained, and socially adept whites lost their middle-class
status with the disappearance of their middle-class jobs. While each community sought
to alleviate the depression in the lives of a distinct class strata and despite (sometimes)
wildly differing notions of governance and economic philosophy, they had some
attributes in common. All drew from a resume of progressive ideas, the most applicable
coming from the robust transfer of notions that Daniel T. Rogers has labeled, famously,
Atlantic Crossings. All three projects made agriculture their economic centerpiece, and
all three demanded "cooperation" or "cooperative spirit" as the primary qualifier for
inclusion. There were, of course, significant differences. All Homesteaders, Colonists,
and Cooperators bargained under the heavy duress of the Great Depression; their rescuers
applied a gentle and subtle duress in order to induce, cajole, convince the Homesteaders,
Colonists, and Cooperators to cooperate and prove the validity of the particular strain of
gospel preached by the bosses.
Chapter I is a consideration of the confluence of geography, society, and culture.
Chapter II identifies the strands of progressive social thought and economic theory and
the speculation that provided foundations for all three projects. Chapter III treats the
9

Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower
Mississippi Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 7-8; Paul E. Mertz, New
Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1978), 5-8;
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subsistence homesteads and the Homesteaders at Tupelo. Chapter IV examines the
construction and politics of Dyess Colony; Chapter V examines life at Dyess and the
choices available and those taken by the Colonists. Chapter VI is the story of America's
most radical and, perhaps, most promising of all the communitarian efforts. Chapter VII
is conclusion and application.
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CHAPTER I
AMERICAN GOSHEN
You shall dwell in the land of Goshen...
Also, do not be concernedfor your goods, for the best of the land of
Egypt is yours...
And at harvest you shall give a fifth to Pharaoh andfour-fifths shall be
your own...
And Joseph made it a statute concerning the land of Egypt valid to this
day, that Pharaoh should have the fifth... Genesis 45:10; 23-26 circa
2500 B.C.E.
The alluvial plain is, in an agricultural respect, one of the most
importantformations ...in all the southern states; nay, more than that,
even in the United States. ...it is still a wilderness; the prejudice of its
unfitness for cultivation has only lately subsided, and the axe of the
wood-man scarcely begun its ravages; but after the lapse of another
century, whatever the Delta of the Nile may have been, will only be a
shadow of what the alluvial plain of the Mississippi will then be. It will
be the central point—the garden spot of the North American continent where wealth and prosperity culminate. E.N. Lowe, Mississippi State
Geologist, 1857.1

By Inauguration Day 1933, the American agricultural depression was twelve
years old. The continuing decline of agricultural prices and the concentration of land into
ever-larger units of production, the absence of a robust foreign market, the tariffenhanced high prices for manufactured goods, the diluted political power of about half of
the rural white populace, and the practical absence of it among blacks posed peculiar
difficulties for the New Deal. Added to the fundamental economic problems, the
American mentalite of the 1920s had embraced the euphoria induced by prosperity.
Flappers, corporate welfare, roaring industrial production, time-purchase contracts, and

'Quoted: Robert L. Brandfon, Cotton Kingdom of the New South: A History of the Yazoo
Mississippi Delta from Reconstruction to the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967): 29.
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the coronation of business and businessmen had coalesced into a Modern Temper, the
"jazz age." By 4 March 1933, the United States had crossed that ill-defined psychoeconomic line that separated recurring American depressions or "panics" from a "Great"
one. By winter of 1932-33, the United States had crossed into an era of economic and
industrial malaise in which it seemed that market forces had abandoned the application of
the "unseen hand" of market and industrial rationality. President Herbert Hoover had
been remarkably aggressive, innovative, and daring in his attempt to assuage what had
become a worldwide conundrum. He had also been remarkably ineffective. The
distinction between "depression" and the Great Depression was not one of mere
semantics.

2

The realization that the depression of 1930 was no ordinary panic and that the
self-correcting attributes of modern capitalism showed little signs of applying a
correction goaded President Hoover into applying aggressive and unparalleled
government action. In spite of Hoover's fairly radical departure from economic
convention, Americans used his name as a mocking, bitter slogan; the depression was
still Hoovering around, empty pockets turned inside out were Hoover flags, old
newspapers used by park-bench sleepers were Hoover blankets. By the conventions of
the day and in accordance with traditional Republican notions of "normalcy," Hoover

2
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became increasingly aggressive and unorthodox as the aberrant nature of the Great
Depression became increasingly apparent and painful. Even as President Hoover
ratcheted up government intrusion into the economy, the Great Depression was
accelerating. In Europe and the Far East, the economic catastrophes made the political
economies of Germany, Italy, and Japan prone to nationalistic frenzy, military
aggrandizement, and a quest for autarchy. The "Dark Valley" through which the world's
people traveled resolved into world war and a decidedly more complicated world.3
The pace of Hoover's willingness to change his mind and insert the government
into business affairs did not keep pace with the ever-increasing realization of the extent
and magnitude of the Great Depression. Yet, some of the notions given fuller form in
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal had their origins in Hoover; some of the
ideas propagated by FDR were eerily similar in substance to those previously suggested
by the Great Engineer. Not only were the skeletons of some of the more radical New
Deal programs suggested and implemented by Hoover's administration, both men were
prone to issue non-sense nostrums in order to create or preserve confidence and instill
hope in the American psyche. "No one has actually starved," said Hoover, when in fact
New York hospitals affirmed that several had died of that malady. "One hobo got three
meals in one day," he noted, assuring Americans that things were not so bad as some
believed. When in December 1930, the International Apple Shipper's Association
decided to sell apples on credit to unemployed men, the now-famous depression era icon
of apple sellers appeared on city streets. Hoover interpreted this phenomena in a most
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positive manner. "Many people have left their jobs for the more profitable one of selling
apples," he said. Most notoriously, he announced that business conditions were
fundamentally sound in the wake of the disintegration of the American credit and
securities markets. Thaumaturgy comprised the bulk of Hoover's public pronouncements
about the depression, its depth, and prospects of recovery; recovery only needed the
restoration of confidence. Hoover's initiatives, many of them modified by the New Deal,
included the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC),
and the Federal Farm Board. The New Deal modified all three of the issues; securities
regulation, mortgage liquidity, and agricultural surpluses. Initially even President
Roosevelt seemed to mirror Hoover's faith in orthodox economic and social theory. FDR
promised to balance and to cut the national budget. He did that, in part, by reducing
servicemen's pensions. It is ironic that Hoover's refusal to accommodate the Bonus
Army and George Patton's attack on patriotic Americans, in FDR's opinion, sealed the
1932 presidential election for him. The new President was also prone to non sense
thaumaturgic statements. Addressing a hopeful but anxious nation, FDR told it that, "the
only thing we have to fear is fear itself," a misstatement of facts as enormous as any that
Hoover ever made. The difference was that the nation believed Roosevelt4
While the 1920s roared with the hum of increasing industrial production,
corporate profits fueled further efficiencies of production, and while much of America
reveled in the Zeitgeist of the jazz age, the scientists and technicians associated with
agricultural colleges, extension services, and experiment stations introduced hybrid seed,
4
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technology, and the scientific application of both. Just as in industry, agricultural
production increased dramatically while the labor required to produce it fell
precipitously. As Ogden Mills, Hoover, and Andrew Mellon presided over a spectacular
industrial boom and the initial phases of its even more spectacular decline, agribusiness
sought a way to restore the prosperity of American agriculture.5
The spectacular Wall Street crash, the dramatic tales of urban fear and poverty,
and the jeremiads of the popular press focused the attention of the nation on the Great
Depression as an urban and business phenomenon. For twelve years southern cotton
cultivators, tenants and small farmers, had been effectively ignored as the agricultural
depression methodically translated the small yeoman cotton farmer into landless cotton
cultivators. Only as the nation felt the intensity of a "great" depression did the
dispossessed of the South command the attention of politicians and policy makers. For
twelve years the agricultural depression had inexorably ground the expectations of the
great majority of agricultural workers and small farmers into ephemeral hopes. Hope
delayed, like justice, is often no hope at all. In the South, particularly in the old
Confederate states and specifically in the cotton-South, eight million destitute and docile
citizens, "half starved black and white" wrote Lorena Hickock, "struggle in competition
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for less to eat than my dog gets at home, for the privilege of living in huts that are
infinitely less comfortable than his kennel."
All three of the communities in this study were born of political desperation but in
two vastly different "cotton-south" economic environments. The Division of Subsistence
Homesteads (DSH) located the Tupelo Homesteads in a region that embraced New South
commerce and industry. Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm were bound both
mentally and economically to the Delta. The region's debilitating economic dependence
on 100-foot-deep topsoil and vulnerability to natural cataclysms moderated the limits of
radical experimentation. This chapter introduces the two distinct geo-economic
environments and the depression-induced desperation that allowed experimentation and
suggested that some people should modify their economic aspirations. Two of the
communities under consideration shared common geophysical and cultural environment;
that environment accounted for the location of the communities. The economy and
culture of Dyess and Delta were, in large measure, a function of a common geophysical
environment, that of the Great American Delta. Tupelo's development was more a
function of circumstance.

6
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Tupelo had grown from a village prior to the Civil War into a bustling little
regional cotton shipment center and mill-town by the 1930s. It was not particularly
favored in terms of natural resources over any of the other villages in northeast
Mississippi. An insignificant village at the end of the Civil War, the town grew as a
function of its relative location, situated about halfway between Birmingham and
Memphis and at the intersection of north-south and east-west railroads. By the onset of
the Great Depression, Tupelo was a minor manufacturing center and cotton depot for the
area and boasted a population of about 6,000. It owed its growth and development,
primarily, to its strategic location. It also had powerful advocates in the U.S. Congress
and Senate. The President depended on the support of Congressman John Rankin of
Tupelo and Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison (Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee) in accomplishing the New Deal legislation. Such cooperation, and an
attempt to reward it, may account for the surprisingly robust presence of the New Deal in
Mississippi. The New Deal came to Tupelo more emphatically, perhaps, than to any
other Mississippi city due to the influence and prestige of Mississippians, particularly that
of Pat Harrison. In addition to the Tupelo Homesteads, the Roosevelt administration
established the Natchez Trace Parkway, and most famously, made Tupelo the first city
served by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Tupelo's development was a function of
politics and location. Northeast Mississippi was typical of much of the inland South.
There were few grand vistas and the climate, while temperate, was neither particularly
brutal nor particularly pleasant; it was, in the vernacular, just tolerable. The landscape
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and conditions were moderate and unremarkable. The Tupelo Homesteaders did not have
to contend with the Delta. The Delta was different.8

From a geologic point of view, the Delta is new ground. The combined effects of
time, glaciations, and the meandering Mississippi River dug a gently sloping (toward the
south) and slightly tilted (to the east) basin. While the slope of the basin is gentle, the
declination from the bluffs that compass the Delta - Arkansas bluffs to the west, Missouri
bluffs to the north, and Mississippi bluffs to the east - to the basin floor is severe. For
millennia, the Mississippi River and a few of its tributaries have been filling in that basin
of almost 12.7 million acres; it is almost exactly the same size as the Mekong Delta of
Vietnam.9 The area drained by the Mississippi and its principal tributaries, the Ohio and
the Missouri, is huge - amounting to about 41 per cent of the area of the contiguous
states. Every year the runoff from this wide area made its way to the Mississippi River.
Just South of Cape Girardeau, the character of the Mississippi undergoes a significant
transition. There the river broadens, slows, and begins its section of writhing, twisting,
loops, turns, and bends; soil suitable for apples in northwest New York mingles with the
ground that supported corn in Iowa and wheat in Kansas and Montana. It is also where
the Delta begins.10
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Memories of the terrible flood of 1927 form contemporary consciousness of
Mississippi River flooding. Visions of pitiful, huddling masses; the efforts of an entire
nation to provide relief; and stories of heroism, mendacity, self-sacrifice, churlishness,
and despair remind that the river is a beast. It seems that the river lies in wait until it
draws people and money into its maws and then wages its awesome assault on humans
and their institutions. As recent phenomena and reactions to them suggest, contemporary
humans are wise to be afraid of the river.11
From the beginning it was not so. In spring, the river system began an elegant
ballet. When rain or snow fell in prodigious amounts and under very common
conditions, the river swelled and roared, its banks teeming and the water rolling, roiling,
roaring, riotously tearing off sections of its bank, snapping huge trees like match sticks
and creating whirlpools and counter-currents. As the Mississippi rose, it stalled the water
rushing from tributaries. The Arkansas, St. Francis, and Yazoo rivers, carrying flood-
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stage volumes and unable to relieve the pressure in the Mississippi River, imposed
similar constraints on their tributaries. Thus the Coldwater, Deer Creek, Little
Tallahatchie, L'Anguille, Big Sunflower, White, Tyronza, Bayou Bartholomew, Cache,
Bayou DeView, Black, Ouachita, Tensas, and hundreds of their own tributary creeks and
streams also roared and rolled, and roiled and finally, the climax! Nevertheless, these
pre-human encroachment eruptions were mild and gentle - floodwater inexorably made
its way to the lowest level - for the ecosystem was self-regulating. The low natural
levees did not crash in defeat at the pressure of a tumultuous flood; they merely
submitted to the inevitable. The flood flowed over the natural levees. The main rivers,
especially the Mississippi, had natural floodways and alternate courses for the water. The
rivers and streams relieved themselves by gently releasing water over the natural levees
formed by previous floods. As the water spread and covered the basin, it slowed, and as
it slowed, it laid deposits from the literal and ultimate "land bank" of continental
America. The larger and heavier sediment fell first, along the borders of the stream, the
lighter silt made its way toward the interior of the basin. When the water receded, the
land along the banks was higher and all the earth so covered was richer.
Moreover, the rivers moved. The Mississippi changed its channel and created
islands and ox-bow lakes. Within the bluff-ringed basin, the river moved east - sidled
west - and then started the whole process all over. In springtime flood, before man's
dramatic alteration of the environment, the Delta - from its northern extent in Missouri to
its termination in Concordia Parish, Louisiana - must have shimmered in the warm sun as

23
the rays reflected from the watery expanse, an inland sea. It may have been beautiful to
behold; no one knows.
Delta terrain is mirage inducing. The scoured-out basin, continually self-leveling,
and flat as the human eye can discern, is actually quite an undulating surface. When
rivers and streams changed their courses - as they moved laterally across the Delta - they
left sediments behind. The heavier sediments formed the natural levees and ridge lands,
making them quicker to dry and to produce. Unnoticed by the unaided eye, the Delta is
laced with ribbons of embankments, old levees, and abandoned creek banks; these raised
ribbons are arrayed parallel with the streams (or parallel with past streams), thus they run
(mostly) southeast throughout the Delta. In that portion of the Delta west of the
Mississippi River, the prevailing winds drove particles of loam against the barely
perceptible ridges and levees and formed sand ridges. Thus in the midst of the low Delta
basin one encounters oddities such as the Sikeston Ridge in Missouri. An even more
anomalous structure, Crowley's Ridge sliced diagonally across the Delta from Missouri
to Helena, Arkansas. Although most of the sand ridges of the Delta are located in
Missouri and Arkansas, Dogwood Ridge extending from Coahoma to Holmes County in
Mississippi, separates the flood plains of the Sunflower and Yazoo Rivers. This ridge,
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two to eight miles wide, is the only place in the Delta where the dogwood tree is
indigenous. Dogwoods are not flood tolerant and prefer well-drained soils. These
unexpected relatively high plateaus provide visual relief to the landscape and a dollop of
sandy loam soil different in nature to the alluvial soils of the rest of the Delta. On most
maps, these "fingers" of ridges and plateaus are shaded to note elevation; the Arkansas
and Missouri portions of the Delta appear to be less robust according to the shading
marking elevation. On U.S. continental maps, typically used as background for televised
weather reports, the physical expanse of the Great American Delta is apparent. The
shading allocated to the sand ridges of Arkansas and Missouri makes the color demarking
those counties less vibrant and robust.13
Delta Development
According to environmentalist Mikko Saikko, the subtle changes in topography
are profound: "elevational change of a couple of inches creates distinctively different
hydrologic conditions, soils, and biotic communities."14 The apparently flat Delta terrain
is actually composed of a series of gently sloping valleys. In some Delta "valleys," the
outlining parallel ridges might only be a few feet higher than the valley floor, and the
ridges miles distant. Thus, the valleys in the inner Delta resulted in a terrain that was
undulating, not bumpy. The valley sides, or "ridge lands," offered an advantage over the
valley bottoms. The ridges and the sloping sides were quicker to drain and dry, thus,
quicker to produce cotton. The soil was ineluctably rich loam and clays. In the interior
13
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of the Delta in the low-lying areas, the flood deposited its finest granules of agricultural
gold. In the nineteenth century, agriculturalists would call this rich lowland clay
"buckshot"; farmers since that time have cursed and praised it. Buckshot is rich but
aggravating. Its consistency when wet was almost like liquid paste and the mud was
aggressive; it tried to swallow whatever came near. In the drought of late summer
buckshot shattered into sharp-sided cracks and crevasses in the earth. One Arkansas folktale involves a farmer that claimed he lost two mules in one year. One of them drowned
in spring when he mired in the mud; the other one fell in a crack in August and had not
been heard from since, he said.15
Despite the hard times and financial difficulties, in the period 1890-1925, the
Delta population increased rapidly. Some of that growth was provoked by the enticing,
but not necessarily truthful, recruitment efforts by cotton barons.16 In December 1895,
E.P. Skene, Land Commissioner (presumably for the Illinois Central Railroad Company)
issued an impressive sales brochure. The company offered to sell Delta land in forty-acre
sections for as low as $7.00 an acre, with only 20 percent down and the rest financed over
six years at 6 percent annual interest. To make sure that prospective buyers understood
what a chance in a lifetime this sale represented, the brochure hastened to clear up some
misunderstandings. Mississippi Delta land was far superior in yield and profit to
15
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agricultural lands in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. In Iowa, average land cost was $23.52
per acre and each acre yielded crops worth an average of $6.85. In Illinois, the figures
were $38.65 and $7.85 respectively; in Indiana, they were $45.66 and $8.23. The
average land value in Mississippi was $17.21 and the average money product was $12.21
per acre. By this ratio, said Skene, the Illinois Central Land was easily worth $50.00 per
acre. The brochure quickly reminded that its land was located in the Yazoo Valley, an
area far more productive than any of the state averages, and this land could be obtained
for as little as $7.00 per acre. Skene warned that these conditions could not last.
"Mississippi will soon double or treble its population by the addition of thrifty,
industrious immigrants, possessed of some capital; the price of lands will then, no doubt,
increase to something like a real value."17
Other misinformation, thought Skene, needed correction. An Episcopal Bishop
"proved" by census information that the Mississippi Delta was healthier than Missouri,
Tennessee, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Illinois, Alabama, and Colorado.
Another Episcopalian averred, "As to malaria, that is more to be dreaded in a week on the
1ft

Hudson than in all our borders in a lifetime."10 If one needed wage work while starting
his crop operations, one could easily, said Skene, acquire work in one of the many area
sawmills. Good water was only a matter of driving a pipe about forty-five feet and the
taxes were expected to average about seven cents per acre. However, the most important
correction came toward the end of the brochure. "NO OVERFLOW (sic) from the
17
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Mississippi River need ever be feared, as the levees built and maintained by the State are
on the best approved system now known." 19 In the space of thirty-one pages Skene
demonstrated that unless one was rich and contented, one must be an idiot to ignore a
chance to buy the richest land in the world at an inconsequential price.
Other efforts to promote the Delta continued throughout the first quarter of the
twentieth century. The Southern Alluvial Land Association did not have land to sell.
The association's purpose was to "place on these lands desirable farmers and settlers."
In 1919, the association published its appeal for delta development. "The Call of the
Alluvial Empire" was a state-by-state expose of the Alluvial Empire, an area almost
exactly congruent with the Great American Delta. The Southern Alluvial Land
Association was a bit more sober than was E. P. Skene. By 1919, most people knew that
topsoil 100 feet deep is not necessarily a guarantee of perpetual fertility. A cotton plant's
root system can procure nutrients only to a depth of about seven inches. However, in the
Delta, those seven inches might be more than enough. F. D. Beneke, the association's
secretary, addressed that issue in his contribution:
Scientific data discloses that there is enough phosphorous in alluvial soil
to produce more than one hundred crops of cotton, nearly one hundred
crops of corn, and sixty to eighty years of other standard crops before
exhausting the present supply, and this from the first seven inches of soil.
Each succeeding inch yields sufficient additional supply for one to several
decades, according to the kind of crops raised. The money properly spent
for fertilizer alone on a northern farm would buy an alluvial farm.2
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Extolling the variety of commercial crops amenable to climate and soil, the association
was also quick to disabuse people of fear of malaria or of the river. With apologies to
T.P. Skene and his Episcopalian witnesses, there was considerably more malaria in the
Great American Delta than there was in the Hudson River Valley. Dr. William Kraus, in
his contribution to "The Call of the Alluvial Empire" was more measured in his report.
Drainage had dramatically reduced the incidence of malaria. In December of 1915, there
were 100 sick calls for malaria in Cross County, Arkansas; in December of 1916, there
were four. Civil Engineer L.L. Hidinger was also more moderate in his comments about
flood control, yet confident. "The levees have now been brought to a height above any
high water that has ever occurred and their width and thickness has been increased so that
today the levee system stands as a great earthen dam bordering each bank of the river and
capable of holding its own against the greatest floods."22
The development efforts of the Illinois Central Railroad and the Southern Alluvial
Land Association were directed at middling and prosperous white folks. One of the
testimonials in the Illinois Central brochure came from a farmer in Illinois who moved to
the Delta. He bought 1,540 acres for which he paid $38,500. He prospered.23
Despite the opportunity costs, there were ways in which plain folks might make a
place in the Delta. Desperate for labor to clear land, drain swamps, and raise cotton,
Delta planters offered opportunities for plain folks, especially black plain folks, to own
land. Often these acquisitive and commercially minded plain blacks sought areas close to
un-improved acreage. They were often able to obtain title to acreage by swapping their
22
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labor to the landlord in exchange for un-improved land. By 1910, blacks owned about
two-thirds of the farms in the Mississippi Delta; the improved acreage in those farms was
rniniscule.
Until the advent of the war-induced agricultural depression of the 1920s, plain
whites, for the most part, did not try to farm the Delta. They were and remained a
distinct minority. The depression revealed some of the horrible conditions and
impossible obstacles to attaining yeoman status in the South. In the course of the
agricultural depression and the Great Depression that succeeded it, Americans were urged
to adopt aspirations foreign to American ideology. Things changed rapidly after 1930,
conditions, ideas, and policies that were mysterious and vague to Delta cotton cultivators,
black and white, controlled and defined their lives. Pressures they did not understand and
forces over which they had no control increasingly determined the economic fate of the
plain whites of the Delta.
The New Deal came to the New South before it came to the cotton south. M.L.
Wilson's notion of subsistence gardening as a necessary component of income in support
a middle-class lifestyle, promised to remove the sting of reduced industrial wages. The
best and most orthodox of Wilson's decidedly unorthodox notions, the most successful of
any of the 100 New Deal agrarian communities, was in the Mississippi hill country about
six miles from Tupelo, Mississippi.

CHAPTER II
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER REVISTED - THE SEARCH
FOR A NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER
"Wearing away the prime of life in a country that can boast as many evils as hell
itself." Cousin to James Franklin Smith1
"But there are lots of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of them is
having the assurance of a competence, of a sufficient living, of a good life and good
neighbors. You boys have a mighty fine chance at that assured life." FDR, May
19342

In a paper presented to the American Historical Association in 1893, Frederick
Jackson Turner proclaimed the end of a definite era of American History; the American
frontier, he said, was closed. Parts of the Great American Delta were isolated and almost
as remote, in practical terms, as were areas noted for their frontier isolation. In the spring
of 1878, twelve years before the Superintendent of the Census revealed the data upon
which Turner built his thesis, James Franklin Smith of Coffeeville, MS, received a
remarkable letter. The letter was from his cousin who lived on a new farm along the Big
Sunflower River, about forty miles distant as the crow flies and the author offers
powerful testimony about the frontier isolation. "Cousin" complained of the lack of
society and conveniences. Living only about fifty miles from the Mississippi River,
Cousin found the conditions in the interior of the Delta as lonely and dangerous as those
confronting settlers on the western frontier. Despite such pockets of frontier-like
1
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isolation within the heartland, the frontier, said Turner, was closed and no longer
provided the safety valve and social opportunities that had formed the American
character. American society, his thesis implied, had to find new mechanisms for
•a

controlling and channeling excess people, energy, and ambitions.
The superintendent of the 1890 census noted that he could no longer find a
continuous line beyond which the population decreased to fewer than two per square
mile. Turner considered that fact and from it developed his widely known, often debated,
but influential frontier tittesis. Turner wrote, "The existence of an area of free land, its
continuous recession, and the advances of American settlement westward explain
American development." According to Turner, it was to the frontier that the American
intellect, " . . . owes its striking characteristics That coarseness and strength combined
with acuteness and acquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find
expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to
effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for
good and for evil, and with all that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom
- these are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the frontier."
In the 1920s and 1930s, economists, policy makers, and politicians saw evidence that the
economy of the United States indeed faced limits imposed by the disappearing frontier of
American industrial consumerism.4
3

Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, (New York: Holt,
RMnehart, and Winston, 1920). Mary Hamilton, Trials of the Earth: The Autobiography
of Mary Hamilton, Helen Davis Dick, ed., forward by Ellen Douglas, (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 1992): passim.
4

Ibid.

While some New Deal policy makers and activists sought to rationalize American
agriculture, others suggested modifications to traditional American notions of industrial
productivity and personal economic aspirations. As economists struggled with defining
parity and planning for an altered world-economy, many Americans began to reconsider
"back to the land" notions. Such willingness to modify and to reconsider were products
of the depression. Further justification for use of "great" to designate the depression
beginning in 1929 is the first consideration of this chapter.
In the decade 1919-1929, without an increase in the work force, industrial
productivity rose by over 100 percent; real income rose a comparatively scant twenty-two
percent. Industrialists struggled to find markets for the output of increasingly productive
facilities, while the work force producing this abundance, through the seduction of
advertising and the advent of time-purchase contracts, reached the limits of consumerism.
Soft demand for industrial goods actuated a severe reduction in employment and
dramatically reduced wages. In 1929, industrial wages in the United States averaged $25
($294) a week; by 1932 the average weekly industrial wage had fallen to $17 ($250).
Fully one fourth of the national work force was unemployed in 1932, and the heavily
industrial Midwest and Northeast experienced unemployment pockets as high as 90
percent.5
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Scholarly investigation of the Great Depression necessarily involves the
consideration of income and prices. Because of inflation, monetary policy, and myriad
other factors, a vast differential exists between the purchasing power of the 1933 dollar
and that of the twenty-first century. Consequently, repeated references to depression era
dollars often present problems in analysis. First, such references obscure the degree of
disparity that existed among different levels of wealth and poverty. For example, a $400
differential in 1933 is equivalent to a $6,222 differential in 2006 real dollars. A
difference in income of $6,222 per year among families in the sixty to seventy thousand
dollar range is significant but hardly catastrophic. A $400 differential among farm
families in 1933 meant that one family lived in poverty while the other enjoyed middle
class status. Secondly, the very degree of poverty or wealth is often understated by use of
depression era dollars as a means of comparison. The scholarly literature on the Great
Depression is filled with references to five-cent cotton and family incomes of $200 per
year. Such repeated references can easily induce a familiarity that, in itself, serves to
diminish appreciation of psychological, social, and political pressures. Familiarity with
the paucity of prices received and paid by the dispossessed is offset by a parallel in
consideration of the payments received by big time producers. As part of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) crop reduction campaign of 1933, the
Delta Pine and Land Company headquartered in Scott, Mississippi, received $114,800.
In 2006 dollars, this rich government dole translates to almost $1.8 million. To illustrate
this largess another way, consider: the 1933 AAA payment was large enough to purchase
seven farms the size of the one established at the Delta Cooperative Farm.6
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Industrialists looked longingly toward those foreign markets that had proven so
lucrative in the Great War and immediately thereafter. Unfortunately, for them,
revitalization of war-torn industries in Europe and the economic nationalism of
worldwide tariff policy served to close the foreign economic frontier for American
industries. Europe, still America's largest trading partner, no longer provided an allconsuming market for excess American production.
As the factories produced goods that Americans could neither consume at home
nor sell abroad, the mining industries also produced a surplus in search of a new frontier.
In 1923, U.S. coal concerns operated 9,331 commercial mines with an annual capacity of
970 million tons. The United States consumed its largest yearly amount of coal at the
height of World War 1-579 million tons. No market and no frontier demanded the
excesses of coal and other minerals produced by American mining productivity.8
Not only were American manufactures and extractions looking for a home,
agricultural products also needed a market. The "pull" of profitable wartime
opportunities and government inducements had resulted in a dramatic increase in
agricultural production. Farmers had brought marginal land into production, applied
technology with fertilizer, and taken advantage of the prices influenced by European warrelated shortages. The price of cotton, for example, had risen from thirteen-cents a pound
in 1913 to thirty-eight cents a pound in 1919.9
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Agricultural prices and incomes had decreased dramatically at the beginning of
the 1920s. The World War had imposed artificiality on the development of American
agriculture as American farmers greatly expanded production in order to meet wartime
demands of home and Allies. Between 1914 and 1919, wheat acreage increased from
about 48 million to over 75 million acres. With increased production and higher prices,
the cotton crop of 1919 brought a record $2 billion and gross farm income that year
reached $17 billion. Overall, with notable exceptions, particularly among the cotton
cultivators, farmers enjoyed a fairly comfortable existence during the five year halcyon
period.10
Conditions for agriculture changed quickly. By 1920, much earlier than for
manufacturing or mining, the loss of markets and the lack of a new economic frontier
clearly revealed that farmers produced more than the market could sustain. In the years
1919 -1929, the price of wheat fell from $2.19 a bushel to $1.04. Farm income fell from
16 % of national income in 1919 to 11.5 % by 1925, to 5.8 % in 1933. Farm cash
incomes fell from an aggregate of $10.3 billion in 1929, to $4.2 billion by 1933, a 60%
decline. By 1933, the average per capita net income for southern farmers, owners
included, ranged from a low of $89 in the black belt to $127 in the coastal plain. The per
capita income for Mississippians, for example, fell to $117. Few of the tenant farmers of
Arkansas and Mississippi had received any cash income since 1921. American policy
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makers and politicians did not use Turner's language of the closed frontier to describe the
economic landscape of the 1930s; many attributed difficulties to the vicissitudes of a
mature economy.11
Pre-New Deal Efforts to "Adjust" Agriculture
United States creditors curtailed loans to Europe at the end of the war, resulting in
lost markets for basic agricultural products. Between 1919 and 1922, the value of U.S.
agricultural exports declined by more than half, from $4.1 billion to $1.8 billion. The
U.S. tariff policy further compounded the problems for American agriculture. Following
accepted protectionist economic policy, the Republican-controlled Congress raised tariffs
on imports, which further reduced the ability of foreign nations to pay for American
agricultural exports while protecting American industrial production from competition.
While foreign markets diminished, grains and meat from South America and Canada
entered the world market in significant quantities. The U.S. Government withdrew
agricultural wartime price supports in 1919-1920; when prices began to fall in 1920, no
mechanism existed to cushion the shock.12
As early as 1920, the farm bloc, a group of Congressmen unofficially led by
Republican Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, voiced support for some sort of
price-equalization machinery. One Iowan explained to Norris that Congress ought to
n
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guarantee farmers, "a reasonable profit, and fair return on everything they produced." A
Des Moines lawyer urged Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace to "see to it that
minimum prices were set at the cost of production plus a fair profit."
In the winter of 1922, Wallace convened a conference concerning the
maladjustment of agricultural and industrial prices. George N. Peek, president of the
Moline Plow Company and later an official under New Deal Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace, suggested that a "fair exchange value" be placed on agricultural
products. Peek defined "fair exchange value," a term translated into popular jargon as
"parity," as "one which bears the same ratio to the current general price index as a tenyear average crop price bore to the average price index for the same period." In 1922,
wheat sold for $1.02 a bushel; according to Peek's calculations, the "fair exchange value"
or "parity" price would be $1.60 a bushel.14
Peek's calculations represented a synthesis of the 1922 general price index of 152
and an agricultural price index of 97. The agricultural price index came from USDA
Bulletin 999, Prices of Farm Products in the United States by George F. Warren.
Concurrently with USDA Bulletin 999, the Department of Agriculture commenced
publication of a power index series in Weather, Crops, and Markets. Utilizing a
synthesis of Warren, Peek, and Weather, Crops, and Markets, USDA economists chose
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the average of prices paid and received during the years 1910-1914 as the baseline, or
100.15
Using this new statistical tool, representatives from agricultural states attempted
to fix farm markets by legislation. The McNary-Haugen Bill, first introduced in 1923,
represented an attempt to adjust agricultural pricing by using direct governmental
interference in the market as a "normalizing" influence. In some ways, the McNaryHaugen Bill of 1923 foreshadowed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Both
measures offered relief in terms of surplus reduction, loans, and price insurance, and both
attracted the support of the liberal/progressive elements of Congress and the vacillating
support of farm-state conservatives. Both plans benefited prosperous and middle-class
farm interests at the expense of tenants and agricultural laborers.
One principal difference was the manner in which the legislation proposed to
treat the agricultural surplus. The McNary-Haugen Bill proposed to establish a parity
price in the U.S. market by "dumping" the surplus abroad. The government would
purchase all agricultural production in excess of that which insured a domestic parity
price. In turn, the government would sell this surplus on the international market at
whatever price it brought. The differential between what the government paid and
15
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received was to be recovered by imposing an equalization fee on producers. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act proposed to reduce the amount of surplus by invoking a
domestic allotment plan. While the Agricultural Adjustment Act reduced the surplus by
controlling production, McNary-Haugen allowed unabated production. The McNaryHaugen Bill met defeat in three consecutive congresses before it passed and twice fell to
President Calvin Coolidge's veto.16
Deep South legislators gave McNary-Haugen tepid support, at best, throughout its
life. Although they represented agricultural states, they also represented, above all, the
interests of prosperous agrarians. Even in the midst of deepening financial distress
experienced by a majority of their constituents, they remained conservative Democrats.
Unmoved by the progressivism of Republican Senators Robert La Follette of Wisconsin
or George Norris of Nebraska, they focused primarily on reducing tariffs and
safeguarding the well-being of commercial farmers. In 1933, FDR called for the support
and leadership of these southern representatives but found that the deepening economic
crises moved them only to lukewarm and temporary support for New Deal initiatives.
They still championed the cause of the prosperous and middle-class farmer at the expense
of the dispossessed cotton cultivators and their views eventually dominated the goals and
methods of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
As Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed office in March 1933, amidst a wholesale
and universally acknowledged depression, there already existed concepts and tools
designed to rectify the imbalance in the relationship between agricultural and industrial
prices. The phrase "mature economy" became a sort of verbal shorthand for the
economic implications of Turner's closed frontier thesis. Specifically, conservatives
16
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promoted the "confidence thesis," and New Dealers argued the validity of the
"purchasing power thesis." New Dealers and progressives argued that the government
had to replace the opportunities and stimuli for growth formerly provided by the frontier.
The new economic frontier, they believed, lay in the area of increased consumerism
prompted by a higher standard of living characterized by Columbia professor and "Brains
Truster" Rexford G. Tugwell as a "pleasure economy." Mal-distribution of wealth,
disparity in buying power between industrial and agricultural workers, and irrational land
usage sprang directly from the closing of foreign markets, the saturation of the American
consumer, and the absence of the promise of radical new consumer oriented technology,
1*7

m short, the fruits of a closed frontier.
In the course of the debate, policy makers explored both derivatives and
negations of the closed frontier thesis. Herbert Hoover saw the promise of a new
economic frontier in the thaumaturgic contributions of science and engineering, an
articulation of the confidence thesis. He believed that capital needed only the tools and
products promised by an unrestrained application of science and technology. He found
allies. At the center of one New Deal agency, the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration (AAA), two Mississippi cotton barons designed the programs that
inflicted devastating oppression on the nation's cotton cultivators. Oscar Goodbar
17
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Johnston, manager of Delta Pine and Land Company, and Cully Alton Cobb, agricultural
publisher and one-time Deputy Director of the Mississippi State Agricultural Extension
Service, ensured that the AAA worked to rationalize cotton production to the benefit of
•

10

large planters and to some members of the American Farm Bureau Federation.
The term "parity" and the notion of rationalization of agricultural prices became
part and parcel of the New Deal's farm policy. By 1933, politicians and policy makers
subsumed the technical nature of the statistical term "parity" into a politically correct and
virtuous sounding aspiration. Politicians and government bureaucrats used the term to
sell the notion of justice, fairness, and equity. The American people believed in all three
- provided that the imposition of such cost nothing. "Parity" cost a lot and it did not
impose justice, fairness, or equity.19
Back to the Land - Notions of Community
Commonly held assumptions concerning the superiority of country life and the
societal benefits of communal living formed part of the intellectual background to the
Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and the Delta Cooperative Farm. In spite of a
18
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transition from frontier subsistence survival to urban-centered market capitalism,
American ideology retained an articulated preference for the character and values that
necessarily come from the country. Benjamin Franklin held that as societies aged they
became corrupt. To Franklin, an urban and industrialized society marked full maturity
and the apex of corruption; according to Franklin, maturation was prelude to destruction.
Thomas Jefferson believed that a virtuous society required a dominant class of unencumbered yeoman farmers. These yeoman farmers, Jefferson thought, were — alone of
all classes - able to act and govern according to the dictates of a free and disinterested
conscience; wage laborers would necessarily be bound by the political, social, and moral
preferences of employers. President Theodore Roosevelt added enthusiasm for outdoor
and rural life, manifested by the Country Life Movement. In 1933, President Franklin
Roosevelt echoed the same sentiments in attributing to country life both the benefits of
peace of mind and the opportunity to gain a "competence." In August of 1933, in an
impromptu speech to residents of a vocational farm for boys, FDR articulated part of his
notions:
More and more people are discovering that if they go to
live on a farm they will never starve to death, while they
may if they remain in the city. Of course, in the city they
have a chance of becoming milUonaires. But there are lots
of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of
them is having the assurance of a competence, of a
sufficient living, of a good life and good neighbors. You
boys have a mighty fine chance at that assured life.20
20
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Indeed, American politicians often invoked the hope-laden properties of the
yeoman farmer mythology. In 1936, after demonstrating a decided animosity toward
thousands of evicted sharecroppers, Arkansas Governor Junius Marion Futrell opened the
newly-created Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission with a statement of faith in farm life.
Farm ownership, he said, "will give our country more real protection against foreign
invasion and conquest than the expenditures of millions on our armies and navies." Fully
concurring with those sentiments, the Commission responded, "Farming is a special
pursuit fundamentally different from all others . . . a way of life all its o w n . . . Farmhome ownership is definitely related to character and patriotism. It is conducive to high
character and good citizenship . . . America will not be a great nation by the end of the
century unless she preserves a healthy rural life."21
Politicians and policy makers of the depression years considered benefits accruing
to individual farm owners less important than the preservation of American agricultural
capitalism. Private ownership precluded evicted sharecroppers and destitute hardscrabble
farmers from joining the ranks of leftist movements. According to the then current
doctrine, "no property owner could become a Communist." The Farm Security
Administration (FSA), stepparent to the Tupelo Homesteads, gained the support of
otherwise conservative politicians who believed that a government-sponsored program of
small farm ownership diminished the attractiveness and, thus, the effectiveness of such
groups as the Communist-led Sharecroppers Union and the Southern Tenant Farmers'
21
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Union, an adjunct of the Socialist Party of America (SPA). Indeed, the legislation that
established the Farm Security Administration (FSA, 1937) also prohibited government
sponsorship or cooperation with any future community or collective/cooperative projects.
Notions of cooperative farming distressed large commercial interests and alarmed the
potentially prosperous clientele represented by the American Farm Bureau. Even the
radical Midwest farm interests, represented by such groups as the National Farmers'
Union and the Farm Holiday Association, which encouraged federal management of
agricultural pricing, maintained a rigid orthodoxy relative to individual farm ownership.
Traditional American farm interests saw communal, cooperative, or collective farm
experiments as a challenge to their prosperity and posterity. Landowning farmers prized
their independence and they saw collective agriculture as a threat to mamtaining such
independence.22
Nevertheless, prior to the complete dominance of the market over the subsistence
economy and before the closing of the frontier deprived un-landed farmers of
opportunity, some Americans had already embraced the notions of communal efforts,
communities, cooperatives, and collectives. Agriculture had often, but not always, been
the focus of such movements.
Communities included particular religious, ethical, or ethnic preferences. In the
1820s, '30s, and '40s, communitarians established dozens of communities throughout the
United States stretching from New England to Utah. Motivations for removal and
community sprang from such disparate sources as revolt against the slave-like working
conditions extant in English-style New England textile factories to the discovery of
golden tablets at Hill Cumorah in New York. The movement continued throughout the
22
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nineteenth and into the twentieth century. In addition to the Mormon settlement in Utah,
one which M.L. Wilson studied with great interest, in 1892 the Jewish Agricultural and
Industrial Aid Society (Jewish Agricultural Society) established a community in
Woodbine, New Jersey, remarkably similar to ones later constructed by the New Deal
some four decades later. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), known popularly
as "Wobblies," experimented with collective farming, adding a twentieth-century element
to the agrarian socialist experimentation of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier.
Interestingly, very few communitarian projects were established for economic or basic
subsistence reasons. Most communities were formed in an attempt to provide a tolerant
atmosphere for experimentation in human relationships or for millennial considerations.23
Meanwhile, the government also periodically expressed its interest in private
agriculture by enacting several land acquisition programs. The Land Act (1820), the
Preemption Act (1841), the Homestead Act (1862), and the Farm Loan Act (1916) were
all efforts to ease land hunger. The consistent removal of Native Americans from
vouchsafed land was further testament to the government's pragmatic response to white
land-acquisitiveness.
Given the history of Americans' fascination with agrarian experimentation
evidenced by the various communities and government land disposition policies, it is
easy to understand how the ravages of the Great Depression served to make more
seductive than ever notions of "back to the land." In 1932, for the first and only time in
23
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American history, population movement favored the country over the city. Rural
population growth exceeded that of urban growth by more than 266,000. This change in
population velocity, admittedly very small, nevertheless, was an indication of the power
of the notion. For some people, "back to the land" was verbal shorthand for romanticized
visions of rural life. For city dwellers, the nostalgic meditations on clean air, unhurried
life, simple pleasures, and self-determination built a place of mental refuge amidst the
crumbling economic infrastructure of the city. Many prodigals returned to the rural areas
of their youth and found that the imagined and incorrectly remembered benefits of
country life no longer existed, or that their memories omitted some of the basic reasons
for having left the country in the first place.24
Progressive Notions of Cooperation -Atlantic Crossings
Daniel T. Rodgers, in his masterful study of the transference of social politics
among North Atlantic progressives via Atlantic Crossings, says that U.S. progressives
were slow to consider the problem of American agriculture:
Old forms of poverty never interested progressives as much as the new
domain of wage labor, old forms of trade as much as the outward rush of
market commodification, old forms of production as much as the new
world of concentrated force and massed economic power. The diffuse and
tradition-bound populations of the great rural hinterlands did not, in the
first instance, draw their attention at all.25
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century Grange, Agricultural Wheel, and the
Farmer's Alliance in the U.S. were manifestations of the "Atlantic Crossings" of
24
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progressive notions. Although turn of the century progressives were, as a group, slow
and moderate in their pursuit of rural reforms, the example that tiny Denmark provided,
along with the apparent redemption of Irish agriculture by means of cooperation and
cooperative associations, excited American rural reformers and agrarians. In 1908,
American retail mogul and only recently a California produce baron, David Luben,
convinced the King of Italy to sponsor the first international agricultural database, Intuit
International D 'Agriculture (International Agricultural Institute) in Rome. By 1935,
according to the Institute, the United States still ranked number one and Texas number
two in worldwide rankings of cotton lint production, but the United States' dominant
position was becoming ever more tenuous. In that year the Great American Delta ranked
only sixth in world cotton production rankings, lagging behind Egypt, India, and Peru.
Rexford G. Tugwell, a disciple of Simon Nelson Patten of the Wharton School at
the University of Pennsylvania, also drew heavily from the notions of his Columbia
colleague John Dewey. Patten, a German trained economist, was decidedly hostile to
classical economics. He told his students that they should not worry about savings, that
they should in fact spend every penny and borrow in order to spend more. Possibly his
advice was meant for the shock value, but it contained a slice of what would later be
labeled "Keynesian economics." Patten was probably emphasizing the point that a
continuous circulation and growth of the money supply was central to high employment,
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thus high consumption, thus a healthy economy. The pragmatism of John Dewey
influenced bom Tugwell and Milburn L. Wilson.27
Two adherents of the notion that the new economic frontier had to come from an
increased standard of living, characterized by a shorter working day and the advantages
of a pleasure economy, articulated and defended the notions that directly resulted in the
creation of the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony. Milburn L. Wilson, an
agricultural economist from Montana State University, and Rexford G. Tugwell believed
in a planned economy, and especially planned land use.
According to Tugwell, an essential component of a rationalized economy was the
decentralization of industry. Tugwell was not enamored of subsistence gardening and
farming; he viewed farm life as physically harmful, culturally deprived, and intellectually
barren. He championed the rapid mechanization of agriculture and the ever diminishing
labor required. Tugwell called for planned land use as part of the girders for erecting
what his mentor, Simon Patten, had labeled a "pleasure economy." The aggregate wealth
of the world was sufficient, if properly distributed and managed, to provide an economy
bereft of egregiously distasteful and laborious tasks; the pleasure economy envisioned by
Patten and Tugwell sharply reduced time required to earn a comfortable livelihood.
People would be free to devote their increased personal time to community and personal
development. Creation of the pleasure economy required a few prerequisite changes in
the political economy. Complete transparency in terms of markets and resources must
govern economic decisions. Companies and institutions would share information and
27
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many of the restrictions governing the operation of monopolies would be discarded. A
rational economy, one that provided dignified and pleasurable economic pursuits to
everyone, required planning. Planning, to Tugwell and his colleagues did not mean
simple orderliness in the application of resources to tasks. Planning in this economic
sense meant that the entire inventory of the world's assets be employed by economic
technicians with access to a comprehensive knowledge of total resources, both physical
and human, and the authority to install mandatory macroeconomic procedures governing
the global economy and its markets. It was decidedly irrational in Tugwell's view, for
example, for a radio manufacturer to schedule production for a factory without first
knowing the size of the market and the resources and intentions of his competitors. Such
application of resources by sheer instinct to meet a market demand, shrouded in mystery
and subject to disruption by competition, was tantamount to betting against the house.
Irrational economic behavior resulted in surpluses and shortages, roaring industrial
production and factories in mothballs; irrational capitalism allowed and even predestined
depressions.29
Tugwell did not expect that the world wide "pleasure economy" would become a
reality within the foreseeable future. The Columbia professor believed that mankind was
unable to accept the realities necessary for a pleasure economy; the changes would not be
accepted, they would have to be mandated. People must experience the benefits of
economic and social cooperation in order to be willing to sacrifice that degree of personal
autonomy necessary for a cooperative society. He saw no indication that the world's
various political entities were willing to place their economic systems, and thus, their
29
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community and society, at the disposal of a few planners. Tugwell s system was
necessarily socialistic, and equally as necessarily non-Marxist People would never
cooperate to the extent necessary; they would have to be coerced.
There were some prerequisites to forming a pleasure economy that
contemporaries would accept. His application of Columbia colleague John Dewey's
philosophy of pragmatism allowed Tugwell to accept and use programs that would have
been disowned by the managers of a pleasure economy. Tugwell believed that
decentralization of industries would remove many of the problems associated with the
densely populated urban industrial centers. By moving industrial production to smaller
communities, workers living on plots large enough to establish gardening and some
animal husbandry would be able to bridge the income gap caused by reduced hours.
Subsistence gardening or farming became analogous to one of the theses in classic
Marxist dialectics. It would serve a utilitarian purpose until its antithesis was called into
existence. The Homestead subsistence gardening projects, the subsistence farm projects
of the state Rural Rehabilitation Corporations, Dyess Colony, and the entirety of the
Resettlement Administration program were, in Tugwell's view, practical concessions
demanded by the spirit of the age and the mind of the times. Dyess Colony, the Tupelo
Homesteads and the Resettlement Administration were exercises in the application of
pragmatism. The Great Depression opened a brief window for experimentation. How far
could the mentalite of the Great Depression accommodate prerequisites for a pleasure
economy? Perhaps the Colonists at Dyess, the Resettlement clients of the RA, and the
Tupelo Homesteaders might provide useful sociological data for future planning.
Tugwell was adamant that willingness and skill in cooperating were mandatory
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prerequisites for further rational economic planning. He was equally sure that that
contemporary people would not willingly cooperate; cooperation must be induced,
coerced. It would come only with the application of duress.
Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony were laboratories wherein to test the
resistance to cooperation. Oddly, Delta Cooperative Farm emphasized cooperation more
emphatically and was less sensitive to personal dignity than did either of the New Deal
communities. The Christians and the socialists, it seemed, held a lower notion of the
dignity of man than did the New Dealers.
M.L. Wilson was not as convinced as Tugwell that the future course of the
American economy would require a reduced workday, nor was he confident that the
economic nationalism in vogue as a response to the depression was a permanent
alteration. He did believe that American agriculture suffered from decidedly irrational
land usage and that subsistence agriculture was a likely cure to shrinking incomes and
inadequate diets. M.L. Wilson was devoted to subsistence gardening and subsistence
farms, and enamored of rural life. 31
Pragmatism held, among many other notions, that one should plan and alter
institutions and mores to fit the circumstances at hand. MX. Wilson adhered to this
notion of pragmatism but added to it a rather strong insistence that the pragmatic actions
and policies designed to fit the contemporary political economy could not and should not
be mandated or heavily influenced by governmental or institutional authorities. Wilson
30
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believed that the benefits of alterations in policies and institutions should be explained to
the public. Institution of such changes had to gain not only the approval of the majority,
but required their active involvement. Wilson was a pragmatist, an advocate of
pragmatic planning, but he was above all a democrat. He was leery of the possible
restriction of liberty as a function of planning. He insisted that American society:
Is capable of producing a kind of supergovernmental (sic) economic and
social intelligence which (sic) can function in harmony with our
democratic heritage and attitude of mind.32
Wilson came into conflict with Interior Secretary Harold Ickes over this very issue.
Wilson designed the construction procedures of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads
(DSH) to use local and democratic control. Ickes objected and was relieved when
Comptroller General John R. McCarl mandated compliance with government mandated
controls. Lawrence Westbrook, an assistant to Harry Hopkins in both the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration and the Works Progress Administrations, sought to
establish cooperative manufacturing businesses in the three communities in which he
held a consultant's position.
The views of Wilson, Tugwell, and Westbrook, all influenced by European
models and pragmatism are evidenced to some degree in all three of the communities in
this study. Tugwell expected that, due to the enormous strain on city populations,
industry would de-centralize. He expected component parts to be constructed in various
small town or even rural locations. Westbrook believed that such decentralization was
unlikely and he had doubts about the ability of subsistence farming or homesteading to
32
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provide a middle-class income. M.L. Wilson was a champion of subsistence gardening
and insistent on local and client control. Tugwell, Wilson and Westbrook felt
cooperative associations were essential for success and the emphasis on such at Dyess
Colony was a source of conflict and irritation throughout the colony's existence.
The European model relied on a three-legged structure for reestablishing and
maintaining a vibrant and prosperous country life. The application of practical education,
good business, and community cooperation had rescued Denmark from the devastation of
the 1870s. With the loss of her southern provinces through war and the devastation of
grain crops because of drought, Danish farmers faced extinction. Their rescue came via
an overlapping network of producer cooperatives. Individual small operators were able
to profit from economic leverage and management. Cooperative cows came with a
record of input and output; instead of being left free to graze at will, the cooperative cow
was tethered to a carefully selected grazing area; and high quality eggs and dairy products
provided an enviable standard of living. Much of the initial inspiration of Miles Horton's
Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee and Commonwealth College in Mena,
Arkansas came from the Danish Folk School Model. The successful Danish and Irish
cooperatives served as a model for U.S. agrarian cooperatives, manifested in such diverse
institutions as grain elevators in the mid-west and agricultural marketing cooperatives.
By the 1930s, cooperatives marketed most of the American tobacco crop and much of the
cotton. In the western grain and dairy regions of the United States marketing
cooperatives enabled the mainly family-sized farm operators to gain the market power
that comes with leverage. In California and especially in the Southeast cotton areas, agribusiness conglomerates and the cotton aristocracy dominated production. In a perversion
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of the spirit of the European cooperative notion, in the South cotton barons formed
marketing cooperatives consisting only of large producers. The vast majority of southern
cotton cultivators were bereft of the benefits of cooperative education.34
Another divide between the Northern Atlantic progressive notions and their
continental cousins is illustrated by the concept of cooperation. In the United States,
southern cotton barons restricted the term to economic consolidation - the power of the
elites to magnify their economic power. In Denmark and Ireland, the notion of
cooperation certainly included economic endeavors, but it also embraced the idea of a
more sociable and supporting society/community. From these notions, for example,
emerged the Llano Colony and the Highlander Folk School. In all three of the projects
discussed herein, New Dealers, Churchmen, and Socialists sought to bring not only the
economic benefits of producer and consumer cooperatives to Dyess and Delta
Cooperative Farm, but also to encourage the flowing of a cooperative spirit. Such
cooperative spirits would counteract the stark and barren social lives of rural southerners.
The New Dealers, Churchmen, and Socialists all agreed that the single most important
characteristic for a potential Colonist, Cooperator, or even a Homesteader - in Tupelo
there was no common economic endeavor - was a "cooperative attitude."
Concepts that gave birth to the Tupelo Homesteads and ideation made into
physical reality in Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm thus did not spring
suddenly into existence as an attempt to mitigate the Great Depression. Notions of "back
to the land" and the advantages of community living had circulated consistently between
34
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the times of Jefferson and Roosevelt, and among the North Atlantic progressives. The
communities constructed by the New Deal continued the American flirtation with "back
to the land" ideation.
Congressional Consistency and the Dispossessed
At the beginning of the New Deal, FDR had little problem in gaining bipartisan
support for legislation proposed in the first hundred days. Not surprisingly, however, one
bill that encountered some difficulty and delay was the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The
inability of farm interests to present a united front predated the New Deal. The McNaryHaugen bills suffered from the conflicting notions of how to compute equalization fees.
A wheat farmer on the very edge of the cultivable arid West thought it fair and reasonable
to assess fees based on production; farmers in more productive areas deemed it obvious
to assess on the basis of acreage. Wisconsin dairy farmers, dealing in highly perishable
commodities, had altogether different concerns than those who raised cotton or corn.
Farmers who produced mainly for export faced different problems from those who
produced primarily for domestic consumption. Each new version of the McNary-Haugen
bill had highlighted different provisions and benefited particular farmers at the expense of
others. Consequently, one year's congressional proponent of the legislation became the
next year's opponent. The farm bloc failed to achieve cohesion because of the disparate
interests of those it represented. Significantly, however, in none of the versions did the
bill attempt to assist tenant farmers or agricultural laborers.36
Similarly, New Deal efforts to adjust agricultural incomes fell victim to
particularism. Any New Deal programs that encouraged a form of farm production at
variance with that preferred by the interests represented by the American Farm Bureau
36
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and agribusinesses quickly faced obstacles. For example, when the Farm Security
Administration (FSA) entertained notions of land held in perpetuity by the federal
government and leased to tenant farmers, heretofore supportive Congressmen became
belligerent opponents. In the view of their middle-class and prosperous agricultural
constituents, government ownership threatened both private property rights and the
prospect of acquisition of new land, at attractive prices, from under-funded, undereducated, under-privileged, and under-represented newly-propertied small farmers.
Distribution of small parcels of land to individuals had always provided opportunities for
the prosperous to accumulate large amounts of property at the expense of small operators.
In many cases, the amount of land distributed was too small for the "diy-farming"
techniques required in the West. It soon became apparent that agriculture in the arid west
had to be conducted on a bonanza scale in order to be profitable. Bonanza farming
required that the newly enfranchised have access to capital; most of them did not. Unable
to farm enough acres to gain the economies of scale, unable to secure affordable
financing, and suffering from discriminatory freight and storage rates, these newlypropertied small farmers often had no choice but to sell to better financed interests. To
avoid concentration of newly awarded lands in the hands of large agricultural interests,
various New Deal programs attempted the sell the notion of land held in perpetuity by the
government and farmed by qualified tenants on a life-tenancy basis. Deep-South
Congressmen vigorously opposed such legislation. They demanded occupancy feesimple, which meant, of course, that any recipient of government land grants would be
free to sell to better-financed, large land interests.37
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Congressional support for New Deal agricultural readjustment plans also waned
whenever such programs materially and substantially offered to assist those on the
bottom of the agricultural ladder, specifically, farm laborers, sharecroppers and tenants.
After all, said Arkansas Governor Futrell, you couldn't do much for "worthless people
who can't be helped." For the most part, the terms "tenant farmer" or "sharecropper"
were practically meaningless to the cotton cultivators of the Great American Delta.
However, under the provisions of the 1934 AAA producer contract, the distinction
between "sharecropper" and tenant farmer became crucial. A tenant farmer had rights to
a portion of the spoils paid under the crop reduction contracts; a sharecropper had none.
To garner all of the payments from the AAA, many planters manipulated the status of
their tenant farmers to that of sharecroppers. When asked to comment on the Arkansas
Farm Tenancy Commission, Mississippi Governor Hugh White said he did not want to
burden the Mississippi Legislature with the issue. Mississippi, he said, did not have those
kind of problems.
It is interesting to note that Congress had little difficulty accepting the notion that
farmers ought to get "parity" because it was a fair recompense for hard work. They
"deserved" to have a certain quality of life. However, sharecroppers, said an Arkansas
deputy sheriff, ought to be satisfied with their condition; they got what their work was
worth.39
Many planners and policy makers envisioned a radically altered American
economic system and they planned for it. This chapter has examined the development of
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the American agricultural allotment plan and the economic and cultural theories that
shaped all three of the communities under study.
Before the programs of the AAA actuated the creation of the Delta and
Providence Cooperative Farms, and before the FSA introduced the notion of permanent
tenancy, a new agrarian experiment began in Tupelo, Mississippi. Oddly, this project
sprang not from the mechanisms of the Agricultural Adjustment Act but from the
president's initial attempt to rescue industry, the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA)ofl933.
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CHAPTER i n
TUPELO HOMESTEADS - A SHELTER IN THE STORM
"But there are lots of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of them is
having the assurance of a competence, of a sufficient living, of a good life and good
neighbors." FranklinD. Roosevelt1
"I remember that during those days you couldn 't hire a decent carpenter in Tupelo, we
had all of them workingfor us." David O. Puckett, Jr., Tupelo Lumber Company2
"Mr. Anthony is, I believe, a warm blooded southerner, native to this region, and a
firm believer in individual rights, andfrom his attitude I knew he resented being asked
to stop his target practice." Claude A. Wagner, Jr., U.S. Park Service Ranger3
The Natchez Parkway meanders for more than 400 milesfromnear Natchez to
near Nashville. Along the way, travelers may stop and read about events of the
prehistoric and frontier history of the area. Interpretative signs point out locations of a
treaty signing by Native diplomats and immigrant warlords, a clash between Native
American nations and European empires, or just a popular "stand." Brochures and books
inform visitors of the age of warfare, banditry, whiskey, and murder. The dark history of
the Trace adds an intriguing stain to the romance and adventure. It is good that the public
has access to this well-maintained, well-researched, and well-articulated commentary.
However, undocumented and in the shadows, unheralded by signs and unnoticed by
travelers is a provocative and well-preserved physical testament - an artifact of an era not
so far gone - to an effort to assuage the consequences of, arguably, the greatest emotional
1
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and economic storm to assault the nation. For a brief while, some Tupelo people found
shelter from the storm in the Tupelo Homesteads.4
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH) initiated the first federal attempt
at agrarian community building. The DSH intended to help middle class people mitigate
the effects of the depression. Of the more than 100 agrarian communities funded by the
federal government, the one at Tupelo is the best example of the philosophy and failure
of the DSH projects.
Oddly, one of the first New Deal demonstrations in agrarian planning came not
from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, specifically enacted to further agrarian interests,
but within the National Industrial Recovery Act (NTRA). Franklin Delano Roosevelt
believed that part of the answer to industrial doldrums lay in a revitalized farm income.
As farm income grew, he reasoned, farmers would buy industrial products. His
experience as Governor of New York and his conversations with M. L. Wilson and
Rexford Tugwell convinced him that an entirely new class of producer/consumer could
speed industrial recovery. Industrial workers, and other wage earners, could greatly
increase their disposable income by growing a significant portion of their food on small
homesteads. FDR envisioned a new class of American consumer/producers coming from
urban congestion or from non-productive farms. They could go "back to the land" with
the assistance of the federal government and begin producing for their own needs while
buying the products of American industries. In April 1933, he wrote Republican Senator
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George Norris of Nebraska of his desire to have congress e n a c t " . . . one more bill which
would allow us to spend $25 million this year to put 25,000 families on farms at an
average cost of $1,000 per family."5 The President, as events clearly showed, was
abysmally wrong in his estimate of the cost of resettlement. The Subsistence Homesteads
concept appealed to Senator John H. Bankhead and on 9 March 1933, Bankhead
introduced a bill to establish a national subsistence homestead program. Despite support
from the President, the bill died in committee. Undeterred, Bankhead attached a
subsistence homesteads provision to the National Industrial Recovery Act. The
homesteads provision passed without discussion or opposition.6
Section 208, Title II of the NIRA, approved 16 June 1933, appropriated $25
million " . . . to provide for aiding the redistribution of the overabundance of population
in industrial centers" and granted the president authority to set up agencies for " . . .
making loans for and otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence homesteads."7 This
section of the NIRA represented the culmination and synthesis of several strands of
economic, social, and agrarian planning. Acting under authority granted in the act, FDR
assigned this project to Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes. Ickes, in turn,
established within his department the Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH), and
convened an advisory committee chaired by Senator Bankhead. The committee held its
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first meeting on 26 September 1933, and made a fifteen-point recommendation for use of
the appropriated funds. The first two recommendations are of particular interest in
conducting an evaluation of the Tupelo Homesteads. The first provision classified the
need for a Demonstration project as urgent. The projects were to . . . "point the way to a
program of a permanent character." They were to reconcile the problems of the
industrial worker and American agriculture with experimental projects; such
reconciliation w o u l d . . . "point the way out" The second provision of particular interest
called for the demonstration projects to be located in," . . . problem areas of the United
States and not on the basis of allocations of funds on the basis of States, the projects to be
selected... as to the individual soundness and merit."8
Simultaneously, another group of projects often identified with the DSH was
coming to fruition. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), under the
direction of Harry Hopkins, also began funding subsistence programs. Through
consolidation and creation of the Resettlement Administration (RA), the supervision of
all subsistence programs were eventually consolidated in the Agriculture Department's
Farm Security Administration (FSA). In April 1935, The RA assumed responsibility for
the previously existing FERA subsistence projects and those funded by Section 208 of
NIRA. Thus, the original DSH projects became identified with the much larger Rural
Rehabilitation projects. Because of such linkage and identification, the DSH programs
were later evaluated and criticized based on their perceived failure to meet criteria that
were not part of their origin or intent. Consequently, political opponents of the New Deal
criticized the DSH projects for failing to obtain objectives which they were not designed
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to meet; circumstances soon proved that the DSH had trouble enough of its own without
borrowing from other agencies. After the RA began its attempt to tackle the problem of
rural poverty, the DSH projects seemed to be non-productive and the residents seemed to
be beneficiaries of government largesse. Most of the homesteaders led lives
indistinguishable from their contemporaries; furthermore, the government had provided
the homesteaders with modern conveniences, tools, and equipment that their
contemporaries had to purchase. The DSH projects also suffered from identification with
the impulsive, impractical, ill-conceived, and wildly expensive Arthurdale, West
Virginia, project, introduced later in this chapter.
The New Deal legislation enacted in the spring of 1933 reflected the contradictory
notions about, and aspirations of, a revitalized agrarian community. Under the energetic
and imaginative Hopkins, FERA established a program of subsistence homesteads as a
part of its rural rehabilitation efforts. These programs were designed to help farmers who
already received relief by making them self-sufficient. In contrast, the earlier DSH
programs envisioned, with a very few exceptions, creation of a new economic entity that
combined wage employment with agriculture. The DSH required a particular type of
client. Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service
Committee and a proponent of DSH, briefly described the ideal client: "We must
experiment with those who share the idealism of the movement, who have the capacity to
respond to those ideals, who have a good deal of the pioneering spirit."9

Proceedings: National Conference on Subsistence Homesteads, Dayton Ohio (December
1933): 28. The movement to which Pickett referred was the conscious effort to stretch
the purchasing power of wage income by raising a large portion of food needs on the
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DSH regulations denied persons on relief rolls participation in the homesteads.
The application for a subsistence homestead required that the successful applicant: be an
American citizen; live in an industrial center; be over twenty-one years old; have an
income sufficient to meet homestead payments; and not have an income sufficient to
secure a loan for a home using normal channels.10 Because of two government agencies
serving dual clienteles but using the same terminology, the DSH projects later lost their
specific identification and became, in the mind of the public, simply another New Deal
welfare project. One exception proved the rule. The DSH approved a very limited
number of projects assisting impoverished farmers. However, the only project of this
type ever completed was at Richton, Mississippi. Other rural projects initiated by FERA
became identified with Richton because of the inclusion of the Rural Rehabilitation
Corporations (RRC) and DSH under the umbrella of the Resettlement Administration
(RA), created in 1935, under the direction of Rexford Tugwell. The Cumberland
Homesteads near Crossville, Tennessee, also provided assistance to those on relief rolls.
However, the Cumberland Homesteaders, in the main, had not been subsistence farmers,
they were "displaced" and "stranded" workers. If, indeed, the Arthurdale project was the
most controversial, it was simply because it was the most publicized.
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The DSH advisory committee identified three types of clientele and three types of
proposed communities:
Homestead colonies established for industrial workers and located in the
out-skirts of cities or large towns; rural settlements in which small
industries or branches of large industries can be established; and
agricultural settlements. The program will deal largely with city dwellers,
stranded populations (i.e. those left jobless by the moving of local
industries or the exhaustion of natural resources, as for instance coal and
copper mines, sawmill workers, etc.), and farmers now working lands too
poor to be profitable.
Each subsistence-homestead project will be established in accordance with
the industrial and agricultural trends as they relate to the population
problems of a given region or State.
Every undertaking will be regarded as experimental. The experiment is to
test a method of living that may conserve the best of both urban and rural
life, afford greater stability in family living and point the way to a more
permanent adjustment for workers in the shorter hour week and part-time
employment. 2
Because the program was not intended to be a welfare effort and since
homesteading represented a new economic endeavor, FDR maneuvered to have it
administered by the person he considered the best executive in Washington, the "old
curmudgeon," Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes. Ickes was an unfortunate choice
as administrator in ultimate authority for the subsistence homestead program. He was
authoritarian and viewed committees and boards with distrust and suspicion. He believed
in micro-management and when his subordinates could not immediately answer inquiries
as to minuscule details, he immediately lost confidence in them. Ickes was also tight-
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fisted and hyper-conservative about the distribution of federal funds; Harry Hopkins was
not. Ickes, rarely finding a subordinate whom he liked, placed the program under M.L.
Wilson, then the head of the AAA wheat section.13
M. L. Wilson did not remain long as Director of the Division of Subsistence
Housing. By January 1934, differences with Ickes over the administration, control, and
even the goals of DSH convinced Wilson of the need to work in some capacity free of
Ickes's supervision. He took a position as Assistant Secretary (later Under Secretary) of
the Department of Agriculture. Fundamental differences regarding fiduciary propriety,
local control and community building exacerbated pre-existing political and
administrative differences between Wilson and Ickes. Wilson envisioned communities
planned and directed under local guidance, answerable to Washington only on
fundamental questions of policy and administration.14
Wilson, true to his belief in the primacy of democracy, constructed the fiduciary
machinery of the DSH with an eye toward local control and direction. Under the laws of
Delaware, the DSH established the Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation (FSHC),

According to Ickes, the president told Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, that
Ickes was "the greatest executive I have ever known." Pinchot was looking to advance
his own interests; he may have been ingratiating himself to Ickes. In spite of an attempt
by The Chicago Tribune to implicate Ickes in a financial scandal, Ickes maintained a
reputation for uncompromising honesty. The quotation in this note is from Harold L.
Ickes, The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 163. The Secret Diaries of Harold Ickes, noted above,
contains evidence of the assertions made in this note. M.L. Wilson left the Department of
Interior shortly after arriving to become Undersecretary of Agriculture. In this post and
with the cooperation of Rexford Tugwell, he exercised influence over the entire rural
rehabilitation, subsistence homesteads, and resettlement programs when they were
combined under the Department of Agriculture.
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a non-profit corporation, with stock held in trust by Secretary of the Interior Ickes. Under
Wilson's plan, each new community would be planned, built, and adrninistered by a local
subsidiary corporation. By using the members of the local corporation to acquire and
dispose of land and buildings and to contract with borrowers, architects, and builders, the
projects were assured of local involvement and support. Wilson believed that such high
profile local involvement would also serve to differentiate the subsistence projects from
the relief efforts of the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA).15
Ickes, on the other hand, viewed local control as an opportunity for graft and
waste. There had been no hint of financial scandal in the Interior Department's PWA;
Ickes believed in close scrutiny and multi-level approval of any expenditure. The ability
of local organizations to select sites, hire architects, and spend money without the lineby-line approval of national authorities alarmed Ickes and provoked his suspicions.
Historian Paul Conkin, the recognized authority on the New Deal community programs,
argues that Ickes's fiduciary extremism, basic distrust of loosely supervised personnel,
and his insistence on intense micro-management came to him as a function of his
previous career as a political reformist in Chicago. Conkin attributes Wilson's insistence
on local control to his career in agriculture dealing with farmers. In a re-statement of the
Hamiltonian- Jeffersonian argument, Ickes trusted persons while Wilson trusted the
people.16
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Ickes received aid in controlling the DSH from an unexpected and unappreciated
source. Responding to President Roosevelt's ruling that required all government
accounts be submitted, approved, and executed by General Accounting Office standards
and procedures, on 15 March 1934, Comptroller-General John R. McCarl mandated that
all federal funds, including those connected with subsistence housing projects, be
deposited with the United States Treasurer and disbursed according to standard
government disbursing and accounting procedures. Ickes bristled at the ruling,
interpreting it as McCarl's attempt to expand his influence at Ickes's expense. The
Secretary of Interior used this ruling, however, to modify Wilson's system of local
control. Meanwhile, Charles Pynchon, Wilson's understudy at DSH, replaced him as
Director in January 1934. n
By spring 1934, the Washington DSH office assumed practically all control of the
projects. The local corporations had to surrender their legal status and the former board
members reconvened as homestead associations. Only when a project was completed
and ready for local ownership would a local corporation be formed. The local association
still made recommendations stemming from their own investigations and fieldwork, but
all decisions, from what materials to use to the specific applicants accepted, required
approval from various newly formed sections of the DSH. As a result, the planning,
building, and occupation of the homesteads experienced delays, duplication, and
confusion that plagued the DSH for the remainder of its short life.
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As news of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and its $25 million
appropriation spread around the country, funding requests, mainly addressed to President
and Mrs. Roosevelt, inundated the DSH offices. In February 1934, loan requests totaled
over $4.5 million. Real estate promoters, chambers of commerce, and individuals
proposed particular schemes; others asked for loans to buy houses. Some of the notions
for the use of the funds were bizarre, alchemy for example. A suggestion from one who
identified himself only as "A Catholic Priest," recounted a tale in the life of St. Vincent
de Paul, a French Catholic Priest captured by the Turks. The French cleric watched his
captor melt gold and silver together until they were fused, then he added a yellow
powder. "The result was considered gold. May I suggest that you have your chemists
work on this possibility? It would increase the amount of gold we have for our money
system or open the way for new standards." From the mass of requests and applications
the DSH had to choose which projects deserved consideration, and then, which projects
should be funded.18
By the end of October 1933, two projects had gained approval. The DSH made a
$50,000 loan to the Cooperative Production Units subsistence project already started by
the Council of Social Agencies in Dayton, Ohio. Ralph Borsodi, the council's advisor,
had long been a promoter of "back to the land" subsistence communities. The initial loan

Letter to President Roosevelt, from "A Catholic Priest," 21 September 1933, President's
Personal File, Box 21-A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Conkin, 101104.

of $50,000 was the extent of assistance to the Dayton project, and it was the only project
in which the government did not own the land.19
The second project funded by DSH was its most famous and most controversial.
Operators had drastically curtailed mining operations in the bituminous coal fields of
Appalachia as the surplus of American coal continued to glut national and international
markets. The Interior Department acquired a 1,100-acre farm at Reedsville, West
Virginia, and established Arthurdale. The DSH approved plans for Arthurdale, named
for the former owner of the farm, to serve as a colony for 200 families. Adhering to the
principles established by the DSH Advisory Committee, the government personnel and
community leaders subjected prospective clients to a series of tests.20
Those applicants who passed the initial screening with high marks for agricultural
ability, physical fitness, attitude, and ambition received in-home inspections. After
further reducing the applications by eliminating persons with tuberculosis and negative
attitudes about farm life, the applications of 200 families gained approval from the
increasingly bureaucratic and fragmented DSH administration. Approximately half the
heads of households were unemployed coal miners, about one-fourth were former
sawmill workers, and the remaining one-fourth were Appalachian farmers. The DSH

Monthly Labor Review (37): 1330. The Dayton project was the only DSH project in
which the government did not own the land. In some other projects, later popularly
associated with DSH projects but not part of the DSH, the government did not own the
land and provided only managerial services. A good example of this type of project was
the Deshee Farm in Indiana. See: Rebecca J. Thompson, "Deshee Farm: A New Deal
Experiment With Cooperative Farming," Indiana Magazine of History, 91 (1995): 380406.
'Ibid., 1329; Conkin 108.
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plans called for a modest house and roughly five acres of tillable land for each family.
The DSH projected that each family would require an expenditure of about $2,000.
Eleanor Roosevelt took a particular interest in the Arthurdale Project. Her interest in
seeing for the comfort of the families and her pressure to hurry along the project, along
with the experimental nature of such project building, produced delay (hastily assembled
houses transported to the site were too flimsy for occupancy), waste, disorganization, and
a resettlement cost to the DSH of over $10,000 per family.
Fears of local committees running amok and dispensing federal funds with a
wholesome disregard for economy and fiduciary propriety, combined with Eleanor
Roosevelt's aggressive interest in the DSH projects, eventually caused Ickes to move
toward divesting his department of responsibility for the subsistence homestead program.
Whereas the president and Ickes had envisioned the houses at Arthurdale as sturdy but
plain and lacking indoor plumbing or electricity, Eleanor Roosevelt, along with Wilson
and project director Bushrod Grimes, aimed for more personal conveniences. They
insisted on indoor plumbing and electricity. In November 1933, the DSH had confidently
predicted that the houses at Arthurdale would be occupied at a cost between $2,000 and
$3,000. By March 1934, Grimes revised his cost estimate; each occupancy would cost
over $10,000. President Roosevelt advised Ickes that DSH " . . . could justify the cost
because it was a model for other homestead projects." Ickes responded by asking,"...
what it was a model of, since obviously it was not a model of low-cost housing for people

Ibid.; Ickes, 152.

on the very lowest rungs of the economic order."

Even the March 1934 estimates were

low; the final cost for each of the homesteads at Arthurdale was $16,635 ($250,456). In
1935, the DSH transferred responsibilities to the Resettlement Administration, under the
direction of Rexford G. Tugwell.23
Under the provision for "stranded populations," the DSH established three other
projects in addition to Arthurdale: Cumberland Homesteads near Crossville, Tennessee;
Tygart Valley Homesteads, outside Elkins, West Virginia; and Westmoreland
Homesteads at Greensburg, Pennsylvania. Each planned for from 250 to 300 units, and
stretched the bounds of orthodoxy in the DSH advisory committee's directive. They
were the most problematic, expensive, and criticized of all DSH projects. It is interesting
to note that the January 1935 Monthly Labor Review listed the designation of the
Arthurdale project as "experimental" rather than "stranded populations."24
The Tupelo Homesteads
By 1 March 1935, the DSH had approved forty-three projects. Of these, inclusive
of the ones listed above, however, only thirty-four were completed by the DSH. The
DSH designated one as "experimental," one as "a resettlement community," three as
"farm communities," one as "co-operative industrial," and one as a "Garden city for

Ickes, 152.
'Ibid.; Conkin, 153-153; 332.
l

Conkin,108: Monthly Labor Review (January 1935): 22.
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Negroes."25 The experimental, stranded populations and farm communities were
permissible under the advisory committee's guidance, but they were not at the center of
the aspirations and visions of the architects and planners of the subsistence homestead
movement. The remaining twenty-four "industrial," projects, best represented the hopes
for a new economic entity and a reconciliation of agrarian and industrial dissonance.
Of the twenty-four projects most representative of the ideas and the aspirations of
President Roosevelt, M. L. Wilson, Rexford Tugwell, and others, six were located in
Mississippi. In addition to the only fully completed DSH farm community at Richton,
five industrial projects for Mississippi gained approval: Hattiesburg, Laurel, Meridian,
McComb, and Tupelo. The DSH never began construction on the Laurel project;
Hattiesburg and Meridian quickly defaulted and the houses were sold to individuals. The
McComb project, which Professor Holley views as the most significant of the DSH
communities, has a particularly woeful history. Only one client ever moved into the
Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads at McComb. The DSH sold the McComb houses to
individuals.27

Groves, Appendix, p. 14. Conkin classifies Arthurdale as a "stranded community." This
is probably a more accurate reflection in operational terms but it contradicts the DSH
terminology. Part of the story of Arthurdale involves the attempt to establish a factory
with a contract with the U.S. Postal Service as a source of employment for the
homesteaders. This provision met with opposition from representatives of furniture
manufacturing areas. The Jersey Homesteads, another "stranded population" community
was able to develop its own commercial textile operation, taking advantage of the skills
of the homesteaders who, in the main, had been employed in that industry.
26

Monthly Labor Review (Januaryl935):19-37; Groves, Appendix, 14; Conkin, 332-334.

27

Conkin, 93-130. It is likely that Professor Holley did not have access to the archives of
the Tupelo Homesteads. The archive assembly and custodial program did not commence
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On 15 December 1933, the DSH announced plans for a twenty-five unit complex
for Tupelo, Mississippi. The local board of directors of the Tupelo Homesteads of
Mississippi, a subsidiary of the Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation (FSHC),
represented the top echelon of community leadership. Its members included: R.V. Road,
V. S. Whitesides, J. H. Leonard, L. A. Olsen, Mrs. T. F. Elkin, J. E. Redus, L. T. Wesson,
J. M. Thomas, Jr., and Tupelo Mayor, J. P. Nanney. Operating under the original
provisions of M. L. Wilson's management and organizational system, the board took
action to identify quickly and place under option likely plots of land ranging in size from
160 to 650 acres on which to build the proposed homesteads.
Two of the options granted but not exercised are of particular interest. Glenn
McCullough granted an option to Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi. Almost seventy
years later, McCullough's grandson, also named Glenn McCullough, accepted a position
on the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority; in 2001, he became
Chairman. Bel-Air Golf Course, now owned by the city of Tupelo, was once the Tupelo

at The Natchez Trace Parkway until the early 1990s. The Parkway staff assembled many
of the records from other sources. Some of the materials on the Tupelo Homesteads were
filed within the records of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Indeed, I found these records
only because a staffer at NARA in Atlanta, Georgia suggested that I look at them. Much
of the primary source material was and is in the Tennessee Valley Authority Records in
NARA, Atlanta. There is little doubt that had Professor Holley been able to access these
files, he would have written more extensively on Tupelo.
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Record Group 79, Department of Agriculture, Resettlement Administration,
Management Division, file D06619114-L14, "Summary and Justification: Tupelo
Homesteads, SH-MS-6," 18 February, 1934, National Archives and Records
Administration, Atlanta, GA. The composition of the Board of Directors changed
throughout the corporation's brief existence. Resignations occurred with regularity,
possibly because of the change in administration caused by Comptroller General
McCarl's ruling and Ickes's desire to gain more centralized control. See: V.S.
Whitesides letter to I. B. Bradshaw, March 6,1934; W.F. Trapp, Associate Community
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Country Club. On 5 January 1934, the Tupelo Country Club optioned its real estate to
the Federal Subsistence Corporation for $19,000. Should the option be exercised, the
membership voted to build a new club. The Tupelo Homestead Corporation did not
exercise that option and there is no language in the minutes indicating whether the option
granted was motivated by financial difficulties or the desire for a new club.
On 26 March 1934, the Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi purchased property
from W. W. and W. M. Thompson. The property consisted of 170.58 acres of land, six
miles north of Tupelo and bisected by the newly constructed U.S. Highway 45. The
acreage, consisting of "pheba silk loam soil, well adapted to garden, truck and fruit,
contained quite a bit of timber." At twenty dollars an acre, it was a good buy.
The Thompson purchase proved to be an administrative headache. Shortly after
the parties executed the contract, one of Thompson's neighbors challenged the sale on the
basis that the land in question included a small portion which belonged to him, not

Manager to J. B. Lawson, Assistant Regional Director, Resettlement Administration,
June 21,1937, all in the management division file noted above.
RG 79, NARA, Atlanta, copies of options granted; Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal,
Nov., 23,1999; RG 79, 86-28-6-(300) "Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Stockholders
of Tupelo Country Club," NARA, Atlanta. The options taken by the Tupelo Homestead
Corporation reflect the quality of real estate desired. The Bel-Air area was and currently
is a very desirable section of the city. This is, perhaps, an indication that the members of
the board did not view potential homesteaders as welfare recipients. They did not view
the potential homesteaders as people who would drive down property values or create
unpleasant neighborhoods. Likewise, the McCullough property optioned was then and is
now very valuable and desirable real estate in Tupelo. In the 1960s, the Tupelo Country
Club did establish a new golf course. Based on limited information one could assume
that the delay of some thirty years in building a new club indicates that the club optioned
its property in hopes of improving its financial condition rather than to satisfy a desire for
a new club.
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Thompson. The law firm of Deavours and Hilbun represented the DSH and, through a
barrage of letters to and from the Thompsons, finally gained a "no objection" statement
•51

from the Attorney General to the commencement of construction on 10 May 1935.
There remained a degree of uncertainty relative to the budget of the Tupelo
Homesteads throughout its life. Figures submitted to the DSH fluctuated as construction
manager C. T. Ames waffled between building twenty-two, twenty-five, or thirty-five
units. Finally, Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi submitted a budget of $58,350 and
received approval for, " . . . the development and the perfection of a Demonstration in
Subsistence Homestead Gardening to be located adjacent to the corporate limits of the
City of Tupelo, County of Lee, Mississippi."32 Even after approval, Ames requested
modifications to the Tupelo Homesteads budget. I. R. Bradshaw explained to
Washington officials that the $58,350 budget was "apparently arbitrarily set" and that the
Tupelo Homesteads should have no trouble qualifying for $75,000.

jU

RG 79, Letter to I .R. Bradshaw, V S. Whitesides, March 6,1934; W.C. Inzer, Lee
County Extension Agent, to I.R. Bradshaw, January 13,1934. Of the almost 171 acres,
114 acres were purchased at $20. The remaining 56 acres cost $50 per acre.
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Ibid., Thomas K. Shuffig, Office of the Attorney General, letter to Paul D. Shriver,
Chief Counsel Division of Subsistence Homesteads, May 10,1935; J. B. Lawson, project
manager to Deavours and Hilbun," April 13,1935; "Inter-Office communication, Charles
E. Pynchonto J.B. Lawson, December 18,1934; W. W. Thompson to V.S. Whitesides,
March 14,1934. The communications cited above, and many others not cited, reveal
severe administrative problems. In addition to contested ownership was the mistaken
notion that part of the land represented a portion of the Thompson homestead. This
matter was not fully resolved until 1937. No evidence exists that this lack of resolution
had any deleterious effect on the individual residents' attitudes about, or plans
concerning, the homesteads.
32

Ibid., "Schedule XVI"; J. B. Lawson to S. N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, DSH, 23 June
1934."

During the period of wrangling over the budget and examination of the property
title, DSH officials evidently worried about losing popular support. Bradshaw
telegraphed N. S. Perkins, assistant chief of the Construction Section:
In my opinion Lawson will go through successfully under revised budget
June twentythird (sic) please approve this and lets get the houses started
STOP We are fast losing public sentiment on account delay, (sic)33
The Tupelo Journal ran a glowing account of the efficiency and economy
practiced by Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi and the Division of Subsistence Housing.
The newspaper noted:
Although the fact has not been officially announced, it is learned that a
considerable portion of the $80,000 appropriation for the Tupelo project
will be turned back to the government. It is officially learned that the
Tupelo Homestead has been constructed at lower cost than expected.34
The Tupelo Journal was evidently not aware of the "sliding" budget for the Tupelo
project. In the same article, The Journal reported that officials in Washington were," . . .
loud in their praise for Jimmy Lawson," the project director.35 The newspaper was not
aware of other communication from Washington. The DSH bluntly informed Lawson
that if he had been:
. . . able to go through with the government purchasing materials and contracting
labor, you could have had your houses half finished and still remained under
budget. . . . Your overhead of $4,500 is entirely out of line . . .
The letter did go on to say that the blame could be placed on the DSH because,"... we
have dragged this project along with various regulations of different kinds until the

Ibid., Telegram I. R. Bradshaw to N. S. Jenkins, 25 June 1934. Bradshaw telegraphed
Jenkins from Laurel, MS, where another project had been approved.
Tupelo Journal, 21 November 1934.
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overhead could not be cut" 36 The "various kinds of regulations" reflected Ickes's
increasing concern about the fiscal and managerial integrity of DSH operations.
Despite the increasing bureaucratic minutiae incurred as a result of Ickes's
dismantling of Wilson's streamlined protocols, despite the waffling over how many
houses to build and where to place them on the property, and notwithstanding the
fluctuating proposed budget, the work proceeded at a remarkably fast pace. On 18 July
1934, Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi awarded a contract of $50,600 to Tupelo
Lumber Company for construction of twenty-five houses, septic tanks, and outbuildings.
The houses, designed by local architect Frank Kincannon, were completed October 15.37
David O. Puckett owned the Tupelo Lumber Company; his son, David O. Puckett
Jr., remembers the whirl of activity involved with the construction:
I had my own delivery truck, it wasn't new but it was mine and I
remember making many a delivery of building supplies to the site. I was
only fourteen at the time but I had been driving forever. I remember that
during those days you couldn't hire a decent carpenter in Tupelo, we had
all of them working for us.38
The New Deal's significant presence in Northeast Mississippi, or at least the
promise of it, preceded the announcement of approval and construction of the Tupelo
Homesteads. On October 27,1933, the city of Tupelo signed an agreement with the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) contracting for power and mapping of a huge direct
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RG 79, SH-MS-6,1. R. Bradshaw letter to J. B. Lawson, 25 June 1934.
Ibid., "Summary and justification."
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David O. Puckett Jr., interview by author, 1 September 1999, Tupelo, MS. The tape
recording is in the author's possession.

power transmission line. This agreement supplied Tupelo with a public relations slogan
still used by the city to this day: "Tupelo, First TVA City." Then, even as now, Tupelo
gloried in the possibilities offered by this government business. The local newspaper
reporter waxed enthusiastic; little journalistic objectivity colored his account:
The New Deal in-so-far as Tupelo and the surrounding trade territory are
concerned is in a fairer way toward achievement than had been conceived
in the minds of any, with the exception of the most optimistic, and, before
the new year has hardly been ushered in, the long proposed reduced rates
will apply to city and farm homes alike.
The subheading of the story promised the line would be in operation by February and a
smaller header promised a 68 percent rate cut.39 The TVA actually performed more
rapidly than it promised. On 27 September 1934, before the Tupelo Homesteads were
completed, the Tupelo Homesteads Corporation granted an easement to the TVA, to
supply electrical power to the homesteads.40

The confluence of these two New Deal programs, the DSH and the TVA, along
with a third New Deal-generated project, proved to be an enormous boon to the Tupelo
Homesteads. In the early 1930s, the Natchez, Mississippi, Chapter of the Daughters of
the American Revolution (DAR), began enlisting the aid of other chapters and interested
groups to pressure the federal government to map and preserve the historic Natchez
Trace. As a result of their efforts, the Emergency Legislation Act of June 1934
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The Tupelo Journal, 31 October 1933.
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RG 79, SH-MS-6, C. T, Ames, "Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi Inc."; "Charles
Pynchon letter to J.B. Lawson. As the project neared completion, under the new
regulations imposed by Ickes, the local group was required to form a local corporation
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authorized initial construction funds. Further legislation in 1938 established the Natchez
Trace Parkway as a national parkway under the National Park Service. The physical
confluence of three separate strains of New Deal thought in Northeast Mississippi was,
arguably, an indication of the importance and power of Congressman John Rankin and
Senator Pat Harrison.

41

With the creation of the TVA, the New Deal harvested the fruits of progressive
labor. Tennessee Valley area representatives and progressives had supported ideas
similar to the TVA for years. During the Great War, the U.S. Army built a hydroelectric
dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in order to supply the armed services with
weapons-grade nitrates. At the end of the war the military, no longer needing the nitrate
fixing facilities, mothballed the installation. The disposition of those facilities actuated a
struggle between capitalistic entrepreneurs and progressive conservationists for control of
the dam. Pursuing notions first advanced by Gifford Pinchot, Chief U.S. Forester under
President Theodore Roosevelt, progressives, led by Senator George Norris, insisted that
the shoals area of the Tennessee River and the hydroelectric dam built there redound to
the good of man and the health of the environment. As head of the Senate Agriculture
with different provisions than the one involved in initial planning and construction. The
Tupelo Homesteads Corporation replaced Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi.
41

Federal Recalled Records, NATR, Accession #290, Box 40, Natchez Trace Parkway
Archives; "Natchez Trace Parkway Home Page," accessed 14 October 1999. Martha
Swain, "Hubert D. Stephens: Mississippi's 'Quiet Man' in the Senate, 1923-1935,"
Journal ofMississippi History, 63, (4), (Winter 2001): 276-77. For a discussion
concerning Pat Harrison's value to FDR in congressional approval of New Deal
legislation see Martha M. Swain, Pat Harrison: The New Deal Years (Jackson: The
University and College Press of Mississippi, 1975): passim. Chester H. Gray, "Putting
More Muscle in the Shoals," Bureau Farmer, 3 (4) (Dec 1927): 12-13. Tupelo was also
awarded other New Deal works projects. They included a mattress factory and a meat
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Committee, Norris occupied a key position in which to block acquisition of the shoals
facilities by strictly commercial interests. When Henry Ford, seeing the commercial
opportunities inherent in a hydroelectric facility, offered $5 million for a project that had
cost the government $130 million, Norris thundered that the committee's acceptance of
the bid would " . . . amount to the greatest gift ever bestowed upon mortal man since
salvation was made free to the human race."42
On 10 April 1933, the hopes of Norris and the old time progressives turned to
substance. When FDR asked Congress for "legislation to create a Tennessee Valley
Authority - a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the
flexibility and initiative of private enterprise" Congress enacted the legislation on May
18,1933. 43
At about the same time that Congress created TVA, the DSH gave a description
of the proposed Tupelo homesteads:
. . . a house and outbuildings located upon a plot of land on which can be
grown a large portion of the foodstuffs required by the homestead family.
It signifies production for home consumption and not for commercial sale.
In that it provides for subsistence alone, it carries with it the corollary that
cash income must be drawn from some outside source. The central motive
of the subsistence homestead program, therefore, is to demonstrate the

packing facility. The meat packing facility processed cattle that the government
purchased from drought-stricken Midwest cattlemen.
42

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), 134-139. The quote is from: Tennessee Valley
Authority, "A History of the Tennessee Valley Authority," 50th Anniversary Edition, 6,
no publication data given.
'Tennessee Valley Authority, 17.

economic value of a livelihood which combines part-time wage work with
part-time gardening or farming.44
The Tupelo Homesteads' construction adhered to the definition. The community
initially consisted of twenty-five houses on lots averaging a little over three acres each,
and included nine three-room houses, eight four-room houses, and eight five-room
houses. Each house received water from a deep well equipped with an electric pump
capable of delivering 225 gallons per hour and a pump-house enclosing the mechanism.
As the planners anticipated that each homesteader would keep a cow, chickens, and hogs,
each unit came equipped with a cow stall, chicken run, and hog pen. The DSH provided
each homestead with fruit trees, berry bushes, farming equipment, fertilizer, seed, a cow,
two shoats, and twenty-five chickens. Project managers arranged with the DSH, the
County Extension Service, and Mississippi State College to provide guidance in
gardening, canning, and preservation of food. Each kitchen came furnished with a
pressure cooker, a relatively new innovation, and supplies for home canning.

45

Unlike most of the other industrial homesteads, Tupelo Homesteads had running
water, electricity, and single-party phone lines. The Homesteads were near enough to
Tupelo for the children of the community to utilize the transportation facilities of the
Tupelo Municipal School District. Likewise, proximity to Tupelo precluded the need for
construction of community cultural, medical, and religious facilities. Construction crews

Conkin, quotes at 110-111.
;

RG 79, SH-MS-6, Schedule XVI"; Ames, 1-2.

83
built an earthen dam across a ravine, which provided a recreational lake for the
homesteaders. 46
On Friday, 16 November 1934, the first homesteaders moved into their new
homes. Two days later, the President and Eleanor Roosevelt, along with Interior
Secretary Harold Ickes, came to Tupelo; the President came to extol the virtues of the
TVA and Mrs. Roosevelt to visit the homesteaders. Before speaking to an estimated
75,000 people at Robbins Field in Tupelo, the party visited the Tupelo Homesteads.47
Prior to the visit, the Tupelo Garden Club had extended an invitation for Eleanor
Roosevelt to speak at a special meeting in her honor, which she declined. Knowing of
her interest in the Arthurdale Project, and wanting to honor the First Lady, the women of
the Tupelo Garden Club carefully prepared and decorated two of the vacant homesteads
for her inspection. Mrs. Roosevelt, however, insisted on visiting a homestead family.
She stopped, at random, at Number 20, the Barron residence. Mrs. Roosevelt became so
engrossed in conversation with Mrs. Barron and in examining the house and the
appliances that she strained the patience of the President. FDR, waiting impatiently in his
car, sent one of his staff members to "fetch her."48
FDR's visit constituted the high water mark of the Tupelo Homesteads of
Mississippi. Contrary to expectations, none of the initial residents bought their homes.

^Tupelo Journal; (Jackson) Daily Clarion Ledger; New York Times; (Jackson)
Commercial Appeal, all of 19 November, 1934. Ickes, 226.
46

Ibid. The dam broke in the early 1960 and was not repaired.

46

Tupelo Journal, November 19,1934
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They thought the price the government placed on the project too high, and they did not
fully understand that they were expected to buy shares in the entire corporation and that
only after 75% of the aggregate debt had been paid would they receive title to their
property in fee-simple. The project passed with bewildering rapidity to the control of
other government agencies, and with such transfer became associated with welfare
programs. By 1937, the homesteads had become a place to rent until one could make
better arrangements.
By the President's own hopes and the DSH standards, Tupelo was not an ideal
place to nurture the aspirations of the economically challenged via this type of
governmental assistance. When FDR outlined the homestead program to Congress he
spoke of potential clients who earned from $600 to $1,000 ($15,555 -19,333) per year.
By providing a way for a person to buy a home at low interest rates (3%) on long terms
(40 years), the president expected that there would be a surfeit of qualified applicants.
He was correct; there was a surplus of applicants. The president also talked about the
fiscal and moral qualifications of applicants; he stressed that this was not a relief
program. The government, he said, would recover all its money; the beneficiaries of this
program were to be persons of good moral character, financial integrity, and strong work
ethics.49

Tupelo Journal, 19 November 1934.
4

Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Volume 2: Year of Crises, 1933 (New York: Random House, 1938), 290-294. Originally,
the DSH planned for 40-year mortgages, however, all actual agreements called for 30year amortization. In the 1930s thirty-year mortgages financing personal residences were
nearly non-existent. Contemporary long-term home mortgages became more-or-less
standard only with the return of service men from their war-time service.
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There were plenty of such people in Tupelo, they just were not likely to submit to
regimented and standardized detail, nor were they likely to submit to ownership
provisions at variance with fee-simple occupancy. Tupelo was different from most other
small Mississippi towns. With a population of 6,000, over 2,000 were industrial workers.
The average per capita income of the first homesteaders was actually between $1,300 and
$1,900 ($20,022 - 29,555) per year. Contrary to the initial guidelines, every head of
household in the Tupelo Homesteads held full-time employment. Compared to the
residents of other industrial projects established by DSH, many of which were located in
far more prosperous regions than Tupelo, the Tupelo Homesteaders' incomes ranked
among the highest. Of all the DSH projects, the Tupelo Homesteaders ranked fifth in
terms of family income. Clearly, the Tupelo Homesteaders did not represent the clientele
the president had originally envisioned.50
Applicants for homesteads at Tupelo underwent the same rigorous examinations
as applicants for all DSH and RA subsistence projects. The homestead association
forwarded applications to a committee of local volunteers; the volunteers forwarded
selected applications back to the homestead association. The state committee, chaired by
I. B. Bradshaw and Mississippi State College home management specialist Anne Jordan,

RG 79, "Summary and Justification."; Groves, 60. The Tupelo Journal, 19 November
1934 listed the initial homesteaders and their employment status. The newspaper listed
James Barron as a part-time employee of the Nehi Bottling Company. However, Mr.
Barron's application and occupancy contract listed his annual income as $1,600 per year.
It is likely that Mr. Barron worked a full week. If not his income from part-time
employment compared very favorably to full-time workers. There seems to have been
some subterfuge with regard to some of the applicants' statement of financial resources.
Many of the homesteaders, Mrs. Perkins, for instance, owned other property.

then screened the applications. Finally, the national DSH Committee, chaired by
Charlotte Smith, made thefinalselection.
Banks Livingston, a long-time Tupelo resident and local historian, remembers the
Tupelo Homesteads and the attitude of the community toward the Homesteaders. They
were not, he said, thought of as being on relief; there was no stigma attached to being a
homesteader. In fact, he thought, the community viewed the homesteaders as one might
view contest winners. Times were tough; maybe they could make this pay off to their
advantage. They might choose to stay there and they might not.
Strangely, it was the infamous tornado of April 1936 that spelled doom for the
Tupelo Homesteads. The tornado created a wide swath of destruction in Tupelo,
demolishing hundreds of homes and businesses. The resulting building boom created a
localized economic revival. Scores of new homes and apartments, many of higher
quality than the Tupelo Homesteads, came on the market. The original homesteaders
now had a better economic environment and more housing options.52

Banks Livingston, interview by author, 10 November 1999; the tape is in author's
possession.
cry

Kathleen Perkins, interview by Sara Amy Leach and Leslie Blythe, 17 April 1977,
transcript, Natchez Trace Parkway, General Files, Tupelo, MS. Vaughn L. Grisham, Jr.,
Tupelo: The Evolution of a Community (Dayton: Kettering Foundation Press, 1999), 87,
134. The intense but short-term lack of housing created a barrage of letters to the
Resettlement Administration and from prominent Tupelo citizens and Congressman
Rankin and Senator Harrison. The RA had approved an additional project for Tupelo in
1936. This new project, Tupelo Industrial Garden Community, was to provide seventy
homes for white and thirty for black occupancy. Although land had been placed under
option and the budget approved, the RA used the funds to help provide relief for farmers
in the drought-stricken Midwest. The new Tupelo project was never built. It would have
been the fourth of TugwelPs Garden Cities. See: RG 83, Records of the Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics, USDA Files, NARA, College Park, MD.
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By 1937, the circumstances of the typical homesteader had changed. None of the
original homesteaders contracted to buy their homes. Since many of the new residents
replacing the original homesteaders were employees of the TVA and the National Park
Service, and were assigned to the Tupelo area on a temporary or rotational basis, they had
no intention of buying their homes and opted for month-to-month rental occupancy.
The homesteaders were initially given two contract options. Contract A called for
a two-year lease, after which time the homesteader was to pay twenty-five percent of the
selling price of the homestead and begin mortgage payments. This sales price, not
established until the local corporation assumed ownership of the entire project, was an
item of contention. The two-year lease period was designed by the DSH to allow
residents time to accumulate the down payment. Equally important, the two-year period
was to serve as a sort of probationary period. Some homesteaders might prove unreliable
or disruptive. The building boom in Tupelo after the tornado caused the homestead
property to be less valuable. From 1936 to 1940, the local Homesteaders were in
constant conflict with the government over the fair market value of the properties.54
Contract B was a month-to-month rental agreement. Both contracts were nonbinding on the homesteaders. Only after entering into a purchase agreement were the
Homesteaders required to fulfill long-term obligations. None of the Homesteaders

RG 79, copies of applications, leases, and letters of inquiry; Perkins interview, Natchez
Trace Parkway, General Files,.
54
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exercised their purchase option and, thus, the Homesteaders were free to move at thenconvenience. The federal government had become, in effect, a tenant landlord.
In May 1937, the Resettlement Administration (RA), which had taken over from
the DSH, formed the Tupelo Homesteads Corporation, to replace the defunct Tupelo
Homesteads of Mississippi, Inc., and authorized the newly-formed association to buy the
project for $110,000. In view of the fact that the project had cost $149,290, the RA
administrators believed that they had offered the local corporation a very good deal. The
local association turned it down. On October 1,1938, after arguments, reappraisals, and
reconsideration, the association finally agreed to purchase the project for $73,182. In
terms of 2006 dollars, the RA offered houses, which had cost an average of $59,882 to
construct and equip, for sale for $31,480.5
The Tupelo Homesteads Corporation had no more success with the project than
had its federal predecessor. While vacancies were rare because of the low rents and the

Conkin, 334. As mentioned earlier, the estimated budget for the Tupelo Homesteads
was in the $50,000 to $80,000 range; why the discrepancy? Part of the answer is in the
increased inefficiency that came as a function of more centralized control following the
Comptroller General's rulings and Ickes' micro-management. However, the biggest
reason is that in 1936 under pressure from Tugwell, Director of RA, ten additional units
were built at Tupelo. These new units were technically not part of the DSH program,
they were designated as a "garden community" under the auspices of the RA. Some
evidence indicates that Tugwell intended for the new addition to actually be the fourth of
his "greenbelt communities." The drought cattle purchase effort dried up funds intended
for the project. However, since they were situated on the property bought for the Tupelo
Homesteads and since they were separated from the original houses only by U.S.
Highway 45, they were added to the Tupelo Homesteads and offered to the association as
part of the Homesteads. These ten houses, unlike the originals are composed of brick
veneer. They are obviously of another mind-set regarding subsistence housing.
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need for temporary quarters for workers involved in constructing the TV A and the
Natchez Trace Parkway, no one, it seemed, cared to own a "subsistence homestead."
The delays, regulations, and duplication of efforts actuated by the DSH insistence on
centralized control removed the efficiencies available through local knowledge. The
homesteaders found better construction at lower prices available in the community. Even
by its own admission, the homesteads were inferior in materials and construction to
homes available through the private sector.57
In late 1939, the National Park Service commenced conversations with the Tupelo
Homestead Corporation concerning the Parkway's acquisition of the homesteads. The
Tupelo project still experienced trouble with delinquencies, turnovers, and the continued
lack of home buyers. The Parkway employees complained of high rents in Jackson and
Tupelo was very near the center of the Trace. These two factors, coupled with the nature
of the Tupelo Homesteads' occupancy problems, made the acquisition of the homesteads
by the Park service attractive. On 31 October 1940, the National Park Service assumed
ownership of the Tupelo Homesteads and made them a part of the Natchez Trace
Parkway. To accommodate the inclusion of the properties, surveyors diverted the path of
the Trace eastward so that the property now fell within the path of the Trace.58
The Natchez Trace also moved its headquarters to Tupelo. Workers from a "stub"
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp at Plantersville helped Parkway workers
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combine three of the houses to form office space, moved four dwellings to widen the road
shoulders, and the Park Service retained fifteen as employee quarters. The surplus
houses remained available for rent until the last of the pre-trace acquisition renters
vacated in 1953. Since 1953, all the remaining houses have been used as employee
quarters.59
Today, the Tupelo Homesteads look very much like they looked in the 1930s. In
the mid 1950s, the Park Service made some changes, primarily the addition or enclosure
of porches and the addition of windows. The Tupelo Homesteads, along with the
Cumberland Homesteads, are the only New Deal communities of the one hundred built
that retain their architectural, structural, and environmental integrity. Park Service
ownership kept the Tupelo Homesteads from sale to individuals, thereby avoiding
significant structural alteration.60
Transference to the National Park Service made relationships between landlord
and tenants even more grievous. Tenants did not understand the new provisions imposed
by the National Park Service. Since Park employees assumed priority, some tenants,
even those who had invested in purchases for improvement of their homesteads, were
asked to vacate their homes, even though other houses were vacant. Many tenants were
not informed of the changed nature of the property. When Mr. B. M. Anthony and his
wife were reprimanded for conducting target practice (on an oak tree) on their "property"

Trace Parkway Bulletin, Vol.1, no. 1, June, 1940, Natchez, MS; Natchez Trace Bulletin,
Vol 1, nos.2&3, November 1940 and January, 1941, Jackson, MS.
59

Ibid., nos. 2&3; Date given by Roger Stubblefield, Natchez Trace Parkway, in
conversation with author.
National Register of Historic Places.

91
they were not convinced that the Park Ranger, Claude A Wagner, Jr., had the authority to
interfere, and allowed that it was, "none of his damn business, anyway." Ranger Wagner
responded by informing Mr. Anthony that the Park Service would dictate to him what he
could plant and, furthermore, the efforts he made to enclose a cow and other animals
were moot, since no farm animals would henceforth be allowed on Parkway property.
After Ranger Wagner explained that the property was part of the National Park Service
and that certain regulations regarding firearms were mandated by federal law and after a
soothing letter of explanation from Acting Superintendent Malcolm Gardner, Mr.
Anthony was somewhat mollified. However, Ranger Wagner, in his report of the
incident to Gardner, indicated a certain appreciation of regional peculiarities and a bit of
wariness about them: "Mr. Anthony is, I believe, a warm blooded southerner, native to
this region, and a firm believer in individual rights, and from his attitude I knew he
resented being asked to stop his target practice. His letter more than sustains my analysis
of his character and temperament."61
This neighborhood, quiet and secure, free from traffic, sits behind the Tupelo
Visitors Center on the Natchez Trace Parkway. There are no signs informing passers-by
of the genesis or philosophical motivations or the human drama associated with the
Tupelo Homesteads; there is no information linking the Trace itself or the hidden houses
to efforts of the government to help people endure the Great Depression. There is no

B.M. Anthony to Malcolm Gardner, Acting Superintendent,. 11 November 1940;
Memorandum for Mr. Smith from Claude A. Wagner, Jr., Park Ranger, Nov 13,1940;
other letters of complaint from tenants as well as the Anthony, Wagner, and Gardner
communications, all in: NATR Accession #290, Box 8, Folder 98, Natchez Trace
Archives.
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remembrance of the President or the First Lady at #20. There is no monument in the
back yard of #7 to mark the gravesite of a baby girl.62
The Tupelo Homesteaders were middle class white people who were temporarily
distressed by the Great Depression. The qualifying procedures ensured that the colonists
were ambitious and hard-working people with some economic skills. As a result, the
Colony failed to attract permanent residents. The Tupelo Colonists were not willing to
lower their aspirations to that of subsistence gardening and part-time work. They were
too successful and confident to settle for a subsistence homestead

The DSH projects were not designed to address the country's number one
economic problem; they were not created to give succor to the downtrodden. The
clientele of the DSH projects in general, and the Tupelo Homesteads in particular, were
middle class folks who needed a place to regroup and reassume their particular notions of
good living and community. About the same time that the first homesteaders moved in at
Tupelo, other folks were moving into new homes just over in the Arkansas Delta. The
Colonists at Dyess were among the most destitute and most desperate plain whites in the
United States. At Dyess, Arkansas, the New Deal tried its own form of alchemy. The
bosses at Dyess did not try to turn base metal or precious metal into gold; they tried to

The interviewee, by last account (1999) is still living. The author sees no good reason
for revealing his identity in view of the fact that such revelation serves no valid historical
purpose and that such revelation would most likely revisit an area of intense emotional
pain and guilt. It was illegal in the 1930s, as it is now, to bury corpses privately.
, Interview by Sara Amy Leach, transcript, Natchez Trace Parkway Archives,
General Files. A copy of the transcript is retained by this writer.
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resurrect and recreate an American not seen since the late seventeenth century - the
American peasant-yeoman.

CHAPTER IV
"FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE PEACE, HEALTH, AND
SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC OF ARKANSAS"
"What class of people will be elegitable to thease farms (sic)? Melvin Raley, De
Queen, AR, 17 September 1934
" . . . we are share croppers on the Ark River bottoms. Mr. Griffin (my husband) is now
in his Iff1 year. We are too old and broke down to continue this kind of work. We have
put forth effortfar beyond our strength to keep off relief. [We] have never had to ask
any onefor any help. But now we are broke down..." (Mrs.) W A Griffin, Sherrill,
AR, 23 September 1934.
"How down and out must a man be before he can get in on it?" F. M. Wauhole, Fargo,
OK, 7 July 1934.
"The corn didn't tassle (sic). The oats didn't get big enough to mow. The peas
didn't come up. The tomatoes are standing just like we put them out, haven't
grown at all. The peanuts haven't a peanut on them..." Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Barton,
Springdale, AR, 1 August 1934.l
Dyess Colony, the largest of all New Deal relief/rehabilitation communities,
proved to be one of the most troublesome and contentious of the agrarian programs. It
cost a little over $3 million, it was only mildly successful, and that success was
glimmering, passing, and short-lived. Dispossessed whites encountered a bewildering
succession of agencies, assorted paperwork, and differences of opinion as they worked to
gain yeomanry status. The new, and to some cloistering, close association of government
employees, regulations, terminology and the ever-changing nature of New Deal
ministrations created tensions between the plain whites and their bosses. The
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the American Farm Bureau Federation
1

Letter to W. R. Dyess from Melvin Raley, 17 September 1934; letter to Bureau of
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UN 3, hereinafter referred to as "WPA Administration File."
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(AFBF), the Agricultural Extension Service, and the southern Democratic power base
attacked both the programs and the philosophy of New Deal agrarian relief/rehabilitation
programs. While the New Deal contended with internal divisions and external attacks,
dispossessed whites in Dyess were left to mind their own business and to do as the
supervisors said. Some of them sought to cooperate fully with the government no matter
in what alphabet agency manifestation it appeared, others murmured and agitated for
change. Some tried to manipulate the system - and some did.
Dyess, Arkansas had no traditions. There were no stories and legends of early
founders, no heroic tales of fleeing the floods or surviving malaria - or Yankees. It had
no history. Almost overnight, a thriving community of about 3,000 souls became
residents of an instant city. Apparently, the town was born mature; there was no
transition from crude trading posts and hovels of rough lumber to modern buildings. All
Dyess buildings were brand new. The town was a little odd; Rexford ("Rex the Red")
Tugwell's New Deal co-conspirators had equipped the town with a gin, swimming pool,
school, community center, gristmill, slaughterhouse, blacksmith shop, lumberyard,
railroad depot, hospital, service station, garage, general store, cafe, grocery store, and
other ancillary services and thirty-two houses. "Government men" occupied the houses.2
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It seemed like a good idea at the time. William Dyess, levy contractor, mule
dealer, politician, cotton baron, and Director of the Arkansas Emergency Relief
Administration, had access to a huge Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA)
grant, thousands of acres of abandoned and tax-defaulted Delta land, and thousands of
dispossessed plain whites within a fifty-mile radius of his Mississippi County, Arkansas
home. According to H.C. Baker, a close associate, William R. Dyess,
conceived the idea of building an agricultural community. A colony of
five hundred homes - homes which were to be modern, liveable (sic)
homes with electricity, running water, private sewage and other
advantages usually associated only with urban communities, and which
would raise the standard for farm homes to a new high level. He
conceived in his plan a hospital, schools, churches, in fact a new order of
things for those who through no fault of their own found it almost
impossible to make their way.3
There is no evidence of how Dyess managed to reconcile the obvious dilemmas
that his notions created. His success as a planter was in large measure due to his
exploitation of the very labor system that his project threatened. He imagined, at first
800, then 700, and finally 500 families in neat modern houses reaping a competence from
the most fecund agricultural land in the world. Dyess and his colleagues very quickly
Record, 20 May 1934; Arkansas Gazette, 10 June 1977; Arkansas Democrat, 29
December 1934. References to "government men" are ubiquitous in the correspondence
files, for example see: letter to W. R Dyess from Jesi A. Chance, 14 October 1934,
University of Arkansas, Special Collections, "U.S. Works Progress Administration File,
hereinafter "WPA Administration File. Like many things at Dyess, notions changed
quickly. Dyess planed for 40 residences, but in fact the Colony only built 32. See
"Resume of Procedures" RG 96.
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H. C. Baker, "Dyess Colony," in Traveling Recovery Road: The Story of Relief, WorkRelief and Rehabilitation in Arkansas, August 30, 1932 to November 15, 1936 (Little
Rock: Emergency Relief Administration, 1936), 153. The original plans called for the
establishment of 750 families on a 20-acre plot. Originally, there was to be no
modification of farm sizes because of exceptional circumstances. For reference to the
change in philosophy, see: Letter to Harry Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937, RG
96.

altered their notions about the cookie-cutter one-size-fits-all economic units and planned
for 500 families on plots of land consistent with family needs and the labor force of each
family. His colonization project, as suggested by its name, Colonization Project No. 1,
was to be only the first. Although President Roosevelt had promised a New Deal from
the bottom up, he bowed to political necessity and expediency. The New Deal
aggressively propped up the traditional pillars of wealth and control of agrarian America,
most energetically in the Delta. Perhaps Dyess felt comfortable with his potential
conflict of interest activities because the cotton barons had much better-connected,
financed, and powerful advocates — the American Farm Bureau Federation and the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). Dyess identified, personally, with the
Arkansas cotton barons. At the time of Dyess Colony's creation, his colleagues and
neighbors were busy brutalizing evicted cotton cultivators; in response to such wholesale
violence dispossessed white and black cotton cultivators formed the Southern Tenant
Farmers' Union (STFU) in adjacent Cross County. Asked about the alleged wholesale
evictions of neighboring sharecroppers, Dyess claimed that he saw no more cropper
migration this season (1934) than any other crop-year. By providing to prosperous
farmers (cotton barons in particular) generous benefits, it most likely appeared to Dyess,
with good reason, that the AAA would more than adequately safeguard the interests of
cotton barons. Presumably freed from intolerable pangs of conscience, Dyess submitted
plans and received approval for "Colonization Project No. 1." Harry Hopkins, supported
by Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, approved the project in March 1934.
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The Bosses at Dyess
At least two phenomena differentiate the Dyess Colony from most other New
Deal programs. The leadership of and at Dyess was atypically constant. The top echelon
of officials at Dyess tended to leave their posts only on the most dramatic conditions;
William Dyess died and the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony fired Colonel Lawrence
Westbrook. (Even after The Dyess Board fired Westbrook from his consultant position,
the Colonel continued to be an ally.) The continuity of the officials and the colony's
existence outside the direction of New Deal Agencies (WPA and RA), made Dyess
Colony an inviting target for New Deal critics. In 1939, the political danger cited above
caused Dyess Colony to seek refuge under the aegis of the Farm Security A6!ministration
(FSA), created in 1937. Furthermore, the odd legal status for Dyess meant that the
Colony was treated as any other entity in its application for government acreage
allotments, relief eligibility certification, and yet was required to apply to its clients the
provisions of the current agricultural relief program. Although technically free from
direct authority of the FERA, WPA, RA, and the AAA, each of those agencies imposed
particular and specific procedures. For example, each of the agencies in its turn and by
its own guidelines determined the amount of "furnish" available to each of the Colonists.
Thus, even though their situation at Dyess Colony created different problems but offered
expanded opportunities compared to FERA, WPA, and RRC clients, the same guidelines
and regulations applied. Likewise, the Colonists were required to execute the same
budget and farm plans, as were the RRC Rehabilitators and RA clients. All of the cotton
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cultivators and would-be yeoman farmers were constrained by the acreage quotas
assigned by the AAA county production committees, dominated by cotton barons,
County Extension Agents and American Farm Bureau Federation officers and
functionaries. In addition to the foregoing grounds of dissension, the fierce political
battles in Arkansas between the "Federal crowd" and the "statehouse bunch" complicated
the Colony's existence. U.S. Senators Joseph T. Robinson and Hattie Caraway were die
most prominent members of the Federal element. William Dyess, Ben Butler (a
Mississippi County implement dealer and vocal supporter of the colony), and Floyd
Sharp led the local "statehouse" forces. The resulting statehouse brouhaha denigrated the
colony and the colonists in the eyes of many. Among the more important bosses with
whom plain whites negotiated were Floyd Sharp, Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, H.C.
Baker, E.S. Dudley, W.A. Rooksbery, R.C. Limerick, Harry Hopkins, Arkansas
Governor J. Marion Futrell, and construction supervisor Cone Murphy. Colonists'
encounters were more frequent and more intense with some of these bosses than with
others. An inverse ratio regulated exchange between the government men and
dispossessed whites; the greater the luminance of the government men, the less was
intimacy with the plain whites of Dyess. Four of the Dyess leaders are of particular
interest.5
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William Reynolds Dyess was bom near Hazlehurst, Mississippi in 1894 and died
in a plane crash on his way back to Arkansas from Washington a little after dark on 14
January 1936. The plane crash that killed all seventeen aboard, including Dyess and the
Chief Accountant and Director of Finance and Reports, Robert H. McNair, Jr., was, at the
time, the worst aviation tragedy in American history. The errand that sent Dyess to
Washington and the proximate cause of his death involved arranging the financing for the
new schools at the colony. The circumstances of his death, Dyess's magnetic and
attractive physical presence, and the dynamic ease with which he managed his far-flung
agency made Dyess a legendary character in the minds of most folks, even among those
who later bitterly opposed the colony management. Floyd Sharp, Dyess's successor, paid
homage to the almost mythic figure in explaining to Harry Hopkins just why the Colony
needed a different legal identity than the one provided by general oversight of the
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. "In March, 1936, with all the respect in the
world to Mr. Dyess, we decided that circumstances made necessary the changing of some
of his original plans." The primary change in original plans intended that the new legal
entity of the colonization project escape the control of the Arkansas ERA and successor
agencies. More precisely, Sharp intended the new corporate status to protect his own
ability to dispense patronage.
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Dyess was a fine example of a New South agrarian. After graduating from
Mississippi A & M, he entered military service and served as an orderly to General John
'Black Jack" Pershing in the Philippines. During the World War, Dyess was a cavalry
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captain and taught at a military school in Georgia. After the war, Dyess took to Arkansas
the skills he had learned from his father, cotton planting, mule trading, and contracting particularly levees, railroad beds, and gravel roads. He migrated to Arkansas and
prospered in completion of contract work on the levees along the Mississippi and White
Rivers. He bought thousands of acres of Delta wilderness and turned it into profitable
cotton land. While building his financial status, Dyess also became a prominent figure in
both local and state politics. He denied, however, just before bis death, that he had any
serious gubernatorial ambitions.7
Floyd Sharp was a lawyer from a modest background. He worked as a composer
at the Arkansas Gazette - he maintained a life-long relationship with the Little Rock
Typographer's Union - and after the war earned his baccalaureate and law degrees. After
a brief private practice, discontinued due to ill health, Sharp joined the Arkansas
Department of Labor as a statistician. His initial experience with relief work was with
the state Emergency Relief Commission, a pre-New Deal agency funded by President
Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Sharp's compassion for the
dispossessed seems to be highly selective. In 1936, at the peak of wholesale tenant
evictions in Northeast Arkansas, he refused to provide WPA benefits to members of the
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). Upon Dyess's death, Sharp replaced him as
Director of the Arkansas WPA. His colleagues elected him President of Dyess Colony,
Inc. at its formation and he retained that position until the FSA liquidated the project. J.
(Junius) Marion Futrell was Governor of Arkansas at the creation of Dyess Colony. He
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was a Dyess ally and remained a colony friend. After his defeat for re-election in 1936,
Futrell became legal counsel for Dyess Colony, Inc. Some of the political rivalry of his
past complicated the colony's existence.8
Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, also using Federal Funds under state direction, had
already established a project near Houston, Texas. Because Westbrook had experience in
establishing a government funded and managed rural relief project, and because of
Westbrook's resume of experience, Henry Hopkins recruited him as an assistant in the
FERA and its successor, the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Westbrook's
relationship with Dyess Colony is interesting. While he worked to bring economic
security and societal enhancement to plain folks, Westbrook also exploited his
relationship with them.9
Lawrence Westbrook was not at all opposed to earning some money on the side
and Floyd Sharp gave him an opportunity. Upon creation of Dyess Colony Inc., the
ultimate control of the project passed from the Arkansas WPA to the corporation, the
stock held in trust by the Secretary of Agriculture. Such re-organization took Westbrook
from direct authority, but he retained his authority over matters that involved the WPA
and rural relief and rehabilitation in general. The colonists at Dyess were still subject to
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the same benefits and obligations as were any other of the Rural Relief clients. For
example, notwithstanding the various cooperative arrangements imposed by Dyess
Colony, all Rural Rehabilitation Clients, including the Colonists at Dyess, remained RRC
clients until its absorption by the FSA and had to execute household budgets and yearly
farm plans. Initially, County Extension Agents approved the plans; after March of 1935,
this approval came from the County Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor. Sharp urged
Lawrence Westbrook, Assistant Administrator of the WPA and close associate of Harry
Hopkins, to resign his high office and move to Dyess to be its Resident Director.
Westbrook declined but did offer Sharp an alternative. In early June 1936, Westbrook
presented Sharp with a contract for his personal services. He told Sharp, according to
Sharp, that he had cleared the proposition with Harry Hopkins who thought the
arrangements outlined in the proposed contract would be of great advantage to the
colony. Westbrook proposed that he assume the position of "Management Consultant."
For a salary of $5,000 per year, Westbrook proposed to provide the Colony with ninety
days per year of continuous on-site service and management. Sharp, supposing that
Hopkins approved the arrangement voted, as did Board Member H.C. Baker, to approve
the contract. "Captain" R. C. Limerick, a member of the Board of Directors and also the
Arkansas WPA Chief Engineer and Director of Operations, demurred. He thought, "for a
salary of $5,000 a year we can get a man with talent and energy to work full-time."
Outvoted on the issue 2-1, Captain Limerick, "being the gentleman that he is . . . made
the motion that we enter into the contract and it was seconded by Mr. Baker." H.C.
Baker and R.C. Limerick refused to approve one particular provision in Westbrook's
proposed contract. Westbrook's proposal provided a $75.00 per diem reimbursement for
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each day beyond ninety days expended on colony business. At the insistence of Baker
and Limerick, the Board required advance approval for "extra days" compensation.
Floyd Sharp granted E. S. Dudley a leave of absence from his Arkansas WPA
position to move to Dyess as its Resident Director. On 9 June 1936, the Board of
Directors of Dyess Colony, Inc. entered into the "management counsel" agreement with
Westbrook. One year later the Board, with the silent concurrence of Harry Hopkins, fired
him. On March 20 1937, Sharp wrote to Harry Hopkins to explain the Board's decision
to fire Westbrook. The five-page letter is deferential, explanatory, and emphatic. Sharp
emphasized, emphatically, that he and the Board were under the impression that Hopkins
knew of and approved the contract and the concept. Sharp complained that Westbrook
had reduced his actual time at the Colony to "five or six days a month" and attempted to
manage the colony's interest from his Washington office. Westbrook, Sharp said, had
sent people to the colony and made changes without informing the Board. He was
particularly upset about Westbrook's "cancellation of an expensive accounting system."
The colony had re-established the same system at a considerable expense. Sharp's letter
described the complexity of managing a good-sized town, a new school system, and all
the related civic as well as social and economic considerations that required the attention
of competent management. Since Westbrook had not fulfilled these obligations, the
management gap had to be filled and toward that end, he informed Hopkins that the
Board had agreed to compensate board members Sharp, Baker, and Limerick at the rate
of $100 per month for their services, but only when and as necessary. Sharp enclosed a
series of Westbrook's expense reports and told Hopkins that he did not question the
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expenses as such but did question if the Colony could justify expenses beyond the control
of the Board of Directors. For Hopkins' information and approval, Sharp enclosed a
letter to Westbrook declaring the contract breached and the reasons. Remaining
deferential to the end, Sharp asked Hopkins to send the enclosed letter to Westbrook or
return it to Sharp for delivery. He, Limerick, and Baker, remained committed to
whatever Hopkins thought best, but would resign should he disallow cancellation of the
contract.11
In the enclosed letter to Westbrook, Sharp was more specific, emphatic, and
petulant with regard to the Board's dissatisfaction. Westbrook's attempt to manage by
correspondence resulted in people arriving at the colony and claiming direct authority
from Westbrook to institute changes without consultation with Resident Manager E. S.
Dudley or with the Board. The Board understood that Westbrook would spend ninety
days in residence at the colony, not just an occasional visit. Sharp complained that
Westbrook did not see him on his last trip to Little Rock: "The evening you came
through here, I waited in my office and called the hotel every thirty minutes until eleven
o'clock, but, as you recall, you had gone to Hot Springs without checking out, and I did
not get an opportunity to talk to you." The real problem with the contract was articulated
in the third paragraph: "I must join with the opinion of the other two Board members that
it is not fair to them for you to draw a good salary, under contract with the Colony, in
excess of the amount they draw for the positions they hold with the Works Progress

11

Letter to Hon. Harry L. Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937; letter to Lawrence
Westbrook from Floyd Sharp, enclosed with letter to Hopkins, RG 96.

Administration. . ." Assuring Westbrook of the "warmest personal feelings" of the
board, Sharp declared that the contract was, for reasons stated in the letter, breached.
The lucrative compensation bothered Sharp from the beginning, but, as he told
Hopkins, he thought that Hopkins had approved both the nature of the contract and the
compensation. In terms of current dollars, Westbrook's part time compensation of
$5,000 per year is roughly equivalent to $72,727; his stipend of $75.00 for all days over
ninety is equivalent to $1,090. By contrast, E.S. Dudley, Resident Manager earned $325
per month, less than $4,000 per year. It was, in the vernacular of the age, "good work if
you could get it."13
Oddly enough, the close relationship continued. Correspondence reveals that
Westbrook, Sharp, and Dyess Colony continued some sort of working relationship.
Within a year Westbrook's name and position as Management Counsel reappeared on the
Colony stationary. Sharp asked Westbrook for advice and help with the Arkansas
Corporation Commission and Westbrook responded. Westbrook helped negotiate the
sale of colony cotton and he devised a scheme to establish housing projects in West
Memphis, and Hot Springs. Profits were to be divided between Dyess Colony, Inc and

12

13

Ibid.

Calculations are from:
http://www.prqiects.ex.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/current/howmuch.html. Salary figures are
taken from: "Administrative Personnel," typewritten roll of monthly salaries in RG 69,
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, "Dyess Colony." Sharps' petulance is understandable.
It appears that Westbrook made a similar agreement with the other two "independent"
projects, Cherry Lake Farms, Florida and Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia. I discovered
this arrangement, at least a hint of it by accident. See: Letter to Mr. Laurence Powell
from Floyd Sharp, 22 July 1936, WPA Management File. If Westbrook's compensation
was near the level he bargained for with the Dyess Colony, then the extent of his larceny
is truly breath taking and merits further examination. A look at Cherry Lake and Pine
Mountain holds promise.

107
the particular politician so involved, a Judge in West Memphis and the Mayor in Hot
Springs. The project would compensate Westbrook based on the profits accruing to
Dyess Colony, Inc. Westbrook commented on the selection of families, helped to market
the products of the colony's workshops, and continued to give solicited advice on various
problems with the colony. It was a strange relationship. Sharp had cross words with
Westbrook over an expense report related to the public housing project in April 1939 and
yet Westbrook continued to consult and be a friend to the colony. Perhaps Sharp's
outrage over the handsome compensation demanded by Westbrook would have been
softened had he considered the rich compensation paid by the English Fine Spinners
Association to AAA official Oscar G. Johnston. Beginning in 1927, the British
manufacturers paid Johnston $40,000 per year, an amount equivalent to $464,248 in
current dollars. Assuming that Delta sharecropper families earned $500 ($5,803 in 2006
dollars) per year during the 1920s, (the most liberal estimate I have yet found)
Westbrook's part-time income - his wages for ninety days - was a relatively modest, by
today's standards, 12.5 times the annual income of the typical sharecropper family. If
one accepts the more orthodox estimate of Delta cropper family income, $120-$l,912in
2006 dollars, then Westbrook's part-time salary on a present-dollar annualized basis
exceeded that of the cropper by a factor of thirty-eight. If Westbrook had managed a
similar arrangement with other New Deal entities, he could have achieved an annual parttime income of $290,908 in 2006 dollars, exclusive of his government salary. There is
some evidence that he did. Of course, one of the barons of the cotton aristocracy, Oscar
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G. Johnston, earned exclusive of his government salary, a little over 80 times the income
of the most successful Delta cropper family.14
Whether money or compassion for the poor motivated people to get in the relief
business, there were ample opportunities to exert influence and to build political strength
in job patronage. Whether one "got on" or "got in" at Dyess could be a function of
influence. Governor Carl E. Bailey had reason to suspect that Floyd Sharp and others
were building political power by using the facilities of Dyess.

Dyess Colony - a brief political history
Three distinct crises illuminate the political history of Dyess Colony. Two of
them - the second following the first almost immediately, in March 1939 - came as a
function of Arkansas Governor Carl E. Bailey's attempt to savage the political career of
Floyd Sharp and to appropriate the awards of the patronage system. The third crisis was
actuated by a revolt of some of the colonists. The first battle came as Governor Bailey narrowly winning a consecutive term, miffed by the opposition of Floyd Sharp, et. al.,
and jealous of the power-building patronage inherent in the relief and rehabilitation
programs - instigated a plan to have Dyess Colony investigated and then placed under the
control of Arkansas officials. In the second effort to destroy the colony, the Governor
revoked the colony's charter.
14

Ibid.; letter to Dear Floyd from Lawrence Westbrook, 20 April 1939 and a series of
letters between Sharp and Floyd from 1936 through 1941, all in RG 96. Lawrence J.
Nelson, King Cotton's Advocate: Oscar G. Johnston and the New Deal, (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1999), 39. The estimate of cropper income, the most
liberal one I have found is from: Paul E Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural
Poverty, (Baton Rouge: The University of Louisiana Press, 1978), 10-11.
http://www.proiects.ex.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/current/howmuch.html

Plain whites were only tangentially involved in the first two crises; they were the
substance of the third. The third crisis is a principal consideration of Chapter Five.
Throughout Dyess colony history a coterie of bureaucrats managed, directed, supervised,
and improved, or tried to improve, the dispossessed whites. As New Deal agencies
succeeded one another in bewildering rapidity, Dyess Colony was exempt from some of
the agency-transition problems. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided
the funds that purchased the land and built the project by providing a grant to the State
Emergency Relief Administration; Arkansas had no legal mechanism for operating a
commercial enterprise. To provide a legal entity, the state of Arkansas (like most other
states) established a Rural Rehabilitation Corporation (RRC) under Delaware laws; The
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation passed Federal funds to national and state
relief and rehabilitation efforts and held title to Colonization Project No. 1. Upon the
creation of the Resettlement Administration and the tragic death of William R. Dyess,
Floyd Sharp, Dyess's successor, joined with H.C. Baker and R.C. Limmerick to
incorporate Dyess Colony, Inc. with all three shares of stock pledged in trust to Harry
Hopkins.
The corporate status of the project both simplified and complicated the
experiment's existence. The Arkansas RRC provided funding, for not only construction
and implementation of the colony, but also allowed for some flexibility for emergencies
and the colonists' debt. Primarily, the fund was to ensure the colony's existence. The
Board of Directors invested the sizable remaining balance of the FERA grant in
government bonds; the Board of Directors was authorized to use the bonds as security for
loans to the Colony. In emergencies, the Board was authorized to sell the bonds to fund
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capital needs. Floyd Sharp, H.C. Baker, R. C. Limerick, and W. A. Rooksberry,
constituted the board of the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. Thus, three of
four board members of the RRC became the Board of Directors of Colonization Project
#1; Floyd Sharp was President and H. C. Baker, and RC. Limerick completed the
directorship. W.A. Rooksberry, Director of the Unemployment Security Division of the
state Labor Department, friend of Floyd Sharp, and political enemy of soon-to-be
Governor Carl E. Bailey declined Board membership; he preferred, said Floyd Sharp in a
letter to Harry Hopkins, to remain as an associate and advisor. The formation of Dyess
Colony was not part of Dyess's original conception. There is no evidence that he ever
conceived of the colonization project as anything other than part of an organized multiunit re-orientation of small-scale agriculture. The incorporation of Dyess, apart from any
umbrella U.S. agency authority, was the product of Floyd Sharp. Baker and Limerick
both remained employed by the Arkansas Emergency Relief Agency and its successor the
Works Progress Administration (WPA). Further legal maneuvering involved separate
corporations for the operation of the various Dyess Colony attendant business and
operations such as the colony store, gin, and the business interests of the colonists.
The Board of Directors decided to incorporate, under the laws of Arkansas, two
cooperative associations, one to operate the colony's store and the other to gin and
market the colonists'cotton-a consumer's and a producer's cooperative. By 1938, the
Colony would have its own credit union, also cooperatively owned. The use of Arkansas
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incorporation laws rather than those of Delaware was to leave the colony vulnerable to
the vengeful actions of Governor Carl E. Bailey.15
Governor Carl E. Bailey was the leader of the Arkansas "statehouse crowd" that
vied with Sharp's associates for control of patronage and power. Although it is not to his
credit, the actions of Bailey as a state governor, were similar to those of many governors
who were jealous of the power held by the WPA chiefs. Fearful of potential vulnerability
should the colony remain a part of the Arkansas RRC, Sharp requested help from allies in
Washington. Dr. H. M. Colvin, an attorney with the Works Progress Administration
(WPA), helped Sharp around the thorny problem of how to keep continued control of the
colony. Colvin assured Sharp that incorporating under Arkansas laws rather than those of
Delaware was proper and provided the greatest legal protection for the continued
governance of the colony by Sharp and his colleagues. The language seemed to require
that the Board of Directors of a chartered cooperative be chosen from the ordinary
membership. Colvin explained to Sharp that the Arkansas statutes provided loopholes
that avoided any diminution of the control of the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony,
Inc. This attempt to evade democratic governance made the Colony vulnerable to attack
from New Deal opponents and was ultimately responsible for the disintegration of Dyess
Colony. This incident is also indicative of the advantages that Sharp held in the New
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Dyess to Westbrook, 30 November 1934; "Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting,
Dyess Colony, Incorporated," 17 February 1936; 25 March 1936; 17 March 1937;
Memorandum to W.R. Dyess from Leon B. Catlett; "Certificate of Incorporation Colony
Industries, Incorporated, all in University of Arkansas Special Collections, WPA
Management File. Letter from Sharp to Hopkins, RG 96. See also, letter from Sharp to
Westbrook, 11 December 1936.

112
Deal hierarchy. Although free of the control and direction of the WPA, Sharp still had
access to WPA staff for advice and research.

l

In April 1936, President Roosevelt created the Resettlement Administration and
appointed Rexford G. (Guy) Tugwell as its Director. The Resettlement Administration
assumed all the agrarian community efforts of the WPA, FERA, and DSH with three
exceptions: Cherry Lake Farms at Madison, Florida; Pine Mountain Valley near
Columbus, Georgia; and Dyess Colony. The corporate set up saved Dyess, possibly,
from destruction at the hands of the cotton-baron dominated political machine under the
administration of Carl E. Bailey. Bailey (inaugurated in January 1937) intended,
according to reportage in the Arkansas Gazette, to destroy Floyd Sharp; he had already
driven W.A. Rooksberry from his influential position, and to injure the colony's new
attorney, former Governor J. Marion Futrell. Since the two cooperative associations were
incorporated under Arkansas law, Bailey attempted to force a complete investigation into
all manner of alleged improprieties at Dyess. He had authority to do so, he said, because
the State of Arkansas might or might not have "an interest" in those corporations. The
colony escaped Bailey's intended maledictions, oddly enough, through the efforts of
some of Bailey's traditional supporters. The House Version of the Bill (HB 616) that
authorized an investigation of the colony is instructive, especially its title and Section 3,
produced below:
A bill for an Act to be entitled; "An act to determine the extent of
the State of Arkansas' interest in establishment, management, and
disposition of Dyess Colony."

H.M. Colvin to Floyd Sharp, 8 May 1936, RG 69 WPA Central Office Files.
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Section 3. Whereas, it appears that the initial investments in what
is now Dyess Colony were made with funds allotted to the state of
Arkansas by the Federal Emergency Relief Adrninistration for general
relief, said funds being endorsed or paid over to the Arkansas Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation; and provision is made in the charter of that
corporation for title in Dyess Colony to pass to the state of Arkansas after
certain conditions have been fulfilled; and Dyess Colony, Inc., has
succeeded the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation in control of the
colony, and it is imperative, if Arkansas has any immediate or prospective
interest in the colony that said interest be determined and protected; now
therefore this act is necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and
safety of the public of Arkansas and it shall be in force and effective from
and after its passage.17
There is nothing apparently sinister about Section 3. Reasonable and disinterested people
could easily find value in ascertaining the ultimate disposition of Dyess property.
However, the purported reason for the bill, i.e., an investigation into whether or not the
state of Arkansas had "an interest" in the colony was disingenuous at the least. The
corporate structure of Dyess mandated that at the suspension of operations the title fell to
the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States; the assets to be distributed via
agreements between the Governor of Arkansas and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.
The House passed the bill but upon presentation in the Senate, the bill met with open
hostility by those who recognized the vicious political vendetta that it represented. The
bill called for an investigation conducted, not by the Attorney General, but by the
Corporation Commission, a board recently "refreshed" by Bailey appointees. Such
blatant, malicious, and transparent political debauchery was too much even for the rough
and tumble Arkansas politicians. Arkansas governors, since the Reconstruction
Constitution (from 1874 and until 1984), served terms of two years and could serve
successive terms. The bi-annual election required that contestants for political power
Copy of Arkansas House Bill 616, RG 69, WPA Central Office Records.
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(not always represented in holding office) keep close tabs and short accounts with their
political allies.18
At its creation Dyess Colony filed papers with the State Corporation Commission
claiming non-profit status. The cooperatives were simply an entity for managing and
directing cooperative economic activities for individual cooperative members. All
profits, dividends, and surpluses were distributed among the members. Angered by
Sharp's support of his gubernatorial opponent, Bailey had his functionaries introduce a
bill that called for an investigation of the Dyess Colony by the State Corporation
Commission.19
By 7 March 1939, Floyd Sharp was confident that nothing would come of
Bailey's assault. He informed Lawrence Westbrook, "It seems that my friends conceived
the idea of putting an amendment on the Bill transferring the question... to the Office of
the Attorney General, on the theory that it was a legal question and not one for the
Corporation Commission to investigate with auditors." After opposing the amendment,
the administration changed its view and urged its adoption in order to have a vote on the
bill before adjournment. Even though the general consensus held that the addition of the
amendment was the death-knell of Bailey's attempt to disgrace Sharp, Bailey faced one
final frustration in his attempt. On the last day of the legislative session, State Senator
Ellis Fagan, a long-time friend of Governor Bailey, began a filibuster. Fagan's loyalty to
the Governor, notwithstanding, he allowed only three brief interruptions while he slowly
and deliberately read the introductory remarks from the Colony's last audit. Ellis Fagan,

Arkansas Democrat, 6- 9 March 1939; Arkansas Gazette, 6- 9 March 1939.
Ibid.
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a loyal Bailey supporter and "statehouse crowd" stalwart proved by his actions that he
was capable of rising above petty Arkansas political considerations. The Arkansas
Legislative Session ended at noon on 9 March 1939; the Colony had been spared.
Floyd Sharp wrote to Lawrence Westbrook in words that are easily interpreted as
"crocodile tears" or simply a smirk. He reported to Westbrook on 9 March:
I feel badly about it for several reasons. First, Senator Fagan, who
led the floor fight has been a close personal friend of Governor Bailey for
years...
I thought it wise, in self-defense, to show a little strength and
defeat this measure, and was successful, but it will only serve to intensify
their feelings against me.
The next day Governor Bailey dropped the other shoe. The State Corporation
Commission revoked the Dyess Charter. Bailey had carefully replaced members of the
commission with his own allies and had them revoke the charter claiming the Dyess
Colony had failed to file a report for three years and had not paid the $ 11.00 annual fee
required of Arkansas Corporations. The Dyess Colony Board of Directors promptly
published two letters from the Arkansas Corporation Commission to the Colony
informing that the Colony was indeed classified as a non-profit and therefore, exempt
from taxes and reports. The letters, dated 9 February and 21 February, addressed to J.M.
Futrell and Dyess Colony, respectively, were followed by a strange and in retrospect
downright goofy epistle from W.S. Miller, of the commission. He said that since they
had informed the Colony and its attorney in February that the colony qualified as a nonprofit, that they had thought about it some more and decided that the Colony was not
20
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Letter to Lawrence Westbrook from Floyd Sharp, RG 96.
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exempt. The letter informing of the revised status dated 10 March 1939, arrived a full ten
days too late for Dyess Colony to comply with the reconsidered regulations. Miller's last
sentence in the letter explained why he had bothered to write, "I feel you are entitled to
know the position taken by the commission." In the meantime, Ellis Fagan received
praise for his political integrity and it did not cost the Governor at all.
Sharp, in Donald Holley's description, now subdued and depressed, assembled
advisors and with Limerick and Baker formed Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation.
In turn, the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony Incorporated sold the property to Dyess
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation.23 The disposition of the Colony was clearly
articulated; at the end of operations, mandated by the revocation of the Charter to
conclude within three years, the assets would devolve to the Secretary of Agriculture of
the United States. Floyd Sharp remained President of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation until its functions were subsumed into the Farm Security Administration
(FSA) in 1944. "In 1951 the Farmers Home Association (FHA) simply closed its files on
the Dyess Colony."24
Blanks and Bureaucracy at Dyess
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"Minutes" 22 March 1939; W.S. Miller, Secretary Tax Division, Arkansas Corporation
Commission to Dyess Colony, Inc., 9 February 1939; W.S. Miller to J. M. Futrell, 21
February 1939; and W.S. Miller to J.M. Futrell, Legal Advisor, 10 March 1939, all in
University of Arkansas Special Collections, WPA Management File. Letter from Sharp
to Colonel F. C. Harrington, Works Progress Administration, 17 March 1939; telegram
from the Arkansas Democrat" to Washington, D. C. reporter, 16 March 1939; all in RG
96.
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The Great Depression may have been the worst of times, but not as bad for some
as for others. Cotton barons, the politically connected, and government bureaucrats fared
better than most. From every rattle of the New Deal cup there poured letters designating
a new level of federal bureaucracy. Each alphabet agency required its own directors,
administrators, assistants, and a horde of clerical personnel, caseworkers, home
demonstrators, inspectors, and accountants. Some plain whites of the Delta meekly
submitted to the status of wage-labor relief and the psychological and physical malaise
into which it cast them. A phalanx of self-consciously competent and solemnly serious
bureaucrats inspected their houses, rummaged through personal possessions, asked
pointed and embarrassing questions about spending and personal habits; they wanted to
know: how "enthusiastic" they were in their religion, how much they drank, and what
diseases and disabilities were present. The "government men" directed, or tried to, their
lives. Dyess Colony and government men introduced plain whites to one of the most
irritating attributes of modernity; they produced "blanks." Government men required
blanks, or forms, for the commodities program, a blank for Rural Relief registration, a
blank for WPA eligibility, another one for certification, a blank for, it seemed, about
everything one touched in the New Deal.25
In the New Deal, blanks represented power and assumed an aura of authority
equal to at least that of the Minor Prophets. It seemed to the dispossessed that blanks
were the key to actuating the programs of the New Deal, and plain white petitioners had
^"Blank" was the generic term most used for application forms. See: James Truly to W.
R. Dyess, no date, WPA File. "Pertinent Agricultural Data," typewritten draft of form
used in interviewing potential clients, RG 96.The reference to "government men" and
"the girl in the office" are ubiquitous in the archives. For example, see: Levi Skyron to
W.R. Dyess,14 October 1934.
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great difficulty locating them. Representative of this appreciation of the near miracleworking power of the blank is the supposition of T.H. Davis of Prattsville, Arkansas.
Davis asked W.R. Dyess when the application blanks would be distributed for sale. The
reverence that plain whites gave to blanks was a subset of the value that they gave to the
printed and official word. One of the most obvious markers of success was the inclusion
of one's name on the letterhead.

26

Official letterhead clothed the bearer with authority not necessarily justified by
the verbiage, as illustrated by Mrs. Emery Hall of Lake City, Arkansas. Mrs. Hall was in
a fix. She had told her landlord, who was insisting that she vacate the property, about
Colonization Project No. 1, and showed him a letter on official stationary from W.R.
Dyess. Dyess's letter was a standard generic response to queries about becoming a
colonist. The form letter said, among other things, that the first colonists would arrive in
October; Mrs. Hall, accordingly, had made plans to move. She showed her letter to her
landlord who agreed, based on the power of the official printed word and Mrs. Hall's
interpretation of it, to allow her to stay on her place until October. Mrs. Hall was
desperate by 6 October. She had not enrolled her children in the local school because she
could not afford to buy two sets of books - one for the local school and another for use in
the colony's schools. She had not heard from Dyess, was she going to get one of the
farms? Her landlord wanted her to move. What was she to do? She wanted help and
advice; she asked the man whose name was emblazoned on the official script. 27
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Letter to W.R. Dyess from T.H. Davis, 24 September 1935, WPA Administration File.

Letter to W.R. Dyess from Mrs. Emery Hall, 6 October 1934, Ibid. Mrs. Hall's effort to
gain entrance to the Colony continued. See Chapter Five.
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Blanks, or the lack of them, had already driven both government men and their
clients to distraction. In the 1931 England, Arkansas "food riot" local Red Cross officials
ran out of blanks and, according to administrative orthodoxy, had no choice but to halt
distribution of emergency subsistence vouchers - blanks in the vernacular of plain folks.
The plain whites of England, Arkansas did not yet appreciate the sacrosanct nature of the
blank; they failed to see how the lack of a form was credible reason for their children to
go hungry again. The merchants of England, rather than see their stock of goods
appropriated by the crowd prevailed upon the Red Cross locals to accept receipts, in lieu
of vouchers. In the summer of 1933, with three weeks left in the cotton acreage reduction
sign-up period, a shortage of blanks brought howls from the County Extension Agents
frantically trying to implement the program. T. Roy Reid, director of the Arkansas
Extension Service wired Cully Cobb, head of the Cotton Section of the AAA and former
director of the Mississippi Extension Service: "Need contract blanks immediately.
Campaign being greatly retarded by shortage of blanks. Please rush supply." Stymied
because of the lack of the semi-sacred script, Reid, a few days later, reported on the
sluggish progress, "committeemen could finish this week if blanks available." Finally,
someone from this large group of college educated government men courageously broke
the bounds of orthodoxy and suggested that the county agents make their own blanks,
using any form of suitable paper. They could make the plow-up pledges legal by
transferring them to the proper blanks (forms) later. It is difficult for contemporaries to
understand the power of perceived "official words." Plain whites felt reverence and
stood in awe of the power of the printed word.
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Mississippi County, Dyess's home county, was an ideal place to hatch
Colonization Project No. 1. Later, Arkansas investigators would quiz William Dyess
about the happy circumstances of its physical location in Dyess's home county. Dyess
avoided sanction not only because it appears there was no collusion involved but also
because it would be hard to imagine a better deal on Delta land. How much land Dyess
bought, from whom, and how much he paid for it became grounds of contention. Dyess,
using funds from the original FERA grant, negotiated the purchase at $2.50 per acre. The
public perception that Dyess had bought the land for $2.50 an acre obscured the truth.
Before Dyess could deliver the property to the Arkansas Emergency Relief
Administration, there was a matter of accumulated levee taxes, drainage district fees,
survey costs, and myriad incidentals. Mirroring the complaints of the Tupelo and
McComb Division of Substance Housing projects, and citing the $2.50 land price, Dyess
colonists viewed the final purchase-price as an outrage. Further misunderstandings arose
because of the reportage of the land sale. The Memphis Commercial Appeal reported
that Dyess purchased about 20,000 acres of land; The Southwest Times Record reported
that the purchase included 10,000 acres; the Colony Herald reported 16,000 acres, and a
history of the colony says Dyess bought 16,000 acres from "drainage district no.9 at an
average price of $8.50 an acre in back taxes.

Some references cite 17,000 acres, others

about 17,000, and still others quote 17,500 acres. The foremost historian of the New
Deal agricultural efforts in the lower Mississippi Valley, Donald Holley, has untangled

Historical Quarterly, 4, (4), (Winter, 2000): 389-406; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 3-5;
17-24.
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the web. Dyess originally planned to purchase 20,000 acres belonging to Lee Wilson
Company, Creamery Package Company, and drainage district Number 9. He was not
able to negotiate that purchase. Finally, Dyess purchased 15,144 acres of tax-forfeited
cut over and swamp land. The final cost, not price, of the improved land was
$136,994.49, $9.05 per acre. Perception is often far more important than reality; the
perceptions about price and costs incited dramatic Dyess revolts.
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In addition to the confusion over the size of the purchase, some thought that W.R.
Dyess had acquired the property in order to benefit his personal associates. Responding
to questions about the project by Senator Thomas P.Gore of Oklahoma in debate over the
proposed Bankhead Bill in the U.S. Senate, Dyess wrote, not to the Oklahoma solon, but
to the Arkansas boss, Senator Joe T. Robinson. He hastened to assure Robinson that the
land purchase was a disinterested business transaction.
When the titles, passed on by our Legal Department in amount of
approximately 16,000 acres, were presented to us for payment, the Federal
Court, through its receiver, gave us a title to this property. The Drainage
Commissioners of both Districts No. 9 and Nos. 3 to 9 gave us title to this
property, and at no time has any part of this property been purchased by
us from any individual whatever?1 (Italic emphasis added)
Dyess's letter to Robinson also anticipated and answered another implied criticism. The
land had been offered for sale at $5.00 per acre, yet Dyess acquired it for half that
amount. Dyess explained thus:

Hemen, "Detailed Report the Dyess Rural Industrial Community," RG 96.; Holley,
Uncle Sam's Farmers, 35; Henson, "Memories of the Dyess Colony," RG 96; Southwest
Times Record, 20 May 1934; The Mississippi County Sentinel, 22 Mayl934; Arkansas
Gazette, 9 January 1939; "National Register of Historical Places Inventory - Nomination
Form," Dyess Colony, University of Arkansas Special Collections.
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While it is true that the Commissioners and the Receiver did have
to do some trading to deliver us this property tax free, this Administration
dealt with no people in this purchase except the Federal Receiver and the
Commissioners of those districts.32
There were other reasons that recommended Mississippi County. In the first
place, Mississippi County, according to the 1930 Census, was the most productive
(pounds of lint per acre) cotton county in the entire nation; its 899 square miles of
territory also made it the largest county in Arkansas. The particular tract, bisected by the
Tyronza River - eight miles from its nearest point to the Mississippi River, on which the
Colony rested, was mostly cutover stump land and the few virgin areas contained gigantic
hardwoods. The top soil, measured in various sections of the tract, ranged from forty to
over 100 feet deep. The citizens of Mississippi County were accustomed to cultivating
the Delta buckshot black land, were acclimated to the environment, familiar with the
vagaries of Delta farming, and numerous. The total population grew from 47,320 in 1920
to 69,289 in 1930 - a 46% increase. In 1930, only 2% of its 69,289 residents worked in
industry. Mississippi County was one of those desperation destinations for plain whites
fleeing the sterile and drought-baked lands of the South. In the ten year period from
1920-1930, the white population of Mississippi County grew from just under 16,000 to
43,144 - an increase of over 170%. The black population actually fell by a little over
5,000 during those years. If ever there was an ideal place and people among whom to
conduct a bold relief and rehabilitation agrarian experiment, it was Mississippi County,
Arkansas. Thousands of "pure anglo-saxon (sic) rural whites and just plain American
negroes" (said FERA inspectors) lived near acres and acres of black land, knew the
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peculiarities of living in the Delta, and were surprised to find that there was no place for
them at Dyess. The Mississippi County folks confronted, perhaps, the first of the
puzzling ways of government men. The project was not for Delta folks, but for the entire
state of Arkansas. There were many other instances of those puzzling ways.
Building Dyess from scratch
The New Deal confronted Americans with bureaucracy. Small town and rural
America were accustomed to a mild form of line-standing regimentation. Voting,
ginning, and various items of civic and personal business required a certain stylized
behavior. One waited in line, dressed appropriately, and conducted one's business with a
person. Plain whites had little interaction with the governmental bureaucracy; they had
little reason to do so. Most every item of business, private or governmental, was
dispatched directly and with a name, a face, and in most cases, a reputation. When plain
whites received a letter, they took it seriously. When they had a question, they attempted
to do what they always did - ask the man in charge. To modern eyes, the responses and
queries of plain folks in the 1930s appear simple and naive. Some, no doubt, were.
However, that which we dismiss as simple, romantic, or just naivete is just as likely a
function of personal responsibility and integrity. In the late summer and fall of 1935,
President Roosevelt wrote clergymen across the United States asking them for an
evaluation of progress. Thousands of them gave the President the benefit of their views.
Revered Henry Felgar Brooks, Pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church, South of
Tupelo, Mississippi did not feel competent to give the President advice. He could only
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report on the comments and attitudes of his parishioners. His only criticism concerned
the requirement that only those who had been on relief were able to obtain work relief.
He reminded the President:
The "Works Program" meets a general need, but there is a pretty general
criticism on it that it applies only for those have been on relief rolls. There
are hundreds and thousands of people who have not asked the government
for one penny of help. Some of them have nothing scarcely to live upon.
Others have but little, but out of their self-respect and regard for the
government of our nation, they have not asked for anything. These are in
need... I personally feel that they ought to be included in the "Works
Program."
Perhaps you might remember me if I should recall to your memory that I
chanced to be the minister who gave the Invocation in the big open field
where you addressed masses on the occasion of your visit to our city . . ,34
Some of the President's correspondent Ministers really thought that the President would
read and respond. Plain whites wrote letters. Some of them are pitiful, some are
eloquent, some are manipulative, some are honest, and all of them - even the ones meant
to deceive - are revealing.
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Visions of ownership of a farm at Dyess came with the announcement of the
project; however, the first promise of economic relief for the dispossessed of Mississippi
County was in the building of it. The scale of the task is greatly underappreciated. The
depression witnessed truly spectacular feats of construction. The Boulder (Hoover) Dam,
the dams and transmission lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and even the
privately constructed depression-era Chrysler and Empire State Buildings tend to
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overshadow the impressive feats of human organization and productivity in the Arkansas
Delta. During the summer and fall of 1934 and into the fall of 1935, Construction
Superintendent Cone Murphy managed the work of as many as 1,500 men at a time in
building an agricultural community from rugged swamps and a modern town complete
with necessary and optional amenities.
Starting in the northeast corner of the property, Cone put crews of unskilled men
to work cutting trees, digging drainage ditches, building bridges and constructing roads.
Six gasoline operated sawmills - two of them portable - and one steam sawmill rendered
the hardwoods into building materials for the colony or for sale. Crews began laying out
the property into twenty-acre plots, and clearing a two-acre house site for each farm.
Officials soon realized, even before any colonists moved in, that the regimentation of
twenty acres per family was not a workable notion. To accommodate different sized
families, Dyess provided standardized homes in three versions, and later after much
discussion and complaint, the colony relaxed its rules and allowed the division of
property into plots of 20,30, and 40 acres. There was no direct correlation between house
and farm size. The labor force of a family determined the acreage; the aggregate number
determined the bedrooms. The size of the farm depended, just as it had under the
sharecropping system, on the family's labor force. A couple with a teen-aged son could
live decently in one of the three room hoses, yet they had labor sufficient for the efficient
cultivation of more than twenty acres. On the other hand, a young family with four small
children could apply only one person to cultivation, yet justify a four or five room house.
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Indeed, the farm size envisioned for the colonists at Dyess is emblematic of the clash of
notions relative to the role of agriculture in the social and economic fabric of the country.
Farm sizes at Dyess Colony reflect a misapplication of the work of Howard Odom,
Arthur Raper, T. J. Woofter, and others. Erosion, thin soil, and the boll weevil plagued
Raper's Georgia counties. The land at Dyess flooded - it did not erode; the topsoil at
Dyess was from forty to over 100 feet deep - its phosphorus content could support cotton
crops for ninety years without enrichment. The boll weevil, like the Death Angel that
passed over the obedient Children of Israel, barely disturbed the cotton culture or the
economy in the Delta; it devastated the "cotton-South."

37

The logging crews were unskilled men taken from the rolls of the Mississippi
County office of the National Reemployment Service; the skilled workers came,
primarily, from the rolls of the Arkansas State office. Using some of the 65,000 board
feet of lumber produced daily by the colony sawmills, Murphy also built facilities for the
workers. Until the camp was established, workers arrived every day by truck from
Osceola. Assertions that the project was located near any established community were
generous. According to the Project Records, the "nearest urban center" was Lepanto,
seven miles west; Tyronza and Basset, each about twelve miles away, Wilson was
approximately ten miles. The nearest significant town, Osceola, was twenty miles away;
Blytheville was thirty and Memphis lay on the east bank of the Mississippi seventy-five
miles to the east while the Arkansas WPA and ERA managers resided in Little Rock, 169
miles to the northwest. Until Murphy's crews built the road, one could not get to Dyess
from anywhere. By mid June, crews had completed a temporary headquarters building,
37
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barracks for the workers, and a kitchen that served three mess halls. Two of the dining
facilities served white laborers, the other one fed black workers. The workers lived in
one of four bunkhouses, equipped with an iron cot, cotton mattress, blanket and clean
sheets. Laborers paid seventy-five cents a day for board and lodging, deducted from
paychecks. The total cost of feeding and lodging crews during the construction period
amounted to $26, 820.66, of which $16, 274.14 was reimbursed via payroll deductions.38
The construction pace picked up apace with the growing work force. In less than
eighteen months Murphy's crews built 500 farm cottages, about 65 miles of graded and
graveled main roads (26 feet wide), an almost equal number of secondary roads (22 feet
wide), 25 main bridges, 35 small ones, about 35 miles of drainage ditches, barns, chicken
coops, and all of the structures, including the "community center" residences for the
government men in the town. The roar from two caterpillar diesel tractors, three
draglines, two ditch dredges, one pile driver, seven sawmills, concrete mixer, planning
mill, and six International Harvester trucks mingled with the slap of the wheels and tires
of sixteen eight-wheeled log wagons, thirty-two lumber wagons, three road wagons, two
wheel-barrows, and a horde of mules. (The mule lot built near the community center
could accommodate 300.) According to State Auditor, Robert H. McNair, the above
listed equipment, excluding the mules but including a "Plymouth Coach Automobile"
cost $94,358.49. For an indication of the size of this project in contemporary terms,
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consider. Calculated based on the consumer price index (CPI), the cost of this equipment
today would be a little over $142 million. The Plymouth cost the colony $675.50.
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Project Director Cone Murphy carried out the construction of Dyess with great
celerity and efficiency. Murphy's crews were so accomplished that they completed the
farm cottages well before the social workers identified and transported the colonists to
their new homes. Using the plans drawn by Dyess's associate, Architect Howard
Eichenbaum, Murphy assembled a crew of twenty-five carpenters and closely supervised
them as they completed a model of each basic design. Then Murphy assigned each of the
carpenters his own crew, gave each crew a set of Eichenbaum's plans, and sent them out
to build three, four, and five room farm cottages, even though the weather was
"abnormally" hot and both men and work animals were handicapped. There were several
cases of heat prostration and the workers " . . . were not pushed to their full capacity."40
By 1 August 1934, four colony residences were completed. The forty town-center
residences were built in close vicinity to the Community Building and were no different
in construction or design from the farm cottages. The residences were designed for the
associated administrators, teachers, and operators of the various commercial enterprises.
Laborers used the first house as sleeping quarters; planners used it to determine the cost
of furnishing a house. The government men decided that, "Three bedrooms, a living
room, and a kitchen were provided for in a very satisfactory manner at a cost of $195."41
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Murphy listed the expectations he imposed on his crews. His expectations were
identical to the supervising architect's estimate of actual time schedules. According to
Eichenbaum:
Each crew of seven men can lay three foundations per day.
A ten - man crew can construct the frame for a five-room house in 16
hours.
Four men can shingle a house in 6 hours.
Eight men can place the siding in 16 hours.
Eight men can complete the ceiling and floors in 16 hours.
Three men can install the hardware, doors, and windows in 16 hours.
Five carpenters and two laborers can complete the barns in 6 hours.
Six men can prime a house prior to painting in 5 hours.
Six painters can paint the house in 6 hours. 2
After the initial routines were established, the construction crews proceeded much more
rapidly than did those responsible for identifying and selecting potential colonists.
Changes in philosophy over the acreage allowed caused some retardation of the building
schedule, but no potential colonists had to wait for a home upon arrival at Dyess.
Murphy's crews built it faster than the FERA or the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation (RRC) or the Resettlement Administration (RA) could fill it. By 31
December, workers had completed 146 farm cottages and twenty residences; two cottages
and four residences were under construction; and wired forty-three buildings for
electricity. With much the same reasoning that had prompted the DSH to build the
McComb Homesteads with wiring but no electrical power, both electrical wiring and
indoor plumbing appliances were included in the construction.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Word got out and plain whites responded, quickly. By May of 1934, letters
inundated Dyess's office asking for information, asserting intention to take up the
government's offer, inquiring as to what type or class of people would be accepted, or
expressing frustration with the lack of information. Thousands of Mississippi County
dispossessed whites and blacks were near destitution. Some had lost their farms due to
physical, climatic, or economic forces; others lost their commercial positions because of
the drastic fall in economic activity. They longed to join the throng and the cacophony
emanating from the sylvestrian swamps of Mississippi County. Colonization Project No.
1 offered hope to the dispossessed in two ways. Some would find work, perhaps, as a
fulltime employee. The structures built to house the economic and community activities
of the colony - the thirty-two town residences built to house the workers and managers of
those activities - meant that there would be some real jobs available at the colony. The
distressed dispossessed looked for jobs. They were, in the vernacular of the time, trying
to "get on" at Dyess. The other avenue of hope for plain whites lay in the possibility of
obtaining a farm and a chance to become a personification of the Jeffersonian dream.
Plain whites made application to the project in order to become an independent yeoman
farmer. The second avenue of hope required that one "get in" at the colony; the first
required that one "get on."

u

"Getting on" at Dyess
Plain whites wanted jobs so they wrote. They wrote letters; they had other people
write letters; they referenced common acquaintances, and they tried to use pity, outrage,

See: WPA Management File Box 8; RG 96.
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or past association to "get on" at Dyess. Local folks were gratified to see that most of the
1,500 construction era workers were local men and that all of them were Arkansans.
However, notwithstanding the procedure of hiring men from the county and state
Reemployment Service offices, there was an area of discretion in selecting workmen.
Certain supervisors, particularly those whose tasks were of a skilled nature, could
"requisition" workers by name.45 This provision and the use of it make for interesting
reading and subtle commentary. The construction phase of the project gathered men
wholesale from the local office; it seemed that available jobs were assigned immediately.
If one depended on the mail to facilitate a hunt for employment, the Dyess construction
jobs would be taken before the missive arrived. However, Dyess was a new town, and
needed all sorts of people representing a range of experiences and skills. The population
growth was a bit slower than the planners expected but by the time that F. J. Hemmen
visited Dyess to ascertain business prospects for his Memphis Sears and Roebuck Store,
Dyess was a brand new and thriving, it seemed, town of about 3,000 people. There had
to be jobs. Some people wanted construction jobs - some construction or remodeling
continued throughout the life of Dyess Colony - some wanted a position, and some just
wanted a life.
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The ability to select specific workmen under the regulations is articulated in: letter to
Jay J. Johnson from W.R. Dyess, 15 October 1935. " . . . and should Mr. Murphy desire
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Letter to W.R. O'Donnell from Floyd Sharp, 10 March 1936, WPA Management File,
"We are terminating for this year the construction program, having completed five
hundred houses and the community center. We expect to construct three school buildings
a little later on under a W.P.A. project which of course will have to be relief labor and
pay security wage." Sharp's letter was in response to O'Donnell's query about full-time
employment as staff carpenter. Hemen, "Detailed Report the Dyess Rural Industrial
Community."; W.R. Dyess to C. M. Laird, 7 November 1934, WPA Administration File.

132
The rules concerning employment with the various New Deal agencies were
neither simple nor elegant but they did exist. In order to gain employment, applicants
had to satisfy the regulations; many suspected that they also must satisfy the "code." How
did one "get on" at Dyess; what was the combination to the code? W. R. Dyess clearly
translated the regulations to an applicant who desired employment at the colony as a
carpenter:
It will be necessary for you to register with the Reemployment
Officer in your County as Carpenter. You should have an investigation
made by the Relief Administration as to your needs, at which time have
your monthly budgetary requirements set by that agency, which will in
turn certify you to the Reemployment office for employment in connection
the Work Division in that County.
Persons assigned to work in the colonization project out of
Mississippi County must be done through the National Reemployment
Service, whose State Office is in Little Rock.47

Dyess's simplified articulation of the regulations made the laws more intelligible,
but said nothing about other, if any, more-informal requirements. Some applicants
concluded by virtue of perspicacity, intuition, or suspicion that one had to possess
influence, "pull" in the vernacular of the day, to secure a position. Mr. J.B. Reynolds

Most of the correspondence is found in the following: RG 69, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics; RG 96, Project Files; FDR Library, Clergy Letter File, the Gardner Pat
Jackson Papers, Harry Hopkins Papers; WPA Administration File; Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina, Delta Cooperative Farm Papers; Duke
University, Special Collections, Papers of the Socialist Party of America.
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of the Arkansas office of the National Reemployment Service.
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approached that issue directly in his letter of complaint and application, "Does it require
political pull to get help from the government?" he asked.
L. C. Hoover did not waste time with the niceties. He wrote Governor Futrell, in
a refreshingly collegial style, and his first sentence instructed the Governor to "Please
take up with Mr. Dyess and get me a job. I kneed (sic) work bad." He "would be very
glad to get the job as 'Commissary Manger' at the Dyess Colony in Mississippi County."
Hoover briefly reminded the Governor of his expertise and said that he would take "some
other good job" if the "Commissary Manger" job was taken. He made sure that Governor
understood that he fully understood the way one played the game. "Mr. Dyess has lots of
jobs" he told the Governor,"... and if you bear down on him he will give me any thing
you ask him for. You no (sic) I have a family and have a girl in St. Luke's Hospital, St.
Louis, making a nurse we have to keep her up - & wasn't for what work my son gets we
would not get by." Hoover urged Governor Futrell to "go get close behind Mr. Dyess
and make him come across..." It appears that Mr. Hoover did not have as much "pull"
with the Governor as he thought. The Governor "got close behind" Dyess by sending
him Hoover's letter. He wrote to W. R. Dyess, "I am inclosing a letter from Mr. L. C.
Hoover. He tells you of his experience, and you see his handwriting. I guess he is in
need." There is no record of Hoover's employment at Dyess Colony.49
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Letter to My Dear Governor Futrell from L.C. Hoover, 29 August 1934; letter to W. R.
Dyess from J.M. Futrell 20 September 1938, both in WPA Administration File, Box 8.
The term "Dyess Colony" was widely used even before the official name change upon
Dyess's death.

More sophisticated was the campaign conducted by Irvin Lay of Jerome,
Arkansas. Lay gathered his forces and had twelve (intentional symbolism?) of his
neighbors and fellow constituents petition Senator Joe T. Robinson. "We, the
undersigned voters and citizens of Arkansas respectfully request your personal aggressive
act in behalf of Mr. Irvin Lay of Jerome, Arkansas." (Italic emphasis added) "This
gentleman, well-known to us has filed his application with President Floyd Sharp and
with Hudson Wren concerning placement in Dyess Colony." Senator Robinson
forwarded the request/petition to Floyd Sharp with the suggestion that: "If he is found
qualified for the work he desires and there is a vacancy available, I should like to see him
given recognition." Floyd Sharp's response to Senator Robinson was tantamount to a
guarantee:
Mr. Lay is well recommended as an Agriculturist and we have his
application on file for consideration at the first opening in the Colony
where his services can be used. Of course, like all other agencies at this
time, the Colony is over-staffed, but apparently Mr. Lay, from his
recommendations, is the type of man that we hope to be able to assist in its
development.50
Senator Hattie Caraway also wanted to recommend an agriculturist for the
Colony. "Howard B. Arnold... states that he is well qualified for the place. I do not
know his qualifications but presume you do. I will appreciate your looking into the
case." Mr. Arnold had written to Dyess that his position with the National Industrial
Recovery Administration (salary $2,600) "was discontinued." He was, said Mr. Arnold,
a "graduate Agriculturist from a recognized agricultural college" W.R. Dyess's response
50
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Ibid.
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to Senator Caraway seems a bit terse: "We appoint only such persons as are suggested
and recommended by the University of Arkansas and the Extension Department." Dyess
addressed his letter to Mrs. Hattie Caraway. (Italic emphasis added)51
J. T. Mitchell's confidence injudicial influence was misplaced. Arkansas
Supreme Court Associate Justice Turner Butler wrote Floyd Sharp on Mitchell's behalf.
He had been informed, said the Judge, that one of the farm supervisors at the colony had
resigned. His letter attested to Mr. Mitchell's competence and character. Floyd Sharp
was not aware of any resignations and regretted that "we cannot give Mr. Mitchell
favorable consideration." E. W. Bradbury's position with the Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation was terminated and he eschewed the influence of state and national figures
in favor of the efforts of local attorneys. Perhaps all politics is local. E.S. Dudley, soon
to be Resident Manager, wrote to one of Bradshaw's barrister boosters that,"... I would
be very glad to place him on the Colony should I have the opportunity." G. V. Ludlum
wanted to run the Colony's cleaning and alteration facilities. With his letter to Floyd
Sharp, he enclosed six letters of recommendation from local clothing merchants. He had
done the alteration work for all of them and they all praised his skills and speed in drycleaning and altering clothing.53
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Letter to Leon B. Catlett from E. S, Dudley, Administrator, 19 April 1933, Ibid.

Letter to Mr. Floyd Sharp from Turner Butler, 18 December 1936; letter to Floyd Sharp
from H. T. Mitchell, 21 December 1936; letter to Hon. Turner Butler from Floyd Sharp,
23 December 1936; letter to Floyd Sharp from G.V. Ludlam, with enclosures, 27 March
1935, all Ibid. One final effort to "get on" at Dyess via the application of influence is
worthy of consideration. It is worth attention for at least two reasons. First, it is most
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The plain and not-so-plain whites discussed thus far seem to have been of the
commercial and technical classes. They attempted to use influence because, in their
estimation, they had it to use. They were not the most luminary among those who wanted
to "get on" at Dyess. Frank Horsfall, past President of Monticello A. & M. College had
Governor Futrell write to Dyess on his behalf. Dr. H. D. Burrus in application as
Physician to the Colony did not include any letters of recommendation. He listed Little
Rock and North Little Rock politicians as references, among them: one editor, two
lawyers, three ex-county judges, and two postmasters, one of whom he "helped to make
Mayor of North Little Rock three different times." Dr. Burrus barely mentioned his
experience and made absolutely no references to his medical education or membership in
any medical society. He did say, however, that he was "wearing a $5.00 hat I won on
Roosevelt." J. G. Waskam, Attorney and Counselor at Law from Marked Tree was
informed that former governor, "J. M. Futrell will be replaced in his official capacity as
attorney for Dyess Colony, Arkansas." Floyd Sharp answered his application and

representative of the manner in which plain whites attempted to use others' influence.
The letter of application and the enclosed references are polite, to the point, and
professional. The second reason this particular applicant attracts attention is his son's
tragic end. Vincent W. Foster of Hope, Arkansas wanted a position as a purchasing agent
for the Colony. He asked for an interview and enclosed highly complimentary letters
from two building and lumber companies in Hope, Arkansas. There is no record of Mr.
Foster's employment at Dyess Colony. The name is familiar because the son of this, at
one time, un-employed dispossessed white achieved prominence and influence exceeding
that of any of the letter-writers and petitioners. In the opening days of the Clinton
Presidency, Vincent W. Foster, Jr., attorney and advisor to the most powerful man in the
Western World met his death under by bis own hand on the George Washington Parkway
in suburban Washington, D. C. Letter to W.R. Dyess from Vincent W. Foster; to W.R.
Dyess from Al Harris, Hope Building Material Company; to W. R. Dyess from J. R.
Williams and Sons, all Ibid.

137
informed him that "our present attorney is under a three-year contract, and there is no
plan or possibility of his being replaced in the near future."54
Other job seekers, without influence or not confident with it, tried different ways
to crack the code. Letters from ex-servicemen cited their veteran's status as justification
for some kind of job. Others described their skill as a barber or beautician, well driller,
carpenter, painter - and some tried to convince officials of the value of specialized
talents. Mrs. W.H. Shopach wanted to know if Dyess did not see the value of hiring
someone to teach the colonists "how to can all sorts of vegetables, fruits and meats as we
have owned and can with a steam presser (sic) cooker for the last five (5) years." 55
Regardless of the common wisdom propagated by Erskine Caldwell and H.L.
Menken about rural southerners and hillbillies, people who tried to "get on" at Dyess
appear to be unremarkably normal. There is very little dramatic and pity-inducing
verbiage in their letters. They do admit to needing a job, and some emphasize that point
most, but their letters are measured, thoughtful and focused, as were the people who
wrote them. Some of the letters contained grammar, spelling, and syntax errors, but most
supplicants carefully composed their letters; some approached eloquence. "You will be
greatly esteemed if you will let me know whether there is a position open for an 'allaround' instructor and leader for the educational, social, and home activities in your plans
for the Farm Community in Mississippi County, Arkansas."56 Those critics who seek

54
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evidence of a degraded culture or a puny work ethic in the society and culture of
unfortunate plain white victims of the Great Depression will be disappointed with the
writing of those that tried to "get on" at Dyess. A much greater number of people tried to
"get in" than tried to "get on." Their letters are more dramatic, complicated, poignant,
pitiful, and interesting.
Getting "in" at Dyess
Fred Westbrook did "not want to come to the Colony myself until I get well." His
letter of application suggested, instead, that he send his wife and ten children. He was
confident that his family could clear the ground and make a crop the first year. He had
six boys and two girls, ranging in age from two to twenty-three living with him. He was
confident in his labor force, not as one would suspect, because of the supple and firm
muscles of healthy and vibrant youngsters; he depended on his wife. "My wife is a hardworking woman and that (sic) why I want her and the boys to get a good nice home
where she and the boys can pay for it. My wife is 32 years old and she needs to be where
she can work good land and make something. Every body will tell you she is a good
woman and she will work..." Westbrook had not read, obviously, the 1931 Delta
Experiment Station report; he expected that a 20-acre Delta farm could make a nice living
for a family often. Perhaps he was an exception, his wife, after all was a hard-working
woman. Westbrook's letter is illustrative of a disconcerting reality of the Dyess Colony;
his letter making application for admission to the Colony was probably futile.57
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Colonists were selected according to the larger dictates and goals of Harry
Hopkins FERA and notions of land-use planning and a pleasure economy. The Dyess
colonists were to come exclusively from those who were currently on the Rural
Rehabilitation rolls. Even then, full consideration and opportunity for a potential client
even to consider the proposition was left to the judgment, discernment, and common
sense of a (often female) "government man." If one had, by heroic measures stayed off
the relief rolls, such success disqualified them. Dyess was to be a place where
industrious people, who through no fault of their own, had lost their security in
agriculture. They, whatever the reason, had failed. Field workers from the Arkansas
WPA - then professionalized by borrowing social workers from the Resettlement
Administration - were to choose from the very best of the failures. These procedures
rankled some; many felt that the Elder Brother had always gotten a raw deal.
Dyess initiated a procedure, retained by Floyd Sharp, by which he answered an
applicant's letter. A letter in response informed the applicant that blanks would not be
available until September 1934. After that date, the response to the applicant directed
him (occasionally her) to their County Rural Rehabilitation office. In response to queries
from mayors, Congressmen and other government men, Dyess mailed a standard letter,
The method of selecting families for that colony will be as follows:
persons living in the State of Arkansas, who have through this economic
emergency lost their property and who have been engaged agriculturally
the major portion of their lives; those persons who were accepted for Rural
Rehabilitation during 1934 and have made an outstanding success. The

15 acres were devoted to cotton. Since most farms at Dyess, even after the modifications,
were still of 20 acres, since the maximum acreage allotted to cotton was mandated to 1/3
of the cleared acreage (modified downward by the AAA county production committee),
and since five of the twenty-acres were mandated as garden and stock acreage, the
practical economics of the Delta Experiment Station Bulletin are relevant. A typical
Dyess Farm cultivated less than seven acres of cotton.
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selection of families will be from all Counties in the State, possibly not on
quota but on merit. This selection is to begin about the first of
September.58
The standard letter contained two notions that merit further consideration. Officials of
the New Deal Agencies were aware of thefragilenature of public support. It was
important, they thought, for these experimental - critics said radical - projects and
programs to be successful and to do it quickly. Early success would keep political
opponents and skeptics at bay. This pressure to perform is manifested in the otherwise
counterintuitive principle of selecting only those Rural Relief clients who "have made an
outstanding success." The Dyess Colony would select the best of those who had failed;
there was no provision for the most desperate.
The assertion that clients would be selected "not on quota but on merit" must have
satisfied most folks; it was in consonance with traditional American notions of
meritocracy and rugged independence. However, the problems in selecting colonists
based on merit or quality of applicants proved to be the most difficult of the many
exasperations that bosses faced over the course of the Colony's existence.
Administrators and social workers struggled with questions concerning the nature of
merit and how to measure it. As the Colony developed, a surprisingly large number of
colonists proved unable or unwilling to adapt, to cooperate. After the first group of
colonists arrived in the fall and winter of 1934, the lack of "quality control" in the
selection of colonists was painfully apparent. Responsibility for selection devolved to the
Resettlement Administration in October 1935. The newly created Resettlement
Administration created a series of inventories (blanks, in the vernacular of plain whites)
58

Letter to James Engal from W. R. Dyess, 2 July 1934.
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to be executed in part by the prospect, but mainly by a hierarchy of social workers and
selection specialists. The infusion of personnel from the RA to Dyess resulted in quarrels
and resentment. State relief workers resented the attitudes of the RA staff; the
Washington bunch doubted the competence of their local colleagues.59
For a brief period from early summer until November of 1934, people were
encouraged to apply. The controls and standards that would soon dominate the "getting
in" process were yet to be developed. The letters of plain whites asking for information
or making application were actually a major point of entry into the colonization process;
the writers of the early letters actually had a chance to influence the selection process.
From about January 1935 and until the end of the process true applicants were selected
based on the judgment of the local social worker. Social workers (Regional Interviewers
in RA terminology) poured over the records of Rural Rehabilitation clients recommended
by the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor and chose the applicants that, in their
opinion, were most likely to succeed. A process of successively more invasive and
personal inventories and interviews winnowed the applicants. Occasionally a letter to
Floyd Sharp would interject a potential client into the evaluation system, but for the most
part, the process began not with positive actions by the dispossessed but in passivity.
As word got out and the job seekers assaulted the gatekeepers with letters from
influential people or arguments, those who wanted or thought they wanted to get in at
Dyess also suspected that there was a formula or code. The dispossessed did not know
59

Letter to Mrs. Azile Aaron, Resettlement Administration, Washington D.C. from Mrs.
Theresa St. Clair, 4 December 1935; "Backdoor report from Eula Gallaher,
Transportation Clerk, Dyess Colony to Anzie Aaron, 30, and 25 April and 6 May 1936;
Memorandum to Family Selection Staff from Eula Gallagher 30 April 1936; to James B.
Lawson from Azile Aaron, 1 May 1936; Lawrence Westbrook to Rexford G. Tugwell, 28
October 1935 all in RG 96.
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the preferred attributes required of the successful applicant. They did not know that the
government men preferred men forty-five or younger with families. Government men
much preferred traditional families and did not view grandmothers and grandfathers as
appropriate colonists. The government men did not view the most destitute as apt
colonists, nor did they consider those that managed to stay off the Rural Rehabilitation
rolls. Families headed by females were ineligible, and men over the age of fifty had little
chance of a place at Dyess. Some of the letters revealed information that disqualified,
some letters came too late to affect selection, but all of them tell us something about plain
whites.60
The volume of letters of application or requests for information to and about
Dyess Colony to the Arkansas Emergency Relief national offices was robust until midNovember 1934. After that time, such letters are almost non-existent. By mid-November
1934, the processes by which one became a colonist were regularized. Government men
selected all potential colonists based on recommendations by social workers, family
selection specialists, and to some extent, County Extension Agents. The main reason for
the diminution in the flow of applicant and information letters was the success of Dyess
officials (including WPA officials) in educating the public.
The letters of application and information from the period of about June November 1934 are significant. Uncolored by the knowledge of the exact attributes
required by a potential colonist, and not sure of what, exactly, it meant to take part in this
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Dot Kennan, "The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for Dyess Colony
Project - Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d., RG 96, Box 182, hereinafter "Procedure
Followed." Untitled and hand annotated narrative of Dyess Colony selection process, RG
96, Box 182, hereinafter "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative"; Henson, "Memories of
Dyess Colony."
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new government project, the writers were sometimes disconcertingly transparent. By
virtue of this transparency, investigators are able to hear what plain whites said and,
therefore, what they thought about themselves and their government. The letters also
authenticate much of the common knowledge concerning the depression South. Some
are from people who lived in the highlands; some from those farming in the southwestern
river valleys, but many of them are from the dispossessed of the Delta.
Arkansas farmers seemed to have blamed the drought as much as the depression
for their current misery. "I have lost everything I have by the depression and the
drought," wrote C.R. Astin from Prescott. Astin farmed "on halves" and "only made one
bale of cotton this year." He wrote that Dyess could see,"what I have made for myself."
Astin had a naive faith in the efficacy of his letter. He inquired whether he could keep
his cow and if the government would provide transportation; if so would the
transportation be by train or truck and could he bring his cow. Did one pay rent to the
government, did the government furnish a team and tools? Concluding his letter he
informed Dyess that he was ready to go anytime - "I would like to keep my cow if there
is any chance" - and that he expected answers to his query by return mail, because, "I am
in need of a place at once."61
Mack Davis of McCrorey allowed that he was "living in the heat of this drought
stricken district, won't make any feed or food for 1935." Davis blamed the drought and
the "down fall in price of cotton of 1930" for his continued indebtedness. He felt that his
explanation sufficed, "I feel like I deserve some help." Other references to the drought
are fleeting but powerful. "I am a tenant farmer and have a team of horses and without
61

Letter to W. R. Dyess from C.R. Astin, 13 October 1934, WPA File.
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any farming tools. The drouth (sic) came and I don't know what to do" said R. H. Shaw
of Ferndale; Joe Bizzault wrote (Mrs.) Senator Caraway that, "by us having such a
drouth (sic) it is going to be impossible for me to pay it this fall." The "it" Mr. Bizzault
referenced was the $150.00 he owed the government from the previous year. Similarly,
Wes Mauldin felt it necessary to address his arrears to the government before presenting
his argument for inclusion in the colony project. "I am a rehabilitator here in Woodruff
County and received a mule this year, but the crops burned so badly they are not of much
value. However, it was no fault of mine." Typical are the numerous matter-of-fact
references: "My crop I have in is completely burned u p . . . my garden burned up here on
account of the drought." "Due to the 12 weeks drouth (sic) we have had we are making
nothing to speak of." The letters mentioned above and cited in the footnote below
contain much more than observations about the great drought that created the dustbowl.62
The letters are rarely one-dimensional; most letters tie several depression drought phenomena together. The following letter, produced below in its entirety is
typical as to content, and illustrative of the language skills extant in some of these plain
whites.
Dear Sir,
We read in the Tulsa Tribune about the Colony at Dyess Ark. for
the Rehabilitation of Tenant Farmers. We want to know if there is any
way possible for us to get one of the farms. The project sounds wonderful.
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Letter to W. R. Dyess from Mack Davis, 8 October 1934; letter to Mrs. Hattie Caraway
from Joe Bizzault, 3 October 1934; letter to W. R. Dyess from Wes Mauldin, 26
September 1934; letter to Dear Sir from Joe Cornell, 31 July 1934; letter to W. R. Dyess
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My husband and I are tenant farmers on the farm of Mr.& Mrs. E.
V. Poyner, we were farming on the halves. We have never been on Relief
before, but will have to ask for aid within the next few days.
Everything we planted has been burned out by the drouth (sic).
We had 14 acres of corn, 12 acres of oats, 15 acres of peas, 2 acres of
tomatoes, 1 acre of peanuts, one acre of beans. We can't get our seed back
from any of them, to say nothing of the fertilizer. We put about 3 sacks of
fertilizer to the acre, under our oats, beans, tomatoes & potatoes. We
planted 2 sacks of potatoes.
The corn didn't tassle (sic). The oats didn't get big enough to
mow. The peas didn't come up. The tomatoes are standing just like we
put them out, haven't grown at all. The peanuts haven't a peanut on them.
We got about 2 Vz sacks of potatoes. We had a lovely garden started, but
only got two or three meals out of it and canned six quarts of green peas.
We are a young couple, twenty-eight and thirty years old,
respectively. No children, Healthy, able bodied, willing to work.
Averagely intelligent, I hope. Averagely educated, my husband has a year
in High School and I a year in College. We are both experienced farmers
raised on the farm. My husband is a good mechanic, fair carpenter, good
teamster, and experienced on the timber. I have kept books, taught school,
and am a typist.
We note that there will be about two hundred farms ready for
occupancy by the first of Nov. We would love to get one of the first as
one of us could work thru the winter and so escape being on charity. We
have tried so hard to make our own way. The idea of charity is bitter.
Neither of us have anyone to turn to for aid, except the government. We
are so eager to get a place of our own, with the opportunity to pay for it.
We are hoping, rather desperately, that this may be our chance. Will you
please advise us if there is a chance, and our method of procedure? 63
One would suppose, if the letter is an accurate reflection of their history, the Barton's,
would have been ideal candidates for Dyess Colony. They had already bought into the
notion of diversified farming as is evidenced by the crops planted. They were willing to
pay the ancillary costs of agricultural production - they had used at least forty sacks of
fertilizer - they were, as a couple, articulate and energetic. Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Barton had
63

Letter to W. R. Dyess from Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Barton, 1 August 1934, WPA
Administrative File.
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tried tenant farming on the thin-soiled highlands of Springdale, Arkansas. Would not
their youth, health, industry, willingness to diversify, experience, and ancillary skills not
make them ideal candidates through which to illustrate the validity of the New Deal
notions as to the creation and preservation of the American yeoman? The answer was, in
a word, no. The Barton's were not Rural Rehabilitation Clients. They had not failed
soon enough to be eligible.
The crop reduction programs of the AAA had little significance for truck-patch
farmers from Northwest Arkansas. Life at Dyess colony, in the heart of the Great
American Delta, presented circumstances foreign to the experiences and expectations of
many of the applicants. Later the aberrant conditions in the Delta proved intolerable for
some of the colonists. They were not used to mud, or malaria, or snakes in their fields.
Like much of the public, they assumed that cotton cultivation was simply a variation on a
theme. Letters from folks who lived in the Delta, who were familiar with the
sharecropping system and the nature of cotton cultivation, discuss issues and offer insight
that should have made them more attractive to the family selection specialists. Some of
the applicants understood the fundamental differences in farming "black land" and the
soils of the timber or prairie. Some had experienced the devastating effects of the AAA
contracts. The third crisis, referenced above, was a function of a series of
misapplications, misunderstandings, egregious arrogance, and the frailty of human
nature. The selection specialists could not have chosen only those familiar with the
vagaries of the Delta even if they had desired to do so. The RRC mandated colonists
proportionally from the entire state of Arkansas. Problems soon emerged.
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Building Dyess Colony offered jobs and political influence. Floyd Sharp in
particular and the Board of Directors in general maneuvered to remove Dyess Colony
from the supervision and control of other federal officials and agencies. Such
independence and the potential political power actuated a struggle for control. This
chapter has examined letters of application from plain whites and their interaction with
the bosses and government men.

The first colonists moved into their new homes at Dyess just about the same time
that the homesteaders moved into their new houses in Tupelo. Understanding the
common reasons, if any, for the failure of the Tupelo Homesteads, the best of the DSH
projects and Dyess Colony, the largest and most promising of the New Deal agrarian
communities, requires a consideration of the life and times at Dyess colony.

148
CHAPTER V
LIFE AND TIMES A T DYESS COLONY
"Oh! Mr. Dyess I have just been crazy since I read about this in the papers." Mrs.
Emery Hall, Lake City, Arkansas, 21 June 1934.
"Since I can't write an official letter about the situation at Dyess, I'm going to slip a
note through the backdoor." Eula Gallagher, Resettlement Administration
Transportation Clerk, Little Rock, 6 May 1935.
"Personally I cannot understand why out of all thefamilies that we have at Dyess we
cannot find four clerks." Lawrence Westbrook, WPA Administrator, 18 April 1938.
"Someone like this is the cause ofdissention among whatfew deserving colonists that
you have. People with one good eye and half sense should know that they have a good
chance over there if everyone would cooperate." (Mrs.) Velma Bullard Pittman, 21
April 1938. l
Between 21 June and 6 October 1934, Mrs. Emery Hall wrote four letters to W.R.
Dyess, Arkansas ERA Administrator and founder of what would be known as Dyess
Colony. The thirty-six pages of small but neat handwriting on school-tablet paper is a
commentary on the struggle of dispossessed whites and one witness to the conditions in
the Great American Delta. Mr. Hall "doesn't write well," she explained, no doubt
uncomfortable (or pretending to be) with speaking on behalf of the family. Her letters
continually asked Dyess for advice; should she enroll her children in school in Lake City,
or should she wait until they moved. They were going to get to move, weren't they?
Should she sell one of her three hogs to buy feed in order to fatten the other two? "I can't
1

Letter to W.R Dyess from Mrs. Emery Hall, 21 June 1934; letter to Azile Aaron, Liaison
Senior Family Selection Specialist, 6 May 1934; letter to Floyd Sharp from C.E
McCaffey, 21 April 1936; letter to Lawrence Westbrook from Floyd Sharp, 9 April,
1938; letter to Westbrook from Sharp, 18 April 1938, all in University of Arkansas,
Special Collections, WPA Administration File, MS UN 3, hereinafter "WPA
Administration File." Letter to Floyd Sharp from (Mrs.) Velma Bullard Pittman, 21 April
1938, RG 69, WPA Central Office Records, Roll 1745, Box 339, hereinafter "WPA
Central Office Files."
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afford to buy books in both places." She had canned blackberries and kraut and pickles.
People said that folks who had a mule would not get one of farms; the Halls had a
government mule, did this disqualify them? She saved the sorghum tops for planting on
the new place. If she could hear soon from Mr. Dyess she would not sell her chickencoop; she would take it with her to the new farm. Could her bachelor brother and
widowed mother move with them? The government didn't give enough feed to fatten
hogs. People said the farms were only for "families of 2, 3, 4, and 5 people." There were
eight in her family. Her mother could keep house and her brother could help her clear the
land while Mr. Hall worked "public work to keep up expenses." She was tired of moving
from "here and there," and tired of "making a living for the other man." Could Mr. Hall
do public work to "keep up our expenses," while she and her mother and bachelor brother
and three children cleared the land for spring planting? She wanted to get there in time to
put in a winter garden, she said. She would, she said, "do just anything to get one of the
farms," and if Mr. Dyess would just give her some encouragement, she would "not say a
word to a soul about it." "Reckon," she asked, "just when we will get to move?" They
had to move and had no money to pay rent; the new schoolteacher was moving into her
place, and nobody wanted to rent to them because they did not want truck patches.
"Please don't get out of patients (sic) with me," she implored repeatedly, "I know you are
worked to death and I am just one of the poor people you are trying to help." Should she
send her thirteen-year-old daughter to the Convent where she could learn practical things
like sewing and cooking instead of the schools at the new farm? "I sure hope we will be
one of the lucky ones." "Does it have to be the man that works? I can do anything any
other woman can do, I could be a visiting housekeeper, or wash dishes at the cafe, my
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mother can keep house while I work and Mr. Hall and my brother can work the farm. Oh!
Mr. Dyess, I so want one of the farms, if you only knew how we have struggled you
would help us." 2
Mrs. Emery Hall and her family moved into their new home at Dyess Colony,
House No. 10, on 12 December 1934. They brought with them their Rural Rehabilitation
debt of $826.27 and their government mule.3
Plain whites moved to Dyess and began community building; their interaction
with government men and bosses is one consideration of this chapter. The officials at
Dyess ignored basic fundamental realities about farming in the Delta and client selection.
As a result, the Colony's population was unstable; most of the clients were unable or
unwilling to establish and maintain a subsistence farm. This chapter also notes the
federal government's first rational assault on rural poverty in the South.
Moving to Dyess
By October 1934, Cone Murphy and his crew had completed the cottages and
infrastructure for eighty-three farms. "The Original Thirteen," so-called because they
came from thirteen Arkansas counties, families moved to Dyess on 25 October 1934 and
by April 1935, Dyess Colony was home to 132 families, all selected by the Arkansas
Emergency Relief Administration. W. H. "Harve" Smith, one of the original thirteen,
was an unqualified success story. Smith was a Bassett County cash renter and had been
2

The narrative and quotes are taken from a series of four letters from Mrs. Emery Hall to
W.R. Dyess, Arkansas WPA Administrator, 21 June, 21 August, 25 August, and 6
October 1934, all in WPA Administrative File. Mrs. Hall consistently spelled Mr. Hall's
name Emery, the Dyess records consistently spell it Emory. Mrs. Hall's spelling is
probably the correct one.
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so all his adult life. The ruinous cotton prices of 1933 left Smith in a precarious financial
condition. He had to sell his team and tools to repay debts, and he was unable because,
said an RA report, of planter preference for black laborers to secure a cropper position.
In May of 1934, Harve Smith received a loan from the Arkansas Rural Relief
Corporation (RRC) and immediately proved that he was a competent farmer. Smith,
rented land from the RRC, bought a mule, one hundred chickens, a cow with calf, enough
feed for the upcoming winter, and had canned a large stock of vegetables and fruit. He
also paid his Rural Rehabilitation loan. Smith was one of the very best that had failed and an ideal candidate for the Dyess Colony. Smith's family moved from a leaky threeroom shack - when it rained they had to move all the furniture into the one room with a
sound roof- into a brand new five-room house on thirty acres of Delta land. 4
J. R. Echols, father often and another of the original thirteen Colonists moved to
Dyess in October of 1934. Echols attended an Arkansas college and worked for that
institution as Farm Manager; he lost his job when the funding for his position expired.
He had been a good Rural Rehabilitation Client, and his family seemed to prosper at
Dyess. The government men quickly came to understand, but were often reluctant to
admit, that poverty did not always signify incompetence. The Echols children were quite
remarkable; they had to leave Dyess to prove it.5
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Dot Kennan, "The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for Dyess Colony
Project - Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d., RG 96, Box 182, hereinafter "Procedure
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"Dyess Selection Narrative"; Henson, "Memories of Dyess Colony." One daughter
married an Air Force Chaplain who became a Lt. Col. One son became an electrician and
retired as a Major in the U.S. Army. Another son earned his Ph. D. in forestry from Yale,

Dyess Colony used the Harve Smith family as an example of the promise of
Dyess. Notwithstanding Smith's success, W.R. Dyess and the Arkansas Emergency
Relief Administration and Rural Rehabilitation Corporation were not pleased. Farmland
that could be in cultivation lay fallow; the economic activity predicted for the town had
not materialized because there were few colonists at Dyess. Among the few colonists at
Dyess some, apparently, were not interested in a life-long commitment to subsistence
farming; some were troublemakers.6
The actual process of selecting and transporting families to the colonies proved to
be too complex for the limited resources and expertise of Arkansas Rural Relief
Corporation and its parent, the Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration. Despite the
Smith family's success story, the family selection process was both slow and, generally,
unsatisfactory. During the eight months October 1934 through May 1935,162 families
had moved to Dyess, but twenty-nine families returned to their old homes. Some left
because they could not get a straight answer about the terms and price of their new farms;
some could not stand the mud and snakes; and some did not understand southern social
customs. A colonist identified only as "being from the western part of the state" clearly
did not understand or care much for southern social customs. He solicited the black
workmen at the colony as boarders and allowed them entrance to his house; he was

and other children were journalists and educators. The NYA paid for Katherine Echols'
tuition at the Sate Normal School and she was a member of the faculty at Dyess Schools
until 1940.
6
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dismissed. There were other problems with the family selection process that only time
revealed. Two families were "somewhat extreme" in their religious fervency and they
"kept the entire community stirred up," and Mrs. Emory Hall's neighbor, S. B. Funk,who
moved his family into No 8 on 11 November, proved to be a radical agitator. Clearly, the
process needed alteration.7
The New Deal seemed to be catching its breath during late spring of 1935. W. R.
Dyess and the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation halted the selection and
transportation of colonists to Colonization Project No. 1. Changes were in the wind. On
8 April 1935, Congress passed the $4.8 billion Emergency Relief Appropriations Act.
Soon a flurry of progressive legislation, Executive Orders, and reorganization culminated
in what many historians label the Second New Deal. Among the new entities in the
alphabet soup were the National Youth Administration (NYA), Rural Electrification
Administration (REA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). By the summer
of 1935, the intent of the New Deal to undertake social reform was apparent. Legislation
and Executive Orders focused on social security, securities, banking and tax reform, and
labor legislation. The New Deal also began its rational and organized assault on rural
poverty with the formation through Executive Order 7027,30 April 1935, of the
Resettlement Administration (RA). Under the direction of Rexford Tugwell, the RA
assumed control of the FERA rural programs, administration of the FERA land program,
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functions of the land section of the AAA, and the Division of Subsistence Homesteads
communities.8
While the transition to RA management caused a slight retardation in the
development of the Tupelo Homesteads, it proved remarkably efficient in filling up the
farms at Dyess. By September, a new selection process was well underway. Lawrence
Westbrook with Harry Hopkins and the WP A entered into an agreement with Rexford
Tugwell of the RA that facilitated the family selection process. The Management
Division of the Resettlement Administration agreed to assume the responsibility for
selection and transportation and installed Senior Family Selection Specialist Clark C.
Tucker at Dyess. The Management Division "borrowed" and placed on the payroll nine
social workers from the Arkansas ERA, a public health nurse from the same agency, and
augmented that force with four RA Family Selection Specialists. Jimmy Lawson finished
his work at Tupelo, moved to Little Rock, and joined the Management Division staff of
Region VI of the Resettlement Administration.
From Washington, D.C., Liaison Supervisor Azile Aaron, after a visit to Dyess,
organized the processes and training for the new and borrowed RA selection personnel.
Aaron recruited Eula Gallagher to head the incredibly complex movement of families and
their possessions to (and sometimes from) Dyess. With employees in place, new blanks,
and revised procedures and training materials in order, the RA began bringing new
colonists to Dyess in January 1936. RA officials orchestrated the plan to correct the
deficiencies in the selection process and to fill the colony between the crop seasons.
8
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Dyess Colony's "independent status" caused Rexford Tugwell some trepidation.
However, Tugwell, and, indeed, the entire Washington community, assumed that Dyess,
upon completion of its construction and occupation stage, would naturally fall under the
control of the RA. Tugwell grudgingly accepted the notion that the RA would acquire
Dyess upon completion of family selection process. Item 3 in the agreement concerning
the RA's role in colonist selection clearly reveals the intent. In a letter to Tugwell,
Westmoreland wrote, "We agree to provide funds for the maintenance and subsistence of
these families until the project is finally completed and transferred to your administration
for management." (Italic emphasis added) One wonders what might have been
Tugwell's response had he known of Floyd Sharp's notions about Dyess's future. By
forming a corporate entity for Dyess Colony, Floyd Sharp had effectively made Dyess
independent of any governmental entity short of the Secretary of Agriculture of the
United States. Dyess Colony, Pine Mountain Valley, and Cherry Lake Farms were the
objects of intense ridicule and bitter criticism. The three quasi-independent agencies
were identified with the RA, and yet Tugwell and his staff had no management authority
or fiscal oversight. Critics often used the aggregate expenditures and the relatively few
clients of the three projects to exaggerate the inefficiencies of the huge resettlement
program. By including the costs of the three orphan agencies in analysis of the RA,
critics exaggerated the per-capita costs of the program. Tugwell and the RA were in the
classic management conundrum; they were responsible for the projects but had no
authority over them. By May of that year, the process was complete.
In five months, the RA selected and moved 347 families to Dyess. In contrast,
the Arkansas FERA had placed 132 families over an eight-month period. Tugwell's

reference to the projects ultimate completion is significant. Dyess's original plans, as
approved by FERA, envisioned the completion of the project after about four years.
During that time, the Colonists would have signed their land contracts, assumed
ownership of the ancillary business (icehouse, shops, store, etc), and established a live-athome agricultural program that maximized the returns on the limited cotton acreage.
According to the plans, a twenty-acre farm would cultivate about eight acres of cotton.
In reality, the local AAA cotton production committee slighted the Dyess farmers in
allocating tax-free acreage. Ultimately, with fervent appeals and complaints from Floyd
Sharp and Lawrence Westbrook, the Colonists were granted more reasonable allotments.
Typically, the production committee allotted acreage cotton at the rate of eight acres per
20-acrefarm.

9

"Government mules" posed few problems for newly employed Resettlement
Administration Transportation clerk Eula Gallaher. As early as July of 1934 the
Arkansas RRC had distributed over 2,000 mules at an average cost of $175.00. The
"synthetic mule," i.e., "one that exists only on paper" caused most of the aggravation and
expense. Stock trucks arrived to transport the work stock to Dyess only to find that the
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government mule had been repossessed, or stolen, or had died, or "got lost." Trucks
returned to Dyess often only partially loaded. From her office in Little Rock, Eula
Gallagher designed, implemented, and supervised the complex ballet of visits, inspection
trips, and moves. In conspiratorial and mildly sarcastic prose in her periodic "back-door
notes" to Liaison Family Specialist Azile Aaron, she reported on the few virtues and
numerous faults of the Arkansas WPA crew.10
The RA benefited from the experience of the Rural Rehabilitation Corporation
(RRC) in selecting and moving families to the Colony. For example, the blanks used by
the RRC personnel in winnowing prospects failed to include comprehensive queries
about the occupation of the head of household. Some applicants were more interested in
working for wages than in building capital; some of the first group had only a tenuous
connection with farming. Likewise, the RRC blanks did not include provisions for listing
various farm implements owned by the prospect. Sometimes the moving truck and crew
from Dyess arrived to move a Colonist's agricultural stock and implements only to find
that among the possessions were such bulky and difficult-to-transport items as farm
wagons. The new policies mandated by the Washington office required that all colonists
visit and undergo a final examination of their attitudes about cooperation, farm life,
religion, drinking, morality, personal hygiene, and intelligence; the Colony physician, L.
L. Huebner, conducted a physical exam of each prospect. The prospective colonists
visited to make sure they could tolerate the physical and fiscal aberrations connected with
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"Back Door Report," letters to Azile Aaron, from Eula Gallagher, 21,25 April, 1 May
1935; letter to Lawrence Westbrook from John H. Caufield, 7 July 1934, all in WPA
Administration File. Caufield seems to have worked officially as a photographer, but
also as an informant to Westbrook.
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colonization. They visited, also, to choose the particular farm and house they would,
perhaps someday, own. The prospective visitors to Dyess came, ostensibly, to inspect
and decide whether the opportunity was worth the risk. The staff at Dyess used the
inspection trip to conduct the final examination of potential colonists.11
The tasks confronting the RA Family Selection Specialists were daunting, but
their tasks were relatively simple in comparison to the logistics problems confronting
Gallagher. The newly crafted and revised procedures for family selection, the product of
the RA Management Division staff in Washington, introduced a new group of
government men and another series of blanks to execute. Operating from ten regional
offices throughout Arkansas, the Field Interviewers investigated the credentials of
families recommended by the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor. There were, of
course, blanks for each stage of the process. For a brief while, the RA continued to use
the blanks created by the Arkansas RRC. The blanks involved Forms A, B, and C. Each
form - A, B, and C - required numerous supplements. For example, Form C, "Case
Workers Analysis" required six "schedules." The RA forms were more detailed. By
November of 1935, the RA unleashed its own flood of blanks, which were fed to a
distribution list that required copies be dispensed to the caseworker, county welfare
supervisor, county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor, the Region VI Office of the RA in
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Kennan, "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative," WPA Administration File; "Procedure
Followed, RG 96. Social Research Report NO. 1, John B. Holt, "An Analysis of
Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects,"
(Washington, D.C: United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Security
Administration, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Cooperating, 1937). How much
and what kind of intelligence was a difficult item for Family Planning Specialists to
attack. See the two documents referenced above.
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Little Rock, then finally, to Dyess Colony. The Senior Family Selection Specialist, Clark
Tucker, made the final decision.

12

Some of the original group of colonists had moved to Dyess without benefit of an
inspection visit. New RA rules demanded that all prospective colonists - husband, wife,
and teen-aged children visit the colony and undergo a physical exam. Since the language
of the original FERA grant mandated that the program benefit Arkansas residents
statewide, each county in Arkansas was assigned a quota at Dyess. The task of
efficiently getting the prospective colonists to Dyess was colossal. Dyess is in the
extreme northeast corner of Arkansas; the distances were, sometimes, enormous.
The Colony bought two brand new school buses, and following a carefully drawn
route, picked up poor folks all over the state of Arkansas and brought them to Dyess for a
two-night visit and return from whence they came. Twice a week, on Sunday and
Thursday, the Colony school buses brought a new group to inspect and be inspected.
Eula Gallagher contacted the proposed colonists, determined, more or less, how close the
bus could actually get to the prospects' homes, and informed the prospects of when and
where, roughly, they were to meet the bus. She then stood by awaiting the problems that
inevitably occurred. One family, in an area that was inaccessible by the bus, agreed to
meet the bus at a service station on the nearest paved road. Anxious lest they miss the
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"Dyess Selection Narrative," WPA Administration File, Kennan, "Procedure Followed,
RG 96. The forms themselves give and idea of the winnowing process. Form A "Case
Worker Analysis asks the "case-worker" to give an opinion as to attitudes and even
personality. For example, the form asks the caseworker to evaluate the family's "general
intelligence," and to comment on such subjective areas as to whether or not the religious
affiliation of the family was "extreme or emotional." Form B is a rather short (13 items)
general questionnaire about previous and current occupation, special skills, etc. Form C is
an exhaustive financial analysis with six separate schedules.

bus, the family decided to camp out at the designated spot the night before. That night
the area received a rare four inches of snow and the family had not brought tents. They
huddled around a fire built on the lee side of the station's wall and completed their
inspection trip. Gallagher attempted to have every bus arrive full or nearly so. The
remarkable fact is that she, mostly, succeeded. In the five months, January to May, the
two Colony school buses traveled an aggregate of 26,532 miles.
The aggravations and problems of the inspection visits paled in comparison to the
actual moves. It took on the average two and one-half trucks and three days to move a
family to Dyess; it took ten trucks a week to move four families. A moving crew
composed of Dyess work-relief clients rushed to unload the trucks and send them back to
the wilds of rural Arkansas. Invariably trucks got stuck. A client who lived relatively
near Dyess gave written directions to his house and commented that the five-mile dirt
road to his house was fine as long as it did not rain; but, after the first mile, it began to
rain. The buckshot ground captured the truck and only after hours, and the frantic search
for a tractor, did the family finally arrive at Dyess. In a cold, rainy March afternoon and
night and into the morning, the mother tried to keep her five-month old infant warm and
contented in the cab of a freight truck. At 2 a.m., a tractor extricated the truck from the
mud. At the peak of moving in the spring of 1936, the Colony used sixty FERA trucks
and crews to move colonists to Dyess. In one week in April, eighteen families moved to

13

Eula Gallagher, "Resume of Procedure and Problems of Planning Transportation and
Moving Families to Dyess Colony," typescript in and Predecessor Agencies, Project
Records, 1935-1940, Arkansas, RG 96, hereinafter "Resume of Procedures."
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Dyess. The cavalcade of tarpaulin-covered trucks and the thrice-weekly buses full of
inspectors made for confusing and exciting times at Dyess.
The selection process was complete and Eula Gallagher was in the process of
closing up shop on 30 April 1936. She had just used her considerable diplomatic skills to
wheedle information from Jimmy Lawson. Lawson had called the day before to obtain
the mailing addresses of the field inspectors. Her suspicions, which she had discussed
with Azile Aaron, were confirmed: the RA was "out" at Dyess. Careful conversation
and interrogation revealed that Lawson was preparing a "pink slip" for all the RA staffers
and most of the borrowed ERA personnel. Her note to the family selection staff informed
them of their termination as of 1 May, wished them well, and expressed satisfaction in
their associations. She also felt a need to soften the ripples that her abrasive personality
had inflicted on her colleagues. "If I have made myself obnoxious in my efforts to get
the staff to furnish adequate directions, and inventories, I wish to say that it was never
personal, and only done for the good of the cause. I trust it will not linger in your mind
when you think of me in the future." 15 Eula Gallagher often demonstrated her acerbic
wit and droll personality in her commentary. On hearing that her colleague, Miss
Topping, would take on a more permanent job with the RA in Arkansas, she related to
Azile Aaron that she had tried to get in touch with Miss Topping: " . . .since she was
coming here I wanted to congratulate the state of Arkansas and offer her my sympathy

u

Ibid.
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Memo to The Family Selection Staff from Eula Gallagher, 30 April 1936, Project
Records, RG 96.

and condolences."

Perhaps Gallagher was a martinet, but there was reason for

satisfaction. Azile Aaron reported that as of 1 May 1936, all the farm cottages except for
fifteen kept in reserve, were occupied. The RA had proved remarkably efficient in the
family and selection process.17
By the time that the dual ceremony memorializing W.R. Dyess and dedicating the
colony took place on 22 May 1936, Dyess, Arkansas was beginning to resemble the
community that Dyess had envisioned. The robust school age population had sent Dyess
to Washington D. C. where he managed to get a commitment from WPA officials to
build modern new schools for Dyess Colony. On 14 January, Dyess was returning from
D C. with good news for the Colony; early that evening the small commercial flight
crashed into Arkansas Delta swamps about forty miles west of Memphis. Lawrence
Westbrook came from Washington and joined Floyd Sharp, H.C. Baker, R.C. Limerick
and Arkansas Governor J. Marion Futrell to honor the memory of the Colony's founder
and to dedicate the renamed agrarian experiment. It would be officially what it always
had been in the minds of the clients and staff, Dyess Colony.18
In retrospect, one can argue that the high-water mark for Dyess Colony was MayJune 1936. Never again would the population of Dyess be as great as in the early
16

"Back Door Report," letter to Azile Aaron from Eula Gallagher, 25 April 1936.
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Letter (Back Door Report) to Azile Aaron from Eula Gallagher 25 and 30 April 1936;
letter to Azile Aaron from Therese St. Clair, 25 April 1936; letter to James B. Lawson
from Azile Aaron, 1 May 1936, all in RG 96.
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Arkansas Gazette, 16-17 January, 22-23 May, 1936; Colony Herald, 1,22 May, 1936;
Mississippi County Sentinel, 22 May 1936; Commercial Appeal, 22-23 May 1936; Press
Scimitar, 22-23 May, 1936. Henson, "Memories of Dyess," RG 96. "Minutes: Meeting
of Board of Directors, Dyess Colony, Incorporated, 25 March 1936," WPA
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summer of 1936. The festivities marking the dedication were impressive, but they failed
to generate the enthusiasm or the crowds that inundated Dyess in early June. Eleanor
Roosevelt stood on the porch of the Administration Building on 9 June and told the
crowd of more than 2,500 that she expected that the success at Dyess would spill over
into the nation at large. "I hope that you down here will derive gains which may be used
to help other people. For as you grow you will find your greatest pleasure in giving
others a helping hand."19 Even though dinner for the First Lady and various Dyess
bosses was waiting at the Colony caf<§, Eleanor Roosevelt insisted on shaking hands with
everyone. Her insistence on intimate contact wrecked her schedule, just as it had
inconvenienced the President in Tupelo twenty months earlier.
Living at Dyess
Affairs looked good in the late spring and early summer of 1936. Five hundred
farm cottages, sporting brilliant white paint and trimmed in brown, red, or green clustered
in quartets at the intersections of the latticework gridiron of spirit-level straight roads.
The exterior of the farm cottage was of cypress, the interior pine. Windows were
screened, the roof was ceiled, and water was available just outside the kitchen door. Each
farm cottage had a hand-pump operated well, a claw-footed enameled bathtub, a hot
water container designed to feed the tub, a toilet, bath lavatory, and a septic tank. It was
true that the water did not taste good and washing with it rendered clothing any thing but
"white as snow," but it was handy and, according to the government men, healthy. After
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Colony Herald, 11 June 1936.

Arkansas Gazette, 10-11 June 1936; Colony Herald, 11 June 1936; Commercial Appeal,
10 June 1936; Press Scimitar, 10-11 June 1936. For Eleanor Roosevelt and the delay, see
Chapter Three.
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all, said Dyess Family Selection Specialist Clark Tucker, the water was simply the same
water that all Delta people used. Some women rather doubted that assertion. The water
system provided for the government men in the town center reinforced those doubts.
Each cottage was wired for the advent of electric lights and an electric pump, waiting
only the extension of the power transmission line to the colony. No one could say just
when the Colony would get power, but the expectation that the colonists would soon have
power was evidenced by the wiring. There were no basements at Dyess but on each of
the farms Cone's crews had built a barn and a poultry house. Like the Homesteaders at
Tupelo, the RA " . . . expected each family to have a flock of chickens, a brood sow, and
at least one milch cow." The actual construction costs for a three room house with
wiring, septic system, plumbing, hen house, barn, and approach bridge was $1,221.64
($18, 393 in 2006 dollars); a four room house equipped in the same manner, $1,365.05
($20,551), and a five room house cost $1,459.92 ($21,966).

21

The houses came in three sizes, but avoided monotony by twenty-seven variations
on the three themes. Placement of doors, windows, roof styles, and the trim gave
individuality to the farm cottages. The furnishings evidenced even more creativity.

^"Construction Plans and Progress," RG 96; Letter to James B. Lawson from Azile
Aaron, 1 May 1936, WPA Administration File; F.J. Hemmen, "Detailed Report of Visit
to the Dyess Rural Industrial Community Near Osceola, Arkansas Under the Direction of
Federal Emergency Relief Administration," RG 96, AK-80 003, hereinafter "Detailed
Report." "Interview With a Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor"; "One of Several Interviews
With References Concerning Mr. Doe;" both in WPA Administration File. Both the
previous references are paraphrased synthesis of actual interviews. RA Family Selection
Specialists wrote these Interviews for training the Family Selection personnel for the
Dyess project. Hereinafter, "Interview With a Rehabilitation Supervisor" and "One of
Several Interviews." The costs above were direct costs and reflected only expenditures on
those particular houses. Costs increased during the process, mainly because the Colony
was forced to adopt NIRA wage scales. The cost of houses was a point of contention for
some.
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According to Home Economist Fern Salyers, the furniture and households goods moved
by the family were threadbare and the decorative taste of some women was, at least,
questionable. One of her biggest challenges, she reported, was in convincing some
colony women not to paper their walls with newsprint. The few rugs were filthy and
ragged and even when new were garish and unappealing. Most colonists had little
furniture; the ERA furnished mattresses at no charge, supplied most with beds and stoves
and charged to their accounts. Another detriment to fashionable and comfortable homes
was the presence of huge and, most often, abused upright pianos. They were out of tune
and "out of key" with interior decorating possibilities, said Salyers. Having a bedstead in
the main visiting room was not conducive to modern living, thought Salyers, so she had
the Colony shop build models of easily and inexpensively duplicated day beds to double
as sitting space during visiting hours and a bed at night. Salyers furnished her own home
with theatrical gauze curtains appliqued with morning glories, simple and easily
replicable furniture, and a "congoleum" rug; she used her town-center residence to
demonstrate good taste and comfortable living to women with limited budgets.
Even before the influx of new Colonists came in late 1935 and early 1936, the
first group of Colonists had provided cultural and spiritual development. When
Lawrence Westbrook and Governor Futrell came to Dyess in May of 1936, four different
manifestations of Dyess Colony's civic pride honored their presence by demonstrating
their skills. A male quartet, a string band, and several soloists entertained the dignitaries
22

"Plans and Progress"; The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937. Home Economist Fern Salyers
lived in House #2, Block No.l at the Community Center. She paid $27.00 per month rent
for the five-room house. She furnished her house cheaply; for example, dull black plain
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and the crowd. The four Dyess women's clubs supervised the cafeteria-style supper,
proceeds pledged to the Dyess Library Fund. Another dedication preceded the supper;
the Dyess Girls' Club presented the funds previously collected for the library. Dyess
residents had a high regard for the printed word and seemed to be more informed than
their peers, even those on other government projects. According to The Arkansas
Gazette, a 1937 survey conducted by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of six
government projects revealed that Dyess families were twice as likely to subscribe to
newspapers as project residents elsewhere.
Building on the solid base established by the people who came in late 1934 and
early 1935, the influx of colonists in late 1935 and early 1936 extended and refined the
efforts of initial colonists. By 1937, the Colony Herald reported on the activities of
twelve Dyess Women's Clubs named No 1 through 12; they convened monthly en masse
in the "Colony Council of Home Demonstration Clubs" and separately once each week.
The Home Demonstration Clubs pursued a brisk agenda of cultural and community
enrichment aims. Typical, it seems from the recorded proceedings of other Dyess Clubs,
was the Wednesday 6 M y 1937 meeting of Club No. 10. Mrs. A.L. Holland of 238
Roosevelt Road hosted the twenty-one members attending the regular meeting. In almost
classic passive-voice language, the Colony Herald reported t h a t . . . "the songs, 'Old
Black Joe,' 'Love's Old Sweet Song,' 'School Days,' and 'Love Lifted Me' were sung by
all." Mrs. Cecil Wilkins provoked the piety of the assemblage by her account of "how
Jesus went about doing good." She made application:
23

Henson, "Memories of Dyess;" "Plans and Progress;" "Detailed Report;" Colony
Herald, 22 May 1936; "Plans and Progress;" "Selection Narrative." The Arkansas
Democrat, 5 December 1937.

We, too, as his followers can do our share to lighten and brighten the lives
of our loved ones, neighbors, and friends... now that the revival is over,
we should not let its good be forgotten, but strive, each one of us, every
day, to carry on its spirit in love and service.24
The main order of business for Club No. 10 was the selection of a delegate to
attend "the State-wide Home Demonstration Club Rest Camp at Camp Pike." The
twenty-one members elected Mrs. A. W. Ledford. The remainder of the meeting
devolved into a discussion of the ways and means to meet the club representative's
expense. " . . . The group devised a musical program and an old-fashioned box supper on
the night of August 2, at the community building." The transactions at Club No. 2 may
have been a bit tenser. "Mrs. Clarence Drewery was elected president to succeed Mrs.
Earnest Norton, who had resigned." The club did not elect a delegate; Mrs. Almos
Overton was appointed to represent the Club at the Rest Camp at Albany. First names of
women, it seems, were relevant only for single women - except, of course, for the
government men women.25
The middle and high school children, led by Miss Katherine Echols, daughter of
Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Echols who moved into No. 74 on 26 October 1934, recruited and
directed a Dyess student orchestra. In 1936, she joined the faculty of Dyess Schools after
finishing one year at state Normal College, funded by the National Youth Administration.
By 1938, according to The Colony Herald, the Dyess Girl's and Boy's 4-H Clubs were
24

The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937. By 1937 the Colony Herald was a mimeographed
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highly professional weekly publication. The paper folded after one year, Donald Holley
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Ibid. Almos Overton was employed at the Colony's lumberyard and lived in town
center. He was laid off in 1938 as part of a cost-cutting effort at the Colony.
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the largest in the world and the Dyess Clubs often won awards at the State 4-H Club
Conventions. The government men had stressed the importance of community spirit
during the interviews; the colonists had been assured that there would be ample
opportunity for leadership and civic responsibihty.
For the first time, medical attention and medicine was available to Colonists as
needed. After a $35.00 per-family-per-year fee, all Dyess people were treatedfreeof
charge at the hospital - drugs, physician services, ambulance and operations included the excess costs born by the colony. By 1937, the Dyess contribution was in excess of
$20,000 per year, and by 1938, the Colony health system had achieved remarkable results
compared to other Delta communities. In 1938, there were no deaths among the seventyfive cases of pneumonia reported at the colony as compared to " . . . numerous deaths
from this disease in other parts of the same County."27 In 1935, the Colony medical staff
had been overworked because of the rampant malaria at the Colony. Draining swamps
and screened windows were, indeed, proving effective in battling malaria; there were no
malaria cases reported in 1938. There were no post-operative deaths at the hospital from
the over 100 operations requiring a general anesthesia. The colony's live birth-rate of 30
per 1,000 exceeded that of Mississippi County's of 24 per 1,000; the colony's maternal
death rate was 0 percent compared to 4.1 percent for the County. Only one person of 76
cases of dysentery died at Dyess, and that, in the opinion of the medical staff, was solely
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"Dyess Arkansas, Vital Statistics," type-script narrative and statistical report, 13
August 1938, RG 69, WPA Central Office Records, Roll 1745, Box 339, National
Archives II, hereinafter "Dyess Arkansas, Vital Statistics."
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because the family would not allow the child to be hospitalized. According to Dyess
physicians J. H. Wilson and Steve F. Turner, "Dyess Colony has the lowest death rate of
any community in the U.S.A. per same class of people per thousand." In December
1938, citing excess costs, Floyd Sharp announced that the Colony would not subsidize
the hospital after 1 July 1939. He hoped that the Colonists could make other
28

arrangements.
Of equal pride and interest to the Dyess community was the Dyess School system.
Conditions during the first school year of 1934/35 were cramped and awkward. The
students in grades one through eight attended one of three makeshift schools located over
the colony. About half the high-school age students rode a Dyess truck to Wilson, the
other half traveled in the same manner to Shawnee. The driver rigged a tarpaulin cover
over the bed of a two and a half ton truck in cold or inclement weather. The two school
buses purchased for the inspection duty were used to transport students to and from the
three temporary Colony schools. By autumn of 1938, Dyess Colony operated three new
ward schools and boasted an $80,000 town-center school for first grade through
graduation. Colony schools enrolled 351 students in 1935, including forty-one who
attended High School at Shawnee and forty-two enrolled at Wilson. By 1937, fully onethird of Dyess's 3,000 residents were school-aged children; by 1939, Dyess schools
enrolled slightly over 1,600 students; and the Colony provided, through the WPA,
modern classrooms and employed thirty-seven competent teachers. The RA assigned
28

Letter to W. R. Dyess from L.L. Hubener, M. D., 28 June 1935; "Dyess Arkansas,
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Educational Specialist J. L. Bond to the Colony to establish the public school system.
Bond organized the available records from former schools, instituted a schedule of
inoculations, and made sure that student records were maintained in consonance with the
state of Arkansas. He did not want graduates of the future Dyess High to be required to
take the certification examination required of graduates of unaccredited high schools.
Bond informed Dyess in November of 1935 mat he was well-pleased with the progress
the Colony schools had made and was only concerned with the lack of appropriate
facilities. To accommodate the often-near impassible conditions of the new and graveled
roads, the Dyess schools opened at 9:00 a.m. and closed at 3:00 p.m. Bond expressed
satisfaction with the educational background of the six female teachers. Four of the
teachers held L.I. degrees, one a B. A., and one a B. S. E. degree. The teachers, none of
whom were married, lived in a town-center residence, a five-room house that rented for
$27.00 per month. At the suggestion of W.R. Dyess, the Colony bore the costs of
furnishing the "teacherage." Dyess said that the total living costs for the teachers should
average about $21.00 per month. The Colony paid the Superintendent, Mr. John G.
Womack $125.00 per month. The six women of the teacherage earned $60.00 per month.
They would be comfortable, he said.
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Despite the wariness of government men about denominational religious
activities, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians sent missionaries to live at Dyess and
soon all three particular evangels of God's grace were negotiating with the government
men for a spot to build a church. In the meantime, the Methodists' notions having gained
foothold first, the disciples of Wesley allowed their neighbors to use their facility. The
congregants of one church quickly proved their rural southern Protestant Orthodoxy.
Misunderstanding over dispensation of charitable funds raised by the women's group
caused some hard feelings and threatened to divide the congregation. The
misunderstandings were soon resolved, in part, out of concern for the community's
reputation. The religious Colonists did not totally eschew the ecumenicalism strongly
preferred by the government men. Representatives of the Moody Bible Institute of
Chicago dwelt among the colonists and led community-wide Vacation Bible Schools,
pinch-hit for various congregations and, upon leaving for other fields, left the library
volumes of piety.
The bosses at Dyess also made provision for men. The United Brotherhood of
Dyess Colony organized men "into a social group to discourage dissenters and to
encourage those who are not fully resettled." Only with the approval of the United
Brotherhood of Dyess Colony could other organizations operate at Dyess. The only such
organization to gain approval was the American Farm Bureau. The American Farm
Bureau proved remarkably adept in the depression in securing membership dues from
30

Dyess Colony, Inc." The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937; The (Memphis) Press Scimitar,
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See Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, 13 May 1936, WPA Administrative File.

those whose interests were diametrically opposed to the AFB's vision of agriculture and
agricultural labor. The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) did not ask
permission.31
The government men intended that the small farmers at Dyess have the same
advantages as did some of the cotton barons. While the plan for Dyess called for about a
third of the acreage to be planted to cotton, the aggregate amount should make Dyess a
major cotton producer. The government men assumed that the local production
committees organized by the AAA, composed primarily of cotton barons, county agents,
and AFB stalwarts, would treat the colonists fairly in assigning acreage allotments. The
assumptions proved totally without foundation. Floyd Sharp and Lawrence Westbrook
had to appeal to Washington in order to obtain a more reasonable cotton allotment from
the AAA. The local production committee allowed one Colonist less than an acre for the
crop year 1938. There were certain advantages that could be accrued to individuals only
based on cooperation. The cooperative association mandated that Colonists plant the
Colony approved hybrid cottonseed variety and restricted the colony gin to processing
only that specific strain of cotton. Cooperation would allow the Colonists to command
the same prices as the best of the cotton barons. The ability to sell a "pure" cottonseed
and to market a uniform long-staple cotton crop required some investment from the
Colonists. They must join and be ruled by the Producer's Cooperative. They were told,
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just as they were when farming cotton on halves, what to grow. Soon Mr. Jake Terry, the
Farm Manager, would be more direct, specific, and insistent in his instructions.32
The initial economic advantages of the colony compared to the sharecropping
system from which most of the colonists had escaped were stunning. Each family had
access to three separate credit accounts. Every month each colony family prepared a
family budget for necessities but also included such "extras" as clothing, school supplies,
and the poll tax assessed by the state of Arkansas. The colony social worker and family
specialists approved the budget and the head of the family was assigned enough hours on
the colony's workforce, at standard relief work wages of thirty cents per hour, to fund
about half the monthly budgetary requirements. The other half was disbursed, until 1935,
in the form of coupon books, redeemable at the colony store. With the infusion of RA
personnel at Dyess, the furnish system was changed to a cash basis. Twice a month the
man received a check for his labor; twice a month the family received a check from the
colony for one-half of the remaining budget. The amounts were charged to the "Regular
Furnish Account." In the spring of 1936, T. Harry Reid, Director of Region VI of the RA
(formerly of the Arkansas Extension Service), informed Lawrence Westbrook that the
Colonists should no longer depend on wage work. The construction phase was over and
the Colonists should devote all their time to farming. The government men at Dyess
proved to be reasonable to settlers in paying off their previous debts to the government,
they even allowed colonists to adjust the terms for payment on their "Capital Goods
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Accounts" (see below), but they were insistent that the furnish account, including the poll
tax, be fully settled in December of each year. Insist they did, but most often Colonists at
Dyess carried small furnish balances over year-to-year. The insistence upon paying the
furnish account is significant in view of president of the American Farm Bureau Eugene
O'Neal's fraudulent claim that the WPA and FSA paid poll taxes for over 6,000 rural
relief recipients in order to build a political machine. At the same time that O'Neal made
his outrageous claims evidence existed that the AFB had over 13,000 black sharecroppers
in six Mississippi counties paying dues to his organization. The AFB claimed to croppers
that the AAA payments came by virtue of the AFB and provided on-the-spot check
cashing facilities so that the croppers could conveniently pay their annual American Farm
Bureau dues. A large banner festooned the walls of the Clarksdale, Mississippi AAA
office, "Pay your AFB Dues Here." 33
Since all the colonists were RRC clients, most of them brought previous balances
on their RRC loans. These amounts, transferred to Dyess Colony and debited to "RRC
Account," after 1935, were designated "Deferred Balances." The designation is
interesting because it allowed the resolution of previous debts to be delayed until the
Colonists had shown sufficient economic progress to amortize it. The uncertainty about
the "Deferred Balances" combined with what some colonists thought was deliberately
33
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confusing and fluid conditions for ownership was to be a prime reason for the growing
disaffection among some.
If a man needed a mule, or a bigger one, (one client was affirmed in his suspicions
mat his two 800 pound mules would not be able to handle the Delta buckshot) or a plow
he had only to gain the approval of the Farm Manager. Armed with the sequentially
numbered and multi-copied blank, the Colonists could draw on the warehouse or mule lot
for his capital needs. Thus, the charges appeared in the colonist's name as "Capital
Goods Account." Again, the amortization of this account would be discussed in the
future, after certain conditions were met. In the meantime, the account accrued annual
interest charges of 5 percent, a dramatic reduction from the cotton-baron furnish
system.

•54

The government men - teachers, nurses, drag line operators, bookkeepers, farm
supervisors, porters, police, commissary manager, colony physician, clerks, drivers,
foremen, Family Counselor (the post-May 1936, title of the Senior Family Selection
Specialist), the management staff, and assorted other employees lived in the town-center
residences. The residences, the community building, and other structures had electrical
service and water system that delivered cold and clear water from an artesian well. The
town-center well water was sweet and devoid of the iron deposits that saturated the farm
cottage wells. Potential colonists were advised to make sure they sampled the water at
one of the farms because the water in the town's artesian well was not the same as the
water from farm cottage wells. The town center water system cost $26,810.60; it would
have cost $215.60 to equip each farm with an electric pump, including the cost of the

'One of Several Interviews," RG 96.
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intra-colony power transmission lines. The sixteen blocks - thirty-two residences - of
the town-center were of the same design and construction as the farm cottages, with one
exception. There were no outbuildings on the lots in town center. None of the Dyess
colony houses had basements, and less than 1% had fireplaces. The people, said Cone
Murphy, always bricked up the fireplaces and installed a wood stove. The five room
houses rented for $27.00 a month; the four room houses for $22.00 and the three room
houses for $17.00. Thirty-two Dyess employees (thirty-seven if one counts all the
occupants of the teacherage) of the 114 employed as of May 1936, rented residences at
Dyess. The mixture of occupational and income levels represented at Dyess is a
reminder of a time when class distinctions were not so vividly manifested as later. In
Block No.21, resided the highest salaried official at Dyess, Dr. L.L. Hubener drew $525
per month; Resident Manager E. S. Dudley earned $325 and lived adjacent to a
Commissary Clerk who earned $100 per month, the Disbursing Officer received $200 per
month, and a Landscaper, salary not specified.35
The colony newspaper monitored the pulse of the club and school activities and
accomplishments; locals formed bands and individuals pulled outfiddlesand guitars or
gathered around one of the beat-up upright pianos and blended Protestant hymnody with
country and Delta blues. The school questionnaire surveyed each child about his or her
musical ability or interest in acquiring it. Perhaps Ray Cash's boy, Johnny, owed part of
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his future legendary success to the musical incubator that was Dyess. Families,
especially those from non-Delta areas, gloried in the size of the vegetables and melons
that sprouted from the black Delta buckshot ground. It took a while for some of the Delta
natives to match their plains and hill-country brethren in vegetable gardening. However,
many of the Delta natives had difficulty cultivating vegetables - most of them had little
experience. One of the oft-repeated cliches about planters and croppers, found in the
works of such writers as Jonathan Daniels and David Conn, concerns planters' provision
of garden plots and seeds for cropper maintenance. Cohn even relates that Delta cotton
barons encouraged their croppers to raise pigs and chickens, but his exceptions proved
the rule. Delta cotton barons of the 1920s and 30s, particularly in the Arkansas and
Mississippi Delta, did not encourage and in most cases did not even allow croppers to
raise their food. The land was too valuable; most Delta cotton barons insisted that
croppers grow cotton to the cabin door. Only after the AAA acreage reduction and under
the soil conservation program did planters allow significant space for cropper gardens.
The American Red Cross supplied vegetable seeds to croppers after the 1927 flood. The
results were disappointing. Red Cross officials discovered that a great many Delta
residents, tillers of the richest soil in the world, did not know how to grow vegetables.
Indeed, after the 1927 flood, Oscar Johnston hired two Alcorn A & M graduates to teach
his sharecroppers how to cultivate and process fruit and vegetables.36
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Spurred on by Home Demonstration Clubs, the Colony sponsored contests
judging or simply rhapsodizing about, the fruits and vegetables produced by kitchen
gardens; twice a year the Colony conducted a "Yard Beautiful" contest. Many of the
Dyess residents had moved from the hills and plains areas of Arkansas. They were
accustomed to sweeping their bare yards, a physical impossibility in the Delta. Dyess
Colony yards were composed of buckshot; mud when it rained and deep-gashed crevices
when it did not. The answer to the dilemma, discomfiting and yet beneficial to some
non-Deltans, was to plant grass seed. Not only did the grass moderate the mud and
cracked ground, it also provided a proper foundation for poultry. The Farm Supervisors
estimated that each family would need about 300 chickens in order to achieve a
population of thirty good laying hens. Throughout his association with the Colony
Lawrence Westbrook promoted egg production for the St. Louis and Memphis markets.
Chickens could not survive out of doors on bare buckshot land. The Deltans among the
Dyess colonists were not overwrought by me stiff soil or the mud or snakes, or wild
animals. A nine-year old Dyess boy found a baby bobcat in the woods with its eyes still
closed during the very week that the Governor and Lawrence Westbrook came to
memorialize W. R. Dyess and to dedicate the project. The lad intended to raise it for a
pet, he said.

only as animal feed - it also constituted a major portion of croppers' diets) are
ubiquitous. Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 91. Johnny Cash was four years old when his
family moved to Dyess, 24 March 1935 - house #266. See: Henson, "Memories of
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The economic condition and standard of living for Dyess residents was, by
middle-class American standards of the time, woefully deficient. Despite the pristine
white houses and arrow-straight graveled roads, the houses at Dyess were built cheaply of
local lumber not properly seasoned. Cheaply constructed houses made of improperly
processed materials require intense maintenance in order to remain neat and attractive.
Dyess Colony homes did not remain pristine or attractive for very long. However,
compared to conditions they had experienced in the American South that were worse than
anywhere else in the world, some colonists reveled in the roofs that did not leak, water
just outside the kitchen door, a good school and teachers for their children, and confident
of a decent supper. Many of the Dyess colonists had lived in such substandard conditions
all their lives, but many had not. For some of the colonists the conditions at Dyess were
best measured not against the immediate past but against their lives before the boll
weevil, prior to the crash of cotton prices, prevenient to the ministrations of the New
Deal. Some colonists still believed that they had a right to pursue the American dream.
Some had much greater aspirations than a life of secure but blighted subsistence
competence. Some, like some of those at Tupelo, did not have a problem with authority
as such; they just did not like people telling them what to do.38
The Third Crisis
"Down in Tupelo everybody seems to be feeling grand," reported Lorena Hickock
to Harry Hopkins; people were buying electrical appliances in anticipation of cheap TVA
38
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power, and she approved of the economic plan designed for the Tupelo Homesteaders.
The homesteaders were simply replicating the wage-work/subsistence gardening
traditionally practiced by most of Tupelo's workers. They had a chance, said Hickock, to
"pay out." On the surface, things were looking grand at Dyess; how people felt was
much more complicated.
There was always some sort of trouble at Dyess. Some Dyess colonists were
anxious when they discovered that their move to Dyess, often a great sacrifice in
abandoned memories and family, did not mean that they were secure. They were on
probation, an inconsequential matter it seemed. Serious consideration of the their
probationary status came only with the dismissal of some of their neighbors. Even if one
agreed that a particular family was not a wholesome influence or good neighbor, the fact
that someone could be evicted for exercising a personal preference rather than for
violation of a law or regulation was sobering. Mr. S. B. Funk believed that the price of
his farm was far too high and totally unjustified and refused to sign the purchase
agreement; his eviction brought protest from here-to-fore cooperative citizens. In 1938, a
non-colonist neighbor, Mr. Paul Finch, demanded that all the officers and members of the
Board of Directors resign or else he would inform newspapers in Memphis, Chicago,
Kansas City, Cleveland, and St. Louis of the gross fraud and outrageous exploitation
inflicted upon the colonists at Dyess in particular and upon the taxpayers of the United
States in general. Mr. Funk and Mr. Finch were rousing up the colonists. More than 100
colonists supported Finch's notions and petitioned President Roosevelt to conduct an
investigation of the Colony. Eleanor Roosevelt directed similar complaints to the bosses
39
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at the RA and at Dyess. The farms cost too much. The government men demanded
$90.00 per acre for land that the government bought at $2.50. The government men said
that the purchase price would not be more than the actual cost - and they offered the
government men's own words as proof. Why could a colonist not plant whatever variety
of cotton that struck his fancy? Why was an American cotton cultivator not free to gin
his own cotton where he pleased? Why was the independent land-holding cotton
"farmer" of Dyess dependent on government men and bosses for marketing the crop?
Why could a man who had obligated himself to a lifetime of mortgage payments not get a
traditional fee-simple occupancy? The government men had a rational answer to each of
those questions. There is no evidence that the bosses actually responded with the obvious
(to the bosses) answer, "Because you have proven to be incompetent." In every case,
said the bosses, the colonists had agreed to the conditions, or extenuating circumstances
had required alteration of the original language. Within a year after the dedication
ceremony, the number of people leaving Dyess became a steady stream - they were not
as steadily replaced.40
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Some colonists claimed that the farm managers used abusive language and
physical intimidation. Dyess officials, among themselves, discussed the truculent
personality of some personnel, the greed of others, and argued about what to do with
those people who would obviously never be able to support themselves. Westbrook
suggested that around 200 families would never be self-sufficient and that the Colony
should plan to provide welfare to them until, perhaps, their children could assume care
for them. Many of the colonists refused to cooperate. The governor and state house
crowd made Dyess a principal target and the AFB tried to wreck any government
assistance to the most destitute Americans. Over 100 Dyess men signed a petition
condemning the government men at Dyess and demanded alterations to the system. At
the same time, a significant majority of Dyess colonists petitioned the First Lady and
asked her to ignore the grousing of a few malcontents. Meanwhile, Rexford G. Tugwell
continued to draw the vicious lashings of the increasingly suspicious and resentful
Southern Democrats; Dyess Colony was guilty by association.41
Clearly, the reality of Dyess was very different from the vision of W. R. Dyess,
and the hopes, if not the expectations, of New Deal planners. The "Third Crisis," was
inevitable considering the number of contradictory phenomena set at play against each
other at Dyess. With a full stomach, a snug and comfortable house, furnish provided and
free of the mind-numbing anxiety of destitution, the Dyess cultivator might well have

1936; Arkansas Gazette, 9 January 1938,10 June 1977. Letter to Floyd Sharp from Paul
Finch, 10 May 1938, WPA Central Office Files.
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reason to reflect and to re-examine his present condition and future obligations. Was his
present state that different from his former?
Before a Dyess colonist had failed dramatically enough to become a client of the
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, his residence status was tenuous at best. He
had no guarantee that he could cultivate the same ground the next crop season. New
arrivals at Dyess could rely on the goodwill of the bosses; they were on probation for at
least a year and could be dismissed if they failed to meet expectations. The new arrival
had no guarantee that he could cultivate the same ground the next crop season; his
residence status was tenuous. On the landlord's place the cultivator had to tolerate the
rude and sometimes demeaning behavior of the boss. At Dyess, one only had to avoid
Farm Manager Jake Terry's acerbic tongue and physical threats. Before Dyess, the
Arkansas cultivator had little discretion over the acreage he could crop. The amount
depended on the opinion of the boss as to the likely efficiency of his labor force. At
Dyess, the bosses determined the size of his farm and his house, based on the size and
likely efficiency of his labor force.
A southern sharecropper planted the seeds that his landlord provided. The
cooperative agreement at Dyess required the colonist to plant the seed the bosses sold
him. Sharecroppers did not choose where or by whom to "gin" cotton; the cotton barons
did that. The Dyess colonist had no say over the ginning of cotton; the Cooperative
Association did that. The fortunes and conditions of the typical Delta sharecropper were
determined by the landlord, the paternalistic, but mostly well-meaning, cotton-baron that
financed the crop and owned the land. At least at Dyess, that most "progressive" of all
the New Deal agrarian programs, the Colonist understood that he was a free citizen of the
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United States and, therefore, entitled to self-governance and representation. America was
a democracy. At Dyess, a triumvirate of government men freed the cultivators from all
the negotiations, all the arrangements, all the travel, entertainment, influence, and power
that traditionally had been the exclusive domain of cotton barons in the cotton business.
The trio of Arkansas WPA officials, dominated by Floyd Sharp controlled the
lives and fortunes of the Dyess Colonists more completely than ever did a cotton baron.
Most Delta sharecroppers owed the landlord at the end of the year. Many of them carried
debts that they did not understand and seemed impossible to repay; every year the
balances got bigger. At Dyess, all the cultivators were in debt. They had great difficulty
determining just how much they owed; it soon seemed that most of them could never
"pay out." Every year the balances got bigger. On a cotton baron's plantation the crop
was, most often, pledged by a crop-lien; at Dyess, it was pledged by a contract. Much to
the chagrin of social commentators and agricultural experts, sharecroppers had a
disturbing propensity to move when their debts piled up. Strangely, some also moved
when they happened to do well during a particular year. It was one of the few tools of the
peasant class. At Dyess when consciousness of mounting debt intruded some Colonists
moved. Sometimes, just to prove that they could, some of the cultivators at Dyess cast
the only meaningful vote at their disposal - they voted with their feet and left Dyess. A
Dyess colonist lived a better life than did the typical Delta cropper; but they still moved.
In May 1936, there were 484 families at Dyess; by April 1938,184 (40%) had moved.
During the period October 1934 to April 1938,649 families had lived at Dyess, of this
number 252 (39%) had moved. Unlike a good number of white sharecroppers and unlike
all of the blacks, the Dyess Cooperator could and did vote. He did not remotely
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resemble, however, the vision of W. R. Dyess, nor that of Thomas Jefferson's yeoman.
He looked more like a traditional cotton cultivator, a southern sharecropper, than he did a
virtuous American yeoman.

42

Floyd Sharp had managed to become, arguably, one of the most powerful cotton
barons in the South. Despite the published intentions of creating a community of land
owning, cooperating, and yet self-directed, modestly comfortable farmers, Floyd Sharp
was mindful of the demonstrated inability of Dyess clients to achieve that status on their
own. In order to rehabilitate the impoverished and apparently hopeless cultivators, Sharp
was reconciled to the fact that Dyess farmers needed direction and they must be
controlled for their own good. Therefore, Sharp, as the state Director managed to control
both the operations and personnel of the Arkansas Works Progress Administration and
the largest of all the New Deal agrarian projects. Floyd Sharp with the concurrence of
two state WPA Board Members, R.C. Limerick and H.C. Baker, exercised control over
his cut of the New Deal more than any other New Deal official, whether elected or
appointed. Dyess Colony, because of Sharp's alteration of its original plan by virtue of
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the corporation, was not under the direction of the ERA, the WPA, RA, or the Farm
Security Administration (FSA), established in 1937. Floyd Sharp was an employee of
and subordinate to the WPA and subject to its policies and supervision. However, since
the Dyess Colony was a separate corporate entity, its affairs were subject to the direction
of the Board of Directors, not to the WPA. Until the FSA absorbed the colony, Floyd
Sharp controlled the economy and lives of his clients and employees more authoritatively
and completely than did Harry Hopkins, or Rexford Tugwell, or Senator Joe Robinson, or
the President of the United States.43
Aware of the traditional American fear and suspicion of collectivization and
Americans' propensity to confuse it with cooperation, the Dyess agreement seemed to
have provided for democratic voice and cropper control. The small farmers at Dyess
could only prosper and compete if they could avail themselves of the advantages accruing
to the cotton barons. Only by pooling the crop and resources of individuals could the
Dyess community achieve the goal of providing a modest and secure competence for its
members. How could the interests and small inputs of a diverse group of stubbornly
independent and indebted Arkansas cultivators be channeled into a significant and
effective participant in American agriculture to the benefit of individuals? The answer, it
appeared, was the cooperative. However, did not cooperation violate long-held American
traditions of self-reliance and determination? The answer to the dilemma, said the Dyess
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Board of Directors, was in the creation of Producers' Cooperatives. The Producers'
Cooperative at Dyess would unify the demands and assets of Dyess cotton cultivators,
thus, gaining advantages normally the purview of cotton barons. The creation of a
cooperative did not violate American notions of Democracy, said the bosses. The
Directors of the Cooperative had control of all business decisions. The Board of the
Cooperative would determine the particular pure strain of hybrid cotton planted at Dyess.
The Board would negotiate with Delta and Pine Land (DP&L) or the Delta Experiment
Station or the University of Arkansas Cotton Branch Experiment Station at Marion for
use of one of the newly biologically engineered strains of cottonseed. The Board
determined who could use the Colony gin. Since only those who planted the approved
cottonseed could use the gin, all the cottonseed extracted from the ginning process was
sold, not for its oil, or as feed for livestock, but as a single pure seed variety and thus
demanded as much as a 60% premium over standard cottonseed. By planting only the
long-staple varieties perfected by the scientists at the Delta Experiment Station or at the
laboratories of DP&L, Dyess cotton brought premium prices. The Board of Directors
also undertook the onerous task of negotiating with the various cotton-factors and
marketing associations that lusted for their business. Stapleton Cotton headquartered in
Greenwood, Mississippi competed with The O'Donnell Brothers headquartered in
Boston, New Orleans, Phoenix, Memphis, Atlanta, London, and Paris to market the
Colony's cotton. The board also enforced the policies of the Colony with regard to
progress in clearing land, attitude toward cooperation, assumption of minimal standards
of living, and adherence to community standards. The Producer's Cooperative wielded
enormous, almost dictatorial power. No matter said the government men, the Board of
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Directors would be chosen from the Cooperative Membership. The Dyess farmers would
choose their own bosses; it was democracy at its best, they said.44
Perhaps not. The specter of ill-prepared, immoderate, and ill-mannered Arkansas
farmers dealing with professional emissaries representing Oscar Johnston and LeRoy
Percy, and other cotton barons was more than Floyd Sharp could tolerate. After securing
the administrative control of Dyess via the creation of Dyess Colony Incorporated,
shortly after the death of W. R. Dyess, Sharp immediately began to plan a way around the
democratic realities of an incorporated Cooperative Association. The Delaware
Incorporation statutes worked well for the creation of Dyess Colony. Control of the
colony was concentrated in the Board of Directors, a group dominated by Sharp.
However, the Delaware statutes concerning cooperatives were problematic. Under
Delaware laws, a chartered cooperative required that the Board of Directors be elected
from the general membership of the association. That feature made the incorporation of
Cooperatives under Delaware statutes unacceptable to Floyd Sharp. The Arkansas laws
provided a loophole. Dr. H. M. Colvin of the WPA Washington staff advised Sharp that
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certain provisions in the Arkansas statutes allowed the Board of Directors of Dyess
Colony Incorporated to continue directing the affairs of the Colonists.
The feeling that it was necessary to secure a Delaware Charter was
probably due to the fact that it was thought that the Dyess Colony
Incorporated which will lease its property to the cooperative association to
be formed would not have proper influence or control over the
association's Board of Directors. However, the Dyess Colony
Incorporated can have very effective control over the Board of Directors
and the affairs of the cooperative association under Arkansas statutes. "
Eventually the attempt to retain control of the people of Dyess resulted in the
disintegration of the noble experiment.
Sharp tried gradually to include the colonists in the leadership of the Cooperative
Association. The activities of the Colony eventually at the end of about four years would
be managed by Cooperative Associations. By then the financially sound infrastructure
of Dyess would be an example of a planned democracy. Sharp hoped to dole out
authority and responsibility to the Colonists as their actions justified it. Ostensibly a
Board of Directors governed both of the Cooperative Associations; one was a producer's
co-op, the other a co-op operating the store and non-profit centers. However, by using
board seats reserved for the Dyess Board and for the University of Arkansas and the
management contract held by the Dyess Colony, Inc. Board, all decisions rested
ultimately in the hands of Floyd Sharp. Resident Manager E.S. Dudley helped the
cooperative board select a committee to meet with the appropriate manager in order to
investigate the affairs and make recommendations for various colony activities. Thus,
some Colonists held the impressive sounding title of Member of the Board of Directors of
the Dyess Colony Cooperative Association; others assumed advisory positions related to
"'Memorandum to Colonel Westbrook from H.M. Colvin, 8 May 1936, RG 69, WPA
Central Office Files.
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specific activities. The degree of dissatisfaction and irritation among the Colonists was
often demonstrated by the petty recommendations and demands of the committees. The
advisory committee complained to the store manager about dogs running free in the store
and the "crabbiness" of one of the female clerks. Other debates concerned whether or not
to place benches on the store porch. At one such advisory committee meeting, the
committee's recommendations astounded Dudley. First, wrote Dudley to Sharp, they
demanded a guaranteed price for any truck crops marketed through the association.
Second, they asked for funds to give to Mr. S.B. Funk in connection with his eviction suit
and to aid Mr. Finch in his investigation of Dyess.46

By the summer of 1937 and continuing until the dissolution of the colony, the
grievances, imagined or real, became part of growing public disaffection with Dyess
Colony. Much of the general disdain or suspicion applied to the Colony was a function
of the ridicule directed at Rexford G. Tugwell by the conservative press, the AAA, and
the agricultural establishment. However, much of it had simmered since the inception of
Colonization Project No. 1. Azile Aaron, Family Selection Specialist at the newly
created Resettlement Administration in Washington and recently charged, by Rexford
Tugwell, with overall management of the family selection at Dyess, made a research trip
to Dyess in the fall of 1935. Based on the information gleaned from interviews with
colonists, Rural Rehabilitation officials, and other government men, Aaron redesigned
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the blanks and the procedures; she also instituted a comprehensive training component
for the family selection personnel, particularly the Regional Interviewers.47
The principal complaint from the colonists, even the most cooperative ones, was
the one-year probationary period and the inability to know what they were to pay for their
new farms. Colonists discovered mat the blanks they signed at Dyess did not actually
guarantee anything. The contract required a Colonist to cooperate, satisfy standard
community obligations, and make reasonable progress during the first year of occupancy.
Upon satisfactory completion of those requirements, the Colonist would be offered an
opportunity to enter into an agreement to buy the farm at a price, at an interest rate, and
for a period of years to be determined later. One of the most universally recognized
deleterious properties of the American sharecropping system affected Dyess Colonists.
Tenants who had no permanent interest in a property had no reason to invest time or
money to improve or even maintain land and structures. The Dyess Colonists,
presumably, had reason to trust their new bosses and the government. Aaron and her
associates discovered that, in spite of the stated nature of the experiment, some of the first
colonists came to Dyess looking for a chance to escape farming for a living. They were
not committed to farming as a way of life, nor did some of them show much interest in
becoming part of a community. Some had great difficulty in understanding how
cooperation, which meant sacrificing personal initiative and preference, could benefit
them. Some of the initial colonists were shocked and woefully unprepared for the
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peculiar nature of life and farming in the Delta. Based on the experience of the colonists
and the RRC, Aaron set about improving the selection of colonist families.
Several of the documents that Aaron's staff prepared for training family selection
personnel are particularly revealing. The Washington RA office created training
documents based on the existing interviews and cases of current Dyess residents who had
been selected by the Arkansas RRC. Using actual questions and objections, the
documents reconstructed past interviews and supplied appropriate answers. These
documents are interesting for at least two reasons. All of the issues, which later were the
subject of so much agitation, were articulated and addressed in the training documents.
Neither the RA nor the bosses at Dyess were unaware of the problems that confronted
some of the Colonists. At least after December 1935, all the government men had read
the documents and had been coached as how to answer those questions. The second
reason the documents are so important is that their existence proves that the colonists
should have been aware of the peculiar nature of life at Dyess.49
The synthetic interview with questions was drawn from actual interviews and
answers supplied for training purposes addressed the nature of the occupancy. The oneyear probationary period was for the benefit of the applicant as well as the colony, said
the model interviewer. The one-year trial allowed the applicant to leave before obligating
himself to pay for the farm. The reason the government men could not specify the price
was that no one knew, exactly, what the final price of the project would be because
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construction was still ongoing. Colonists did not get a deed with their amortization
schedule and contract because the government was obligated to protect its investment.
Thus, the colonists would get title when the farms were paid for.

50

The potential colonists came to the interviews with questions apparently based on
rumors. Selection personnel hastened to assure that the Colony did not use bells to
summon people to the fields and that Colonists were not required to get permission to
leave the property. Some had concerns about having visitors, others asked about the mud
and the quality of water. In their answers, the interviews offered straightforward answers
along with a moderate commentary. For example, in assuring that Colonists could leave
the property at will, staffers also commented on the necessity of applying close attention
to the crops if one was to be successful. Relatives and friends could visit at the discretion
of the Colonist, interviewers assured potential Colonists, but one should be considerate of
the sensibilities of neighbors. The houses were not large enough for extended families or
numerous visitors. Extended stays by large numbers of people could easily
inconvenience Colony neighbors. The questions asked by the colonists in early 1936 did
not come as a surprise to the government men - they had ready, and for the most part,
truthful answers. That some of the assertions made by the interviewers turned out to be
less than accurate is certain. Twenty acres of Delta land was not sufficient to produce
food, feed, and cash enough to amortize the loan and provide a wholesome living. The
property turned out to be not as safe from flooding as the interviews said. Even so, the
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interviews and the training materials they used were not deliberately misleading. Any
errors or misrepresentations were honest errors. Every Dyess Family Placement
Specialist had been trained by use of the synthetic interviews. Later some colonists
claimed that they were ignorant of the items discussed in the training materials.51
"Dyess Colony, Inc," is an in-house narrative and summary of conditions at Dyess
covering its inception through 1937. It is anonymous, and it is a non-published
typescript, yet it contains direct quotations from several reports of RA officials, it seems
to have been created for internal use only as an objective summary, and not as an attempt
to justify or defend the Colony. Therefore, it seems to be a trustworthy source. The
narrative was glowing in its report on the character, training, and attitude of the Regional
Interviewers and Family Selection Specialists. All were college graduates; all had
received some post-graduate training; all were Arkansas natives. They had compassion
for the potential clients and were passionate about the promise of Dyess. Most of them
were from rural backgrounds and all demonstrated skill in driving the muddy and rutted
roads of rural Arkansas. All had faced situations that made an automobile useless and all
had reverted to riding a mule or horse to an interview, or hiking through the Arkansas
wilderness of mud and swamps in the Delta, or piney woods, prairies, and remote
mountains in other parts of the state; four interviewers were women. Some of the
Washington officials suspected the compassion and enthusiasm caused the Interviewers
to oversell the conditions and hope at Dyess and to understate the difficulties of
cultivating cotton in the Delta.52
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The Washington RA staff was convinced that the key to proper family selection
lay in good recommendations from the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors. Some of
these officials had "oversold" the project to their least successful clients. Many of the
county supervisors refused to mention the project to their best clients. They did not want
to lose their most successful clients, or best mules. As a result, some of the applicants
came to Dyess expecting almost Utopian conditions while others never became applicants
because the county supervisor never informed them about Dyess. Later analysis of the
Dyess family selection identified another problem. Despite the training and introduction
to Dyess, the Regional Interviewers had often oversold Dyess. Compared to the places
and under the conditions that their clients lived, the possibilities at Dyess made it difficult
for young college-educated social workers to remain objective and analytical. Part of the
interviewer's duty was to dissuade those who demonstrably were unsuited for the
project.53
Soon other problems occupied the minds and conversations of the colonists. The
"Deferred Balances" loomed large in their fears. In addition to the debts transferred from
the RRC, the balance grew because of particular circumstances. The initial ERA grant to
Dyess Colony included a substantial reserve fund, designed to ensure the colony's
existence should there be unusual or aberrant situations. Because of the reserves and the
provision that applied all payments, not to the U. S. Treasury but to Dyess Colony, Inc,
the Board of Directors were free to provide liberal conditions for the repayment of the
Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts. Should a colonist not be able to pay on the two
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accounts, arrangements were quickly and easily arranged for payment at some future
time. Payments were applied only to the furnish account until the balance on that account
was satisfied. Only after the furnish account had been paid, were payments allocated to
Deferred or Capital Goods Accounts. However, even the seniority of the furnish debt and
its claim to first payment did not halt the growth of the furnish balance. It seemed that
aberrant situations hindered the colonist' ability to achieve complete amortization of
previous furnish and capital goods accounts within the first four years, as Colony officials
initially forecast. Most of the colonists came after January 1936; therefore, many of them
had time to clear and plant only a fraction of their acreage, a large part of what they
planted was devoted to vegetables and feed. Part of the reason for this liberality was the
flood of 1937. The flood further delayed land clearing, the government men evacuated
all the mules, and their evacuation and temporary care cost the Colony $10,712.05. No
one could make a payment on Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts; the government
wrote off all the 1937 and one-half of the 1938 Furnish Accounts. No payment was
required on the Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts, but interest still accrued at 5%.54
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Minutes: Meeting of Board of Directors, Dyess Colony, Inc., 17 February 1936; 25
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of the farms, Sharp insisted that the colonists understand the total amount of the annual
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The End
The 20 April 1939 postal telegram was addressed to Floyd Sharp as WPA
Administrator, not as President of Dyess Colony, Inc. Corrington Gill, the Assistant
Administrator of the Works Progress Administration wired Sharp:
Petitions by various inhabitants of Dyess Colony received complaining, in
brief, that cost of land to them would be its actual cost, said to be two
dollars fifty per acre, and improvements thereon whereas actually
corporation is trying to force deeds upon them at a cost exceeding seventy
five dollars per acre. Complaints also re eviction suites (sic) against S. B.
Funk and A. J. McCraven. Various other complaints by petitioners
alleging abuses. Please submit written report as soon as possible.55

Just nineteen days earlier, Lawrence Westbrook had confided to Sharp that Gill desired
merely to, "hold the situation in status quo pending final decision as to what agency of
the government will be responsible for these communities." The continuing agitation of
McCraven, Funk, and Finch - and the murmuring among some - allowed no quiet
environment in which to dispose of Dyess Colony.56
The original plan, and one continually reaffirmed by the Dyess Board, provided
that in four years from inception, the Colonists would have established profitable
Cooperatives to manage the marketing and ancillary activities. In four years, planners
thought, all the 500 farms would be solidly secured by government mortgages, there
would be no furnish or capital goods balances, and the New Deal would have
demonstrated a way to redeem American agriculture. Dyess and the other two aberrant
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projects, Cherry Lake and Pine Mountain, would resurrect a player that America had not
seen since the late seventeenth century. In an industrialized nation, in the midst of an
agricultural technical revolution (cotton was mechanized later than any other American
staple crop), and in a geo-economic environment in which gaining an economic and
social competence from family-sized farms was impossible, the New Deal proposed a
reappearance of the independent and disinterested yeoman farmer. He would plan his
production for subsistence, trade his surplus for extra-community goods, and, perhaps sell
his surplus according to notions of "just price" rather than market forces. The telegram
and the issues addressed must have represented a dilemma for Sharp; to write an adequate
report he would have to go back, at least to early 1937, if not earlier.57
Conditions that spawned petitions, eviction suits, and "various other complaints"
were present at the beginning and became more robust with age. Floyd Sharp's five
years as President of Dyess Colony Incorporated and Arkansas WPA Director had just
reached their nadir as Sharp received the telegram. Governor Carl Bailey had just
dissolved Dyess Colony Incorporated and Sharp was trying to control his outrage against
those who, in his opinion, were simply taking advantage of the naive Colonists by
making ludicrous charges of malfeasance against the Dyess staff and Board. Earlier in
the year, at the Governor's dissolution of the corporation, Floyd Sharp and Lawrence
Westbrook had been trying to determine under which agency the Dyess Colony could
avoid domination of Governor Bailey's allies. At the same time Sharp was fearful that
the colony and its remaining trust fund balance would fall into the hands of the Arkansas
statehouse crowd; he was trying to find a way to rescue W.R. Dyess's dream. It appeared

57

The Colony Herald, 1 May 1936; The Commercial Appeal, 5 November 1936;

199
as if Governor Bailey had won. That the WPA would call Sharp to account for
conditions and actions concerning a program over which the WPA nor any other agency
had authority served only to accent the gravity of the situation. Normally matters
concerning Dyess were addressed to him as President of Dyess Colony, even those from
other governmental departments and agencies, particularly the Works Progress
Administration. The corporate entity that removed Dyess from WPA and RA control also
removed it from their protection. The fall-out from Dyess might very well negatively
CO

affect Sharp's career and it might disassemble the patronage system he controlled.
Perhaps events in January 1937 were a portent of troubles corning to Dyess. The
first years of the Colony's existence, 1934-35 were times of bustle and construction; of
designing and redesigning; of recruiting and explaining; and then the almost sudden
culminating rush of colonists who came to Dyess in early 1936. Only those who came in
1934 had a chance to clear a significant portion of their acres in time for the 1935 crop;
some who came in 1936 also were not able to clear land quickly enough to harvest a cash
crop. Nineteen thirty-seven should have been a great year for Dyess Colony. Most of the
colonists had positive attitudes about their new homes and landlords; families had cleared
a substantial amount of land; pigs, mules, milch cows, and chickens supplied food for the
table and power for the fields; and fine new schools educated the children. The women's
clubs were robustly improving themselves, and fully intended to improve everybody else.
The year of 1937 would demonstrate what hardworking and right-minded people could
do if they only had a fair chance. But, Dyess Colony was in the heart of the Great
58
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American Delta and in the Delta success had always been as much a function of chance
as equity. In January when the Mississippi River flooded, again, and backed the Tyronza
River over the flat Delta land, Dyess colonists were evacuated to higher and drier places;
the crop at Dyess Colony was delayed while workers cleared and cleaned and waited on
the colony's mules to return from their exile at the state prison farm.5
In spite of the 1937 flood, the Colony was making fair progress in becoming a
major player in the Delta cotton hierarchy. Resident Manager E.S. Dudley reported to
Westbrook on 13 November 1937, despite bad weather, that the colony had ginned 1,493
bales of cotton totaling 788,133 pounds. The long staple and high-tensile strength cotton
grown at Dyess was denser than the common upland green seed cotton sewn by most
producers. The average bale of Dyess cotton weighed almost 528 pounds, the typical
bale of cotton in the 1930s weighed around 500 pounds, but often less. The cotton bale is
a measure of volume rather than weight. In a further effort to increase the market value
of cotton, Westbrook and Sharp were, in 1937, discussing with the Arkansas and Florida
extension services the possibility, and risk, of planting the even more valuable sea-island
strain of cotton, heretofore grown successfully only in coastal South Carolina and
Georgia. In 1937, the occasional vocal complaint and the sometimes-casual attitude
about "community spirit" had become, by the end of the year, a murmur; in the next two
years, it became a roar.60
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Even the first colonists expressed some anxiety about the initial rental
agreements. The biggest problem seems to have been not the probationary period, but the
undetermined price of the new farms. The government men tried to explain to the
colonists that the final price of the farm could not be determined until the entire planned
infrastructure and ancillary facilities were completed. There were certain adjustments
necessary in order for equity in pricing the farms. For example, initially only two acres
of ground was cleared for each new farm-site. The land adjacent to the house was
cleared as a convenience to new arrivals; new comers would at least have a garden spot.
The colonists were expected to clear their own property, if the colony cleared any land
beyond the two acres, then the colonists would be charged $15.00 for each acre cleared.
The rental and the purchase contract allowed the Colony, in cases where a colonist's
progress was not satisfactory, to clear land and to add the per acre charge to the purchase
price. In the spring of 1936, against stated colony policy, some of the Colonists were
employed at relief work wages by ERA schedule to clear their own land. The alteration
in the Dyess policy was to speed up cotton production, to make up for lost time. Some
Colonists claimed that they were not given credit for the land they had cleared while on
relief work. They felt that the amount of land they had cleared while drawing relief
wages should be exempt from the land clearing charges included in the price of the farms.
Precisely why they expected to be paid for the work and at the same time draw all the
benefit of the work for their own profit puzzled the government men. Many of the
Colonists thought that the price of the house was inflated and almost all thought that the
price for the land was extortionary. It was common knowledge that Dyess had bought the

Memphis, TN, 11 October 1937; letter to Floyd Sharp from H.D. Sanders, Regional
Engineer, WPA Memphis, 16 October 1937; all in RG 69 WPA Central Office Records.

land for $2.50 an acre. The government men wanted $75.00; some said $90.00 an acre.
Some said they never would have signed the rental agreement had they known how much
the farms would cost.61
The government men assured the Colonists that the government would charge
only what the property and its development cost. Such notables as Lawrence Westbrook
and Floyd Sharp made efforts to allay anxieties about the price; in no case, said Sharp,
would the farms cost more than they had cost the government. At least that is what he
told them in 1935. By 1936, the colonists were assured that the prices would be
"reasonable." In the halcyon days of early spring 1936, Sharp reassured the concerned
Colonists:
. . . We have delayed the actual selling of these homes to the families until
such a time as we could complete most of the buildings. Meanwhile
families have been moved in on tentative agreements. We are now in the
final stages of the Colony construction and beginning to plan for the
future.
. . . You can start to work with every assurance that your interest is our
interest, your success our success, and that these homes will be sold at a
fair price and payments extended over a period of years within the
reasonable earnings of the property. The new Corporation will work out
these sales contracts with you shortly after the dedication of the Colony
which is now tentatively scheduled for the month of June.
. . . We want you to know that we are more interested in your having a
home and being in position to earn an independent living than we are in
collecting back the money used in this development. We make this
statement, not because we want to leave the impression that you will not
be required to pay for this property, but because we know that once you
have a comfortable home and facilities for making a living, the actual
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annual payments that you will be required to make to the Corporation for
your home will be an easy task.
Resident Manager E. S. Dudley published assurances in the Colony newspaper, and all
the Regional Interviewers as well as Dyess Family Selection Personnel, presumably, had
addressed with comforting assurances and as much clarity as they could muster, the -asyet-undetermined price of the farms. What had been mild anxiety for some became
outraged resistance by others on the distribution of the first land deeds to the settlers at
Dyess Colony. S. B. Funk, citing his own work in clearing the land and the initial land
price of $2.50 an acre refused to sign the purchase contract. Not only did Funk refuse to
sign, he also articulated his charges and suspicions freely and found that some of the
Colonists were also dissatisfied with the conditions and requirements of Dyess. He
conferred with Colonist A. J. McCraven and McCraven also refused to sign his contract.
Some were surprised that the land contracts did not allow them total freedom to sell their
property as they saw fit. Until the balance had been paid, said the contract and
government men, the property could be transferred only to Dyess Colony, Inc. If the
Colonist wanted to sell, he only had one potential customer.63
Other things bothered some of the Dyess Colonists. The Farm Manager and
Assistant Director Jake Terry was domineering and abrasive. Homer Donaldson
complained to President Roosevelt.
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Mr. Dudley and Mr. Terry (the managers) stopped me m the road and
Terry began to use abusive language and I ask him to quit and then he
begot (sic) worse and when I did the same he struck at me. I have two
witness (sic) on this as it happened in front of Mario Rattan's home house
556 and Mr. Pulliam of house 562 was with me. Mr. Rattan was very
dissatisfied with the way they done in hearing of his house... and that is
the way Mr. Terry has been doing h e r e . . . and most of the people here
will tell you the same.64
The Dyess bosses, Sharp, R. C. Limerick, H.S. Henry, and Lawrence Westbrook were
cognizant of bis prickly personality and imperious manner. Baker, Limerick, Sharp, and
Westbrook discussed his contempt of the colonists, and deemed it unfortunate
considering Mr. Terry's demonstrated farm ability. However, when Terry refused to take
Westbrook's advice to have samples of the Colony's cotton graded, and as a result the
Colony's crop brought a lower price, the bosses decided that Terry's services were no
longer required.65
One of Floyd Sharp's most frustrating endeavors at Dyess was the formation of a
Cooperative Association that could assume ownership and operation of the various
Colony centers at a profit. In an effort to explain the cooperative contract to the colonists
and to encourage them to join, in 1938 Sharp hired lawyer C. T. Carpenter of Marked
Tree, Arkansas. Carpenter had demonstrated sympathy for the dispossessed and he had
recently fallen out of favor with some of his recent clientele. His representation of
evicted Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) members had diminished his practice.
He hoped to educate the Colonists about the cooperative principle in general and the
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benefits of the Producers Cooperative in particular. He had great difficulty. In Sharp's
memorandum to the Colonists outlining procedures for 1939 he explained that now, after
the three years of construction and the flood and the reorganization of the Consumer's
Cooperative, the Colony and the colonists would prosper. It was true, he said, that the
Colony would no longer subsidize the Hospital. It was also true that for a two-month
period, the Colony would bear the expense of returning colonists to their homes or to an
equidistant place before February 28,1939. The Colony offered this feature in order to
accommodate the Dyess families that were dissatisfied. The Colony, said Sharp,
intended to never make such an offer again. The furnish for 1939 would be handled
exclusively by the Dyess Credit Union. Owned by the Cooperative Association, twelve
of the twenty Directors were employees of the WPA or of Dyess Colony, Incorporated.
All crops and all property would be pledged to the bank in security of the furnish. The
maximum amount of furnish would be calculated based on ten cents per pound, 400
pounds per acre.66
By the time Sharp received the telegram from Corrington the end was near. As
early as June 1938, T. Roy Reid had called on Sharp inquiring about Sharp's attitude
concerning transferring Dyess Colony to the Farm Security Adniinistration. Sharp and
Westbrook discussed the FSA's interest in Dyess and Sharp commented on the
competition among federal agencies. The governor's revocation of the Dyess Charter
had effectively dissolved the corporation and Floyd informed Westbrook that the
Arkansas statutes allowed a dissolved corporation three years to conclude all its business
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and liquidate its holdings. That meant, said Floyd, the $200,000 government bond, held
in a Little Rock bank box, the remnant of the once robust Dyess Trust Fund, was safe
from confiscation by the state.
During the remainder of 1939, Funk and McCraven gathered publicity and
focused their outrage over the price of the farms. Their non-Colonist neighbor, Paul
Finch made charges so outrageous that even rabid anti-New Deal critics grew tired. By
the end of the year, Dyess Colony had become the property and concern of the Farm
Security Administration. Through a complicated procedure the Colony was liquidated in
January 1944, but all the details were not settled until 1951. Some colonists moved away
at great loss, some sold and moved away, and some made large farms and stayed. The
losses at Dyess were enormous. The only positive is that the losses to the U.S.
Government amounted to less each year.68
In Retrospect
S. B. Funk had no real reason to complain, at least as far as the price of his farm
was concerned. Administrators at Dyess went to great lengths to explain the $2.50-peracre price that W.R. Dyess paid at the outset Interviewers were encouraged to provoke
questions and if the questions were not forthcoming from the prospective colonists, to
propose a question and answer. Funk claimed that his five-room house was over-priced,
that he was charged too great a fee for his turn-in bridge, and that he was not given credit
for the land he had cleared. In response to Funk's complaint, Dyess Colony requested
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that the Colony's accountants, Russell, Brown, and Company analyze the cost of Funk's
property. They reported that the cost of the five-room house, barn, poultry house, turnin-bridge, and 36.99 acres was $3,539.56. A credit of $275.90 toward land clearing
reduced the cost to $3,265.66. The sales price to Funk was reduced to $2,999.52. The
accountants pointed out, notwithstanding normally accepted standard accounting
procedures, no prorated charges for community infrastructure had been added to the sales
price. Funk's assertions were without foundation. Funk's price-per-acre, including the
house and structures, was $81.09. Excluding the house and structures, the land price was
$19.37 per acre. According to Russell Brown & Company, the market value for cleared
and drained Delta cropland was between $90.00 and $100.00 per acre, and even for
"buckshot" land in the midst of an agricultural depression.69
Paul Finch's challenges were more difficult to refute, in part, because he dealt in
the murky world of intrigue, conspiracy, innuendo, and motives. Finch was not a
Colonist but his small farm was almost completely surrounded by Dyess land. His
property was a salient into the Dyess community. Dyess Resident Manager E. S. Dudley
did not get any good information regarding Finch's activities until later than he thought.
Dudley wrote to H.C. Baker and Lawrence Westbrook in May of 1938, reporting on a
meeting that took place at the Finch place amongst fractious colonists. Apparently, said
Dudley, the meeting, details about which he had just heard, was one of a series and it was
the only one about which Dudley had any information. He did have, he said, a list of
those thought to be closely allied with Finch and Funk who had attempted to keep the
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Dyess staff ignorant of the meetings. Some people had reported seeing Finch and Funk
entering various colony houses. He suspected that those who attended were just curious.
One Colonist told him that the only reason that he went to sign the petition criticizing the
Dyess management was that he wanted a ride to town. On the whole, Dudley told Baker,
he did not think Finch was a cause for great alarm because even some of the more
prominent citizens of south Mississippi County viewed Funk as a troublemaker and a
danger to labor relations.70
Lawrence Westbrook was concerned about Finch's activities before word of the
meeting(s) came to Dudley. He inquired of H.L. Mitchell, the Executive Secretary of the
STFU, as to whether or not the trouble at Dyess and with Mr. Finch reflected the
activities of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Mitchell reported that he knew of no
such union activity at Dyess, but did advise that Union activist Howard Kester was
tentatively scheduled to speak at Dyess on 8 April. Lawrence Westbrook cheerfully
reported to Sharp that the STFU was innocent of the trouble at Dyess and heartily
endorsed Kester's appearance at the Colony. Howard Kester, said Westbrook, was a
71

"high quality person."
Finch demanded that the Board of Directors and staff at Dyess resign and their
positions be filled by Dyess colonists, and elected by the membership. All decisions
would require the validation by a majority of Dyess members. A jury of twelve men
selected by the Dyess membership would decide any issues requiring further
adjudication, Finch proposed. He charged that the colony industries, a favored project of
70
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Lawrence Westbrook, were sweatshops, the colony charged $30.00 to $35.00 per ton of
hay for which the colony paid only $12.00 to $17.00, and the bosses at Dyess were
greedy, arrogant, and incompetent. Furthermore, said his newspaper article, 99% of the
colonists were dissatisfied and wanted the changes he recommended. Finch was
exaggerating his support. By far most of the Dyess residents, even in the midst of Finch's
most vigorous criticisms, did not support the revolt or sign the petition. Most of the
Colonists were embarrassed by the reportage - it made them look ridiculous.
In late 1939, Dyess Colony was transferred to the Farm Security Administration.
The FSA closed out the various credit accounts, negotiated a price for the farms and
settlement of the debts. Dyess, Arkansas became very quickly, and remains to this day, a
typical seedy, blighted Delta town. The deeds and mortgages presented by the FSA
allowed Dyess farms to be sold piecemeal. Some settlers stayed and retired at Dyess.
Some prospered and retired elsewhere. Most did not stay at Dyess. They appreciated the
opportunity, the enhanced living conditions, the excellent schools, and the chance that
Dyess gave to think and to evaluate options. Those that left Dyess Colony moved for the
same reasons as did the Tupelo Homesteaders. Some things are too precious to sacrifice.
The President had urged young men to settle for a "competence" in the country rather
than gamble on getting rich in the city. The Dyess folks, like those at Tupelo were not
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ready to settle for a competence, and they would form a community and cooperate with
those of their own choosing and preference.
One reads Arthur Raper's work on two Georgia counties to understand why Dyess
seemed to offer such a great opportunity for the advancement of poor Arkansans. In
Georgia, a terrible combination of thin and nutrient-poor soil, gashing erosion that
destroyed cropland, the boll weevil, and a degenerate credit system devastated the cotton
economy and the lives of tenant farmers. By contrast, at Dyess black buckshot Delta
ground lay supine in anticipation of seed. The land seemed to revel in its almost
gratuitous fecundity. New Dealers imagined that the rich, non-eroding, boll weevil
resistant Delta could sustain a community of subsistence-minded yeomen. The
government men at Dyess modified the crop-lien system; the quartet of evils that plagued
Greene and Macon Counties, Georgia did not exist at Dyess. Hindsight allows
contemporaries to see with much greater resolution notions that were confused and hazy
to the New Deal government men. Even with fine schools, comfortable houses, adequate
food, and medical care, most Dyess settlers decided that the sacrifices required to achieve
them were too great. For one thing, no matter what the government men said, twenty
acres - even Delta acres, were not enough. And then there was the main reason for their
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discontent, they did not necessarily have a problem with authority - they just did not like
other people telling them what to do.74
The RA was efficient in moving clients to Dyess, the conditions and opportunities
at Dyess were not sufficient to create a content and satisfied community of yeoman
farmers. Tensions between the government men and clients, aggravated by paternalistic
attitudes and political ambition retarded the cooperation demanded by the bosses. The
experiment at Dyess suggested that the problem of poverty among small cotton farmers
in the South was not a function of the boll weevil, or thin soil, or erosion. The major
problem was much more fundamental. It was no longer possible, even on the best
agricultural land in the world, for a family to make a living on twenty to forty acre cotton
farms.
Such is the story of the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony. The effort of New
Dealers at Tupelo and Dyess represents only one part of the effort to lift the "Shadows
Over Goshen." There was trouble brewing throughout the cotton country. Socialist
Christians, Marxists of various stripes, and dispossessed sharecroppers gathered near Hill
House, Mississippi and proceeded to conduct, arguably, the most radical agrarian
experiment in U.S. History - mingling Jesus and Marx in the Mississippi Delta. Chapter
Six is about Christians and Socialists and sharecroppers; liberal paternalism and
repression; and the death of a vision. It is the story of Delta Cooperative Farm.
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CHAPTER VI
DELTA COOPERATIVE FARM AND THE DEATH OF A VISION
Why dont (sic) you fellows come down off the official high horse and be human for a
while. The Christmas season is a good time to begin. And the plantation country waits
for you to make it a real "new deal"for these forgotten men... William Amberson to
T. Roy Reid, 22 December 1934.
The attendant loose talk also runs along bad lines: social equality and what have you.
If I were in your place and could afford to do so, I would take a vacation and spend
some of my time at Hill House. W.M. Kethley, President, Delta State Teachers College
to Francis Harmon, General Secretary, YMCA
If we can build the union, we will take over all the damn plantations. H.L. Mitchell to
Howard Kester
We endeavor to exemplify the return of Christianity to its prophetic mission of
identification with the dispossessed..." Reinhold Niebuhr
Never before have I seen with such blinding clarity the essential and irreconcilable
conflict between the scientific and the ecclesiastical approach to social problems.
William Amberson1

The agricultural depression in the cotton South was in its thirteenth year by the
time the Federal Government thought it necessary to intervene. The gap between the
onset of the agricultural depression in 1919 and the belated governmental action in 1933
occurred because the bulk of the depression burden fell on people who did not matter. As

better from W.M. Kethley to Francis Harmon, 8 October 1936, University of Memphis
Archives, MVHC, MSS 16, Delta Cooperative Farm. H.L. Mitchell to Howard Kester,
22 March 1936, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union Papers, Roll 3, Originals in the
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC.
Hereinafter the microfilm edition of the STFU Papers cited as "STFU Microfilm."
Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, (New York: Arno Press and The New
York Times, 1969), 54. "Untitled ms., University of Memphis Archives, Mississippi
Valley Historical Collection, #13, Box 1, folder3, "Delta Cooperative Farm Papers,"
copy, the quote is attributed to Niebuhr. "A Statement to the Board of Trustees,"
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union Papers, University of North Carolina, SHC.

long as degradation and poverty inflicted predominately southern rural blacks, there was
no political necessity and little moral urgency in applying corrective measures. However,
the general depression of 1929 was rapidly creating a class of dispossessed whites who
found themselves bound by the same economic and social chains that had immobilized
blacks since Reconstruction. The Tupelo Homesteaders took brief refuge from the
economic storm and the Dyess Colonists yielded to duress; the Cooperators at Delta
Cooperative Farm fled from stark terror.
The crop reduction activities of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA) necessarily required that agriculture and its attendant protocols undergo intense
scrutiny and adjustment. As the policies of the AAA intruded on the familiar cotton
production procedures in the South, certain regional peculiarities came into view. The
AAA implemented policies and created a situation very much analogous to turning over a
rotting log in the woods; turn it over and all sorts of creatures are exposed to light.
Widespread malnutrition, pellagra, hookworm, mental retardation, almost
unbelievable poverty, and a robust repressive economic system slithered into public view
as provisions of the crop reduction campaign of the AAA disturbed the cotton culture
environment. Sharecropping and the crop-lien system had long been a regional scandal.
Regional scholars and activists examined almost every aspect of the system but this work
remained within a tightly constructed circle of academics and published studies did not
appear until well into the mid 1930s. Novels with a sharecropping motif, Erskine
Caldwell's Tobacco Road (1932) and God's Little Acre (1933) for instance, did appear.

According to historian Donald Holley, they were popular because of their frank treatment
of sex rather than as exposes of the conditions of sharecropping or tenancy.2
FDR believed that reconciliation of the dissonance in prices between industry and
agriculture was essential to national recovery. In his inaugural address, President
Roosevelt promised to promulgate, " . . . definite efforts to raise the values of agricultural
products and with this the power to purchase the output of our cities."3 FDR responded
to the political pressure and the economic emergency and satisfied his inaugural promise
by asking Congress to approve the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Especially important in
the bill was its call for parity prices and the authority of the president and the secretary of
agriculture to establish a balance between agricultural and industrial prices. The
president specifically proposed to raise agricultural prices to parity. He defined parity as
the relationship of agricultural commodities and industrial prices as measured by the
prices in the base period, August 1909 - July 1914.4 The act also allowed the secretary to
reduce the production of agricultural commodities by paying farmers rental or benefit
payments for land withdrawn from production.
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act clearly sought to alleviate the distress of middle
class and prosperous farmers, and was a significant plank in the president's plan for
industrial recovery. FDR believed that reduced consumer spending came, in part, as a
result of the loss of farm income. Even with the mass pull of cities, in 1933, fully sixty
percent of the population still had rural or farm connections. The president blamed much
of the decline in manufacturing on the inability of this large population to consume the
output of industry.
Cully Cobb, Director of the Cotton Section of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration claimed that implementation of the AAA crop reduction contracts had no
effect on agricultural labor or tenancy. Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace,
admitted that there were some unfortunate incidents. Scholars agree that the AAA cotton
producer contracts imposed severe repression and hardships on those at the very bottom
of agricultural society to the benefit of middle-class American farmers and the cotton
aristocracy, those most aggressively represented by the American Farm Bureau.6
In response to the hardships brought on by the AAA programs, two distinct
socialist camps converged to create the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms. In the
Northeast Arkansas Delta, a country dry cleaner, an internationally acclaimed intellectual,
a county constable, America's most famous contemporary missionary, and a perpetual
Socialist Party presidential candidate listened to the humanitarian views of a
distinguished professor of physiology. From his avocation as a guiding member of the
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Memphis Chapter of the Socialist Party of America, Dr. William Ruthraugh Amberson,
professor of physiology at the University of Tennessee Medical School in Memphis,
provided the practical guidance that resulted in the formation of the Southern Tenant
Farmers' Union (STFU) and the intellectual genesis of Delta Cooperative Farm.
Amberson and the Delta Cooperative Farm - and its lineal descendant, the Providence
Cooperative Farm - have received little attention from scholars of the STFU. The
scholarly literature on the Southern Tenant Farmers Union is huge.7

7

The papers of the STFU, originals at Chapel Hill, are available in more than sixty
publicly accessible archives. Donald Holley gives the Delta and Providence Cooperative
Farms four sentences and makes no mention of Amberson in his fine book Uncle Sam's
Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), 106,192. H.L. Mitchell, in what must be considered
the authorized word on the STFU, Mean Things Happening in This Land: The Life and
Times of H.L. Mitchell, Co-Founder of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (Montclair,
New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1979) briefly mentions Delta Farm in four places,
but Amberson is given somewhat fuller treatment. Paul Conklin, Tomorrow a New
World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959)
treats the farm in thirty-four words. Neither David E. Hamilton, From New Day to new
Deal: American Farm Policy From Hoover to Roosevelt, 1928-1933 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), nor Paul E. Mertz, New Deal Policy and
Southern Rural Poverty (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1978) mention
either farm. Mertz gives slight attention to Amberson. The most impassioned scholarly
work on the STFU is Donald Grubbs, Cry From the Cotton: The Southern Tenant
Farmers' Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1971.) Grubbs takes no notice of either farm but he gives Amberson fuller attention than
any of the other scholars. Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and
Prophets, 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981), gives insight
into some of the personalities but not the details of the Delta and Providence Cooperative
Farms. Jonathan Daniels, in his highly reflective, speculative, anecdotal, biased, yet
frustratingly well-written panoramic view of the depression South, A Southerner
Discovers the South (New York: The McMillan Company, 1938), gives significant
attention to the work of the STFU and of Delta Cooperative Farm. Daniels and to an
even greater degree, David Cohn, are typical of the breezy, poetic, yet banal treatment of
social conditions in the Delta. The only satisfactory treatment of the Delta and
Providence Cooperative farm is Jerry W. Dallas, "The Delta and Providence Cooperative
Farms: A Mississippi Experiment in Cooperative Farming and Racial Cooperation, 19361956," Mississippi Quarterly 4 (3) (1987): 283-308.
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The first group of Socialist activists, composed of liberal churchmen headed by
Reinhold Niebuhr, endeavored to:
. . . exemplify the return of Christianity to its prophetic mission of
identification with the dispossessed, of bearing witness of the judgment of
God in history upon the injustices of the existing economic and political
order, and of aiding men to enter into the possibilities of a more abundant
life with which God has endowed His creation.8
After studies at Eden Theological Seminary and Yale Divinity School, Niebuhr served as
a pastor in Detroit for thirteen years. In 1928, he joined the faculty of Union Theological
Seminary as Professor of Christian Ethics and remained there until his retirement in 1960.
His influence on moral, ethical, and religious philosophy was and is enormous. His bestknown and most influential works were Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) Beyond
Tragedy (1937), The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941), The Children of Light and the
Children of Darkness (1944), and The Irony of American History (1952). The Delta and
Cooperative Farms proved to be a laboratory for the application of lessons that Niebuhr
hoped would emerge from Moral Man and Immoral Society. Interestingly, it was a thesis
of this very book that Amberson later hurled accusatively at the directors of Delta and
Providence Cooperative Farms as he resigned from the board of trustees.
The Christian Socialists most intimately associated with Delta and Providence
Cooperative Farms identified with, and were heavily influenced by Niebuhr. Sherwood
Eddy, a student and protege of Niebuhr, had written numerous meditation books and
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traveled the world as a missionary and trouble-shooter for the Young Men's Christian
Association (YMCA). Over the course of his career, he witnessed Soviet collective
operations, assisted cooperative farmers in Japan, conversed with Adolph Hitler, Benito
Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin, and served as point-man for many humanitarian fundraising efforts. Sam H. Franklin, a protege of Eddy, spent his early career as a
Presbyterian missionary to Japan. Franklin became the first resident director of Delta and
Providence Cooperative Farms. Finally, A. E. (Gene) Cox, a recent graduate of Texas
Christian University, with interests in accountancy and the Bible, came to the attention of
Sherwood Eddy. Eddy convinced Cox that the letters GPC, which had appeared to Cox
in a vision, did not mean "Go Preach Christ," but rather they were directing him to "Go
Pick Cotton" in Mississippi. Cox initially served as the farm bookkeeper and, upon
Franklin's resignation, he became the Resident Director. He remained in that post until
the Providence Cooperative Farm finally closed in 1956.9
These "Christian Socialists" paid more attention to humanitarian than political
objectives. They did not speak in traditional Marxist terms, nor did they concern
themselves with party orthodoxy or direction. They were, in the main, nominal socialists
and did not see any particular economic or political ideology as a cure for economic and
cultural distress. Their political notions were somewhat analogous to Tugwell's view of
pragmatism; God's graces were not subject to any particular civic government form, and
a pleasure economy required neither the blessings of Adam Smith nor the inevitability of
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Karl Marx. Socialism seemed the best response to what they saw as perverted capitalism.
Their experience in institutional governance emphasized their lack of fealty to socialist
dogma American Christianity, particularly the ecclesiastical tradition practiced by
Niebuhr, was conducted within a highly hierarchical system. Ordained ministers, in all
Christian traditions, were considered to have some "higher calling" than the parishioners
and matters both spiritual and temporal were most often adjudicated by sessions,
diaconates, conferences, presbyteries, conventions, and synods, and so forth. Thus, the
church was in most cases a highly elitist institution. Taking comfort in their "higher
calling" and drawing on their experience of elitist governance, these Christian Socialists
found it difficult to allow popular or democratic governance. Their notions of elitist
guidance and superior knowledge placed them in direct opposition to the philosophy of
their secular socialist colleagues in the administration of the Delta and Providence
Cooperative Farms.
A second camp of socialists also undertook to aid the sharecroppers of the South.
Norman Thomas, perennial Socialist Party presidential candidate, led them, ostensibly.
Thomas was a friend of FDR and had access to him from time to time. Clarence Senior,
Executive Secretary of the Socialist Party of America, gave advice and helped with fundraising campaigns. Blaine Treadway, a member of the Executive Committee of the
Socialist Party of Tennessee, worked part time as a press operator for the Press Scimitar,
the Memphis evening newspaper much more sympathetic and balanced in its reporting of
union activities than the conservative Commercial Appeal. Treadway had developed a
close association with Amberson and later shared his increasing suspicion of the practices
and ambitions of the Christian Socialist element involved with the cooperative farms.
The chief operative, intellectual strategist and prime motivator of social activism was
William Ruthraugh Amberson.10
10
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Dr. William R. Amberson earned bis Ph.D. in physiology from Princeton in 1923.
In the same year, he accepted a position as faculty at the University of Tennessee Medical
School in Memphis. While there he co-authored six textbooks; he became head of the
department in 1932. Amberson joined the Memphis Socialist Party, served as state
secretary for the American Civil Liberties Union, and thoroughly involved himself in
social activism. Through Amberson's close friendship with Paul Porter, adiriiriistrative
assistant to AAA head Chester Davis, the STFU gained an audience with the Secretary of
Agriculture and placed a union representative on the 1937 President's Commission on
Farm Tenancy. Amberson also maintained friendship with Paul Appleby, Executive
Assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Amberson served as the union's
liaison with the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote articles and letters for publication,
coordinated the legal defense of union members, and collected evidence used to bring suit
on behalf of the STFU against planters who had evicted sharecroppers under the
provisions of the AAA contract. In addition to his founding work with the STFU and the
enormous time and energy he devoted to its development, Amberson conceptualized and
promoted the creation of Delta Cooperative Farm.
Even before the effects of the AAA cotton acreage reduction campaign were
apparent in the mid-South, Amberson and the Socialist Party of Memphis were already
trying to apply pressure on the authorities for better treatment of the dispossessed. On 5
June 1933, well before the AAA contracts were executed, Amberson, under the auspices
of "the Committee of Socialist Party" (sic) issued a "Report of Investigations of ShortScottsboro Boys being formed by the ACLU. A.E. Cox Collection, Series 7 folder lc,
Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, letters to and from Senior, Treadway,
Amberson, Thomas; William R. Amberson "Outline of Proposed Union," a copy of this
document is also found at the University of Memphis Archives, Mississippi Valley
Collection, the original at the Southern Historical Collection, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Weighting and Similar Dishonest Practices by Merchants in the City of Memphis." The
report described the experiences of investigators in buying store-measured commodities
and in redemption of relief coupons. The report named guilty individuals and companies
and urged new city ordinances concerning weighing, the publication of guilty operators'
identities, and removal of certain merchants from the relief program. The committee
presented its report to city officials and to the two major Memphis newspapers. No
evidence exists that the report found publication or that Memphis Mayor Edward Hull
"Boss" Crump's political machine attempted any corrective measures. Several names
appeared on the document. One of particular interest is that of George A. McLean.
McLean was at the time a Professor of Sociology at Southwestern (now Rhodes College).
One month before the Tupelo, Mississippi, Homesteaders moved into their new Division
of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH) homes, McLean left Memphis and moved to Tupelo
where he bought the Tupelo Journal. The names on this document are typed and there
are no signatures. It is possible, though not likely, that McLean's name was appended
without his knowledge or permission. Rumors in the Tupelo area circulated, even after
McLean's leadership in developing Tupelo into a marvelously successful New South city,
that McLean was a communist and that "they ran him out of Memphis back in the '30s."
Archival evidence indicates that at least another portion of the rumor has merit. Lucille
Miller, Secretary of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the American Civil
Liberties Union, wrote to Amberson in June 1934. Her letter asked for information
concerning Professor McClain's (sic) dismissal from Southwestern College, "because of
his activities on behalf of labor. This case has recently been called to our attention. We
should like to have the facts."11 McLean was no communist, his business
accomplishments attest to that. However, McLean was always in the forefront of social
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improvement and incurred the disfavor of Tupelo's business elite in his early years m
Tupelo.12
Tenant farmers and sharecroppers constituted the largest group of rural poor in the
nation. In 1930, they totaled 1,091,944 white and 698,839 black families, about 25% of
the South's population and about half its farmers. The conditions in the Delta were
worse. In the Arkansas and Mississippi portions of the Delta, tenants or sharecroppers
operated well over 85% of all farms. The 1930 Census figures are revealing. Arkansas
tenants operated 152,691 of 242,334 farms. Of those, only 14,961 tenants paid cash rent.
A representative Arkansas delta county, Desha, more accurately represents the cotton
culture. Of 3,516 farms, tenants operated 3,130, amere 481of those were cash tenants.
Tenants operated 225,716 of Mississippi's 312,663 farms; 27,103 paid rent. In a
representative Mississippi Delta county, Tallahatchie, tenants cultivated cotton on 6,612
of the 7,298 farms; only 251 tenant farmers paid cash. The crop reduction program of the
AAA paid farmers for taking land out of production. In the spring of 1934 Hiram
Norcross, absentee owner of a 5,000-acre cotton plantation near Tyronza, Arkansas,
evicted twenty-three of his 248 tenant families. Reduced acreage meant, obviously, a
decreased need for labor. Wages for agricultural laborers in the cotton South averaged
between fifty and seventy-five cents a day, and as planters began to see the economic
advantage of replacing sharecroppers with day laborers, they forced hundreds of cotton
sharecropping families to vacate their sub-standard housing. Many of them pitched tents
along the road and sought relief from the already overwhelmed state emergency relief
administrations.13
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Eleven white and seven black men evicted from the Norcross plantation gathered
nearby at the Sunnyside School and formed the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU).
The apparent force behind the new organization was the small Tyronza Socialist Party,
the only two significant members were dry-cleaner H. L. Mitchell, and Clay East, a
county constable. Mitchell reported that by the time he and East arrived at the meeting,
the men had decided to form a bi-racial organization. According to Mitchell, the
sharecroppers approached him with the idea of forming a union. It is likely that Mitchell
had previously planted the organization idea as he made his rounds through the Arkansas
countryside. It is also likely that Mitchell and Thomas got their notions from Amberson.
Archival evidence clearly indicates that Amberson, Socialist Party of American Executive
Secretary Clarence Senior, and Mitchell had already discussed the possibility and nature
of some sort of sharecroppers' union.14
Communist-influenced black Alabama sharecroppers had already claimed
"Sharecroppers Union" therefore, the group decided to incorporate in Arkansas under the
name, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). This name, however, was misleading.
Although the union recruited tenant farmers for membership, the union championed the
cause of sharecroppers, a class of society without representation in the government or
economy. In part because the union chose to use "tenant farmer" as part of its name, the
United States Government, newspapers, and the public of the 1930s often identified
University of North Carolina Press, 1935,) 1 and passim; Grubbs, 43-45; Mertz, 3-4; The
figures cited in this note are from: http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/ The
counties selected representing the Arkansas and Mississippi Delta are at the mid-point in
terms of tenant concentration. As the decade continued the number of sharecroppers
decreased.
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sharecroppers as tenant farmers. This mingling of terms created its own set of problems.
Upon the advent of the AAA crop reduction contracts there existed a marked difference
in the social and economic status between that of the tenant farmer and the sharecropper,
and the term "tenant farmer" is imprecise at best. In 1934, the public, the press, and
government officials used the term "tenant farmer" mdiscriminately and universally to
designate as one single entity at least three separate classes of farmers, all of whom
suffered from specific economic problems and faced different limitations in climbing the
agricultural ladder. The designation was particularly important with regard to the AAA
producer contract. The tenant farmer owned rights that were protected by the language of
the contract; laborers had none. By manipulating the status of tenant farmers to that of
sharecroppers, planters could relieve themselves of responsibility for furnish and housing.
According to the AAA, sharecroppers were wage laborers and as such had no claim to
shelter or furnish. It was cheaper to hire help during picking time than to have a family
live on the place. 15
In December 1934, Amberson presented a report for dissemination among the
membership of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Socialist Party of
America (SPA) on the "Present Status of Legal Action in the Defense of Tenants and
Sharecroppers Threatened with Eviction." The report noted that more than 100 members
of the STFU had received written or oral eviction notices from plantation management
informing them that they must vacate houses and lands by December 31,1935. The

15 Grubbs, 29; Mertz, 31; Conrad, 85, 87-93; William R. Amberson to Clarence Senior,
Feb 4,1936 in Cox Collection Series 7, folder 1 b, Special Collections, Mitchell
Memorial Library. For a discussion of the legal status of tenant farmers and
sharecroppers see A.B. Book, "A Note on the Legal Status of Share-Tenants and
Sharecroppers," Law and Contemporary Problems 4 (October, 1937): 421-526.
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report speculated that the reasons for evictions were membership in the STFU and the
new payment proposals of the AAA.16
Concurrent with the cotton picker strike conducted by the STFU in 1935, and
increasing union agitation for investigations of violations of AAA contracts, violence,
repression, and wholesale evictions raged throughout Northeast Arkansas. Planters and
their riding bosses disrupted union meetings with gunfire and threats. Thugs threw
dynamite sticks into an evicted sharecropper encampment; local law officers imprisoned
union speakers. In the spring of 1935, Norman Thomas visited Northeast Arkansas. As
he was being introduced to a meeting of the STFU at Birdsong, a group of riding bosses
interrupted the meeting, dragged Thomas from the platform, and escorted him outside.
Vigilantes drove Thomas from town and beat some of bis companions. "We don't need
no Gawddamn Yankee bastard to tell us what to do with our niggers," explained a riding
boss.17
As sharecroppers from Northeast Arkansas lost their homes, they inundated relief
offices in Arkansas and in Memphis. Amberson wrote the Resettlement Administration
(RA) and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) requesting a program to
aid the evicted Arkansas sharecroppers. He talked in person with Will Alexander of
FERA who greeted Amberson's requests with cool aloofness and pleaded inability to help
due to current projects. Amberson soon realized that identification with the union
militated against help from any of the federal relief organizations. The aid given by the
Arkansas ERA was controlled by the local cotton aristocracy. Cotton baron domination
of local relief administration ensured that local relief workers directed benefits to their
16 William R. Amberson, "Present Status of Legal Action in Defense of Tenants and
Share-Croppers Threatened with Eviction," Cox Collection, Series 7, folder 2 i, Special
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library.
17

Sherwood Eddy to "Dear Friend," 18 March 1936, Arthur Raper Papers, SHC, Chapel
Hill. Holley, 82-86, the quote is taken from page 86; Mitchell, 128-129, Grubbs, 7375,85, 89,102-103,104-106.
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best croppers and tenants; union members were ignored. In late 1935, C. H. Dibble, a
plantation owner near Parkin, Arkansas, ordered almost 100 sharecropper families off his
property.
The influx of newly dispossessed and the continuing pressure from those already
evicted inspired in Amberson the notion of a cooperative farm.18 In late 1935, Sam
Franklin, on furlough from his YMC A assignment in Japan contacted Amberson and
expressed some interest in the condition of the sharecroppers. Amberson told Franklin of
his plans to establish a cooperative farm for the benefit of evicted sharecroppers. The
idea appealed to Franklin and he arranged to visit with Amberson in Memphis.
Franklin's boss, Sherwood Eddy, also expressed interest in the project and funded
Franklin's exploratory trip to the Bluff City. En route to Memphis, Franklin visited the
Division of Subsistence Housing Arthurdale project in West Virginia. In view of the
enormous expenditure of federal funds on the project, Franklin assumed that similar
government funding would be made available for other promising projects. Amberson,
better informed by bis correspondence and conversation with various New Deal officials,
quickly disabused Franklin of that notion.19

18 Amberson to Oscar Johnston, October 21,1934, Cox Collection Series 7, folder 2a;
Amberson letter to Oscar Johnston, November 23,1934, Amberson to Hiram Norcross,
November 23,1934, both in Cox Collection, folder 2b; Amberson to Clarence Senior,
February 4,1936, Amberson to Senior, February 4,1936 both in Cox Collection, folder
lb; Amberson to S.N. Vann, Arkansas Emergency Relief Admimstration, December 31,
1934, Cox Collection folder 2c; Amberson to Sam Franklin, summary of conversation
with Will Alexander, November 19,1936, Brooks Hayes, Resettlement Administration,
to Amberson, July 29,1937, Cox Collection, folder 2g; Sam Franklin to Amberson,
December 28,1935, February 13,1936, February 14,1936; Amberson to Franklin
February 11, and February 26,1935, all in Cox Collection, House Box 1, 1996
Accession, unlabeled folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library.

!9 For information on Franklin's visit, his interest in cooperative farming, and
Amberson's information relative to the possibility of federal assistance, see Amberson,
Franklin, and Senior correspondence cited above.
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Franklin had experienced what Amberson viewed as the practical solution to
sharecropping, cooperative farming. Franklin met with Amberson, Mitchell, and East in
February 1936 in Amberson's Memphis home. There seemed to be an immediate
connection. Franklin's experience in working with Japanese collective farms and his
intelligence, energy, and enthusiasm impressed Amberson. While he was interviewing
Franklin, Amberson still saw the creation of a cooperative farm as a function of the
Socialist Party. In a 20 February 1936, letter to Senior, Amberson revealed his thinking.
He detailed his efforts in the field to provide relief to the dispossessed and his search for a
suitable place for a "genuine cooperative farm." Amberson proposed that Franklin head
the venture. As no funding was likely to be forthcoming from New Deal relief and
resettlement agencies, Amberson suggested that the Socialist Party itself help to establish
the proposed cooperative. The letter complained about WPA officials warning Franklin
to stay away from the union and that the WPA claimed that they were taking care of the
evicted families. Furthermore, evicted union sharecroppers received no relief while relief
officials gave the cotton barons' best tenants preferential treatment.20
Early in 1936, Amberson and Franklin began planning the cooperative venture.
Amberson and Franklin toured Northeast Arkansas and Franklin urged Sherwood Eddy to
come and see the conditions for himself. In early March, 1936, Eddy and Franklin visited
the tent cities of evicted sharecroppers. Threatened with jail if they did not immediately
leave, these two ministers were arrested and jailed for several hours by Parkin, Arkansas,
police for the crime of being outside agitators. After this experience, Franklin, a farm boy

20 Cox Collection Series 7, folder lb, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library.
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from rural Tennessee, decided that he would stay in his native South and help the
sharecroppers rather than return to Japan.21
Eddy enthusiastically embraced Amberson's proposal to purchase a large tract of
land. He was willing, he told Amberson, to finance the farm by committing a charitable
trust fund at his disposal. STFU Executive Secretary H. L. Mitchell suggested that they
buy land in Arkansas but Eddy insisted, "We could not hope to raise crops upon literal
dynamite."22 Although Mitchell warned that starting a cooperative farm in Mississippi
rather than Arkansas was like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, Eddy and
Franklin began touring parts of three states in the Mississippi Delta in search of
appropriate property. In March 1936, in the last hours of an apparently futile three-day
search, a real estate broker directed Eddy and Franklin to a 2,138-acre tract near Hill
House in Bolivar County, Mississippi. Eddy had to fly back to New York, having missed
scheduled rail connections from Memphis. He considered the last minute revelation of
this segment of Goshen as miraculous and often invoked notions of the supernatural
manifestation in his periodic fund-raising appeals. Along with a few mules, rude cabins,
and some farm equipment, Eddy purchased the property for $17,500. Slightly over 600
acres of the property was cotton-ready; the remaining 1,500-acres was unevenly divided
between cypress swamp and ridge lands. Eddy proposed, and the hastily formed Board of
Trustees agreed, that profits of the cooperative amortize the loan at an interest rate of
2.5%. The funds that Eddy committed were residual funds from another humanitarian
effort. At the end of the Great War, Eddy, and businessman James Causey, later a
director of the farms, had begun an effort to raise $500,000 in order to feed refugees in
21

Arthur Raper, "Notes on Trip to Hillhouse, Mississippi and Eastern Arkansas, 1936;
Sherwood Eddy to "Dear Friend," 18 March 1936, both in Arthur Raper Papers.
Franklin, 8-10.
22

Franklin, "Early Years," 23.

the French occupied Ruhr. William H. Timken of Canton, Ohio, had made a $20,000
contribution. U.S. Government intervention made the fund unnecessary and Timken
advised Eddy to use the money wherever Eddy thought it would do the most good. Years
later, Amberson castigated Eddy and Franklin for their hasty and rash decision in
purchasing the Bolivar County property. Eddy was acting with perfect consistency; he
was also the first contributor to Myles Horton for the establishment of Highlander Folk
School, a radical labor and social institution, in Monteagle, Tennessee. 23
Five original members formed Cooperative Farms, Incorporated. They were
ReinholdNiebuhr, president, Sherwood Eddy, William Amberson, Sam Franklin, Jr., and
John Rust. A few weeks later, sociologist Arthur Raper and Bishop William Scarlett of
the Episcopal Diocese of Missouri joined the board. The board named Sam Franklin,
Resident Director of the cooperative project and Blaine Treadway as Associate Director.24
Both Rust and Treadway were appointed to the board for decidedly utilitarian
reasons. John and Mack Rust had invented a mechanical cotton picker. Originally from
Texas, the brothers had found support and cooperation from the Newllano Colony in
Louisiana. John Rust, recognizing mat a successful cotton picker would further shrink
the demand for agricultural labor, expressed his intention to donate the profits of the sale
of his invention to eleemosynary organizations, particularly those serving dispossessed
^Letter to "Dear Folks from Sherwood Eddy, 19 March 1936; Delta and Providence
Farm Papers #3473, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, (hereinafter "Delta nd Providence Papers." This letter informs
the interested people of H.H. Timkin's donation. According to Eddy, Timken refused to
accept repayment because he had already deducted 15% from his tax obligation.
Amberson to A.E. Cox, January 17,1973, Cox Collection, House Box 1,196 Accession,
William R. Amberson Trustee Folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library.
Thomas Bledsoe, Or We'll All Hang Separately: The Highlander Idea (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969), 22. Franklin, 8-13; Mitchell, 132; Dunbar, 116-117.
24 "The Delta Cooperative Farm," letterhead stationary, letter dated November 4,1936
from Sam Franklin to Amberson, Cox Collection House Box 1,1996 Accession,
unlabeled folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. Sherwood Eddy, "The
Delta Cooperative's First Year," The Christian Century, 54 (3 February, 1937), 139-140.
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farm workers. According to Sherwood Eddy, the Rust brothers had committed 90% of all
profits from the development, production, and sale of the mechanical cotton picker to a
foundation, the principal purpose of which was to ameliorate the economic distress of
displaced agricultural workers. Specifically, nine-tenths of cotton picker profits were to
be invested in a series of cooperative farms, cooperative stores, and educational projects
for black and white. Eddy was awed by the Rust brothers' potential generosity. "If this is
done," he wrote of the proposed donation of future profits,
it will be the first time in history, as far as I know, when a major
mechanical invention has been completely socialized in a capitalistic
country and harnessed to human welfare, and where virtually all the profit
of the investors goes to the relief of human labor which would suffer
because of the machine. Already I can see our new cotton picker invention
going down the broad acres of our cooperative farm with the people
prosperous and happy and their children in school. 25
Furthermore, he planned to demonstrate his perfected cotton picker at Delta Cooperative
Farm. There is no evidence that Rust channeled any funds to the Delta Cooperative
Farms. He did establish a charitable foundation in 1951. In a paper he delivered to a
local historical society, "The Origin and Development of the Cotton Picker," Rust
recounted his tribulations and final success with the cotton picker. He mentioned with
fondness the support he received from the radicals at the Newllano Colony in Louisiana.
There was not a single mention of the Delta or Providence Cooperative Farms. There is
no record of the effect of 90% of the profits derived from the delivery of the single most
important item of cotton technology since the cotton gin.

26
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Sherwood Eddy, to "Dear Friend," Strictly Personnel and Confidential, 18 March
1936, Arthur Raper Papers.
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Sherwood Eddy, Ibid; Alva W. Taylor, "Rust Brothers Open New Path," The
Christian Century (April 22,1936); John Rust, "The Origin and Development of the
Cotton Picker," unpublished narrative, copy in University of Memphis Archives, MSS
115, WTHS Manuscripts, Rust Collection, 1933-1953, Box 1, Folder 1.
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Dr. Amberson planted Blaine Treadway, a true-believer secular socialist, at Delta
Cooperative Farm. Amberson recommended forcefully that Franklin secure Treadway's
appointment as associate director. Prior to learning that Eddy would provide funding for
the cooperative effort, Amberson had targeted Treadway as the likely head of a
cooperative effort, but since the Christian Socialists provided the money, they selected the
top leadership. Treadway and Amberson viewed the "social gospel" advocates with a
cautious suspicion. In particular, they suspected that Eddy, Niebuhr, and Franklin did not
understand or appreciate the necessity of full democracy in carrying out farm operations,
nor did they understand the importance of full disclosure of the Farm's financial affairs.
Finally, both Amberson and Treadway believed that the true hope for cooperative
agriculture and the restoration of a prosperous life lay in a strong class-consciousness
among the membership. Franklin and Eddy, on the other hand, saw economic and social
redemption as a function of the effects of practical religion. Class-consciousness and
economic and political motivation had no place in the restored Kingdom of God in the
land.27
Treadway, a bachelor, and Franklin, providentially and only temporarily separated
from his wife, Dorothy, moved into a two-room shotgun cabin along the main road that
traversed the farm; from there they began directing the frenetic work of the first year of
27

Sam Franklin to Amberson, December 28,1935, February 13,1936, February 14,1936;
Amberson to Franklin February 11, and February 26,1935, all in Cox Collection, House
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Library. Amberson to Senior, February 4,1936, Cox Collection Series 7, folder lb,
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the cooperative. As operations commenced on the property, Franklin gave existing
tenants an opportunity to stay on; only three of eight families did. The evicted Arkansas
sharecroppers, most of them from the Dibble plantation, began arriving in late March and
by August 1936, thirty-one families, twelve white and nineteen black, had taken positions
on the farm. At first, some of the new arrivals had to double up or live in tents. The
necessity of immediate planting in order to harvest a fall crop and constructing cabins for
newly arriving families required Herculean efforts by Franklin, Treadway, and the
members. In addition to the necessary tasks, farm staff and membership were
inconvenienced by accommodating the host of visitors brought to the farm by the
generous publicity the cooperative generated.28
In the first year of cooperation, the Delta Cooperative Farm members established
a sawmill, built houses for all families, cleared some new land, and despite the late start
and one of the worst droughts in years, produced 152 bales of cotton. The drought
reduced the cotton yield but it also made the cypress timber more accessible. Sherwood
Eddy informed the "Dear Friends" network of existing and potential donors that the Farm
built new cabins at flat cost of $33.00 per unit. They did have screened windows and
sanitary outhouses, but none of the modern attributes of the Dyess Colony houses. Arthur
Raper visited Dyess and envied the Colonists pristine wired and piped homes; housing at
Dyess was farm superior to the cabins at Delta Cooperative Farm. Sherwood Eddy gave
an encouraging account of the first year in The Christian Century. According to Eddy,
the trustees held a "$30,000 farm fully paid for and free from debt." Thirty families were
settled on the farm, and the members had been able to pay the trustees $1,000 toward
28

E. B. Mckinny, 1st Vice President, Southern Tenant Farmers; Union, 14 March 1934,
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The Epworth Highroad, 6 (February 1937), 5; Franklin, 13-16; Eddy, 139.

amortization of the land. In addition, they had been able to distribute among themselves
$8,909 in dividends, or $327.53 per family. Each family also received an average of
$122.29 in certificates for the labor involved with cabin construction and clearing fields.
Thus, at a time when the average income of the southern tenant farmer family was $212
($3,808) per year, the Delta Cooperative Farm families earned, in cash and deferred
certificates, $449.82 ($6,545).29
Eddy continued with even more glorious examples of the results of cooperative
farming. The farm had sold $4,000 worth of timber from its saw mill operation and put
another $1,000 worth of timber into houses, a community center capable of seating
several hundred, and recreational and educational facilities. During the first year the
cooperative had commenced hog and poultry operations and a dairy operation was
underway. The cooperative store, called Rochdale in honor of the cooperative established
by English mill workers in 1843, declared a dividend of nine per cent.30
In the conclusion of the Christian Century article Eddy stated, without
elaboration, that the two races had been cooperating on the basis of interracial justice.
Acknowledging that the experiment had begun in violence, he noted that" thus far we
have been grateful for the cooperation of many in our adopted state of Mississippi." The
directors, he told his readers, were already planning for a second cooperative farm.31
29
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Reinhold Niebuhr's "Meditations From Mississippi," also published in Christian
Century, was just as enthusiastic but more philosophical in its praise. Unlike Eddy,
Niebuhr made a veiled allusion that all was not perfect in this Mississippi paradise. Some
of the members did not find satisfaction on the farm:
Undoubtedly they have worked harder man an average sharecropper. No
wonder that a few yearn for thefleshpotsof Egypt, though these fleshpots
contained nothing but fat-back and cornmeal. One Negro left last week
with the remark, "I need a rest."32
These articles, and others, brought tremendous attention to the Delta Cooperative
Farm. Liberals praised the farm as the Christian example of service toward economic
emancipation. Eleanor Roosevelt asked Eddy to visit her and discuss the farm. Other
inquirers and admirers included Rexford G. Tugwell, Henry Wallace, North Carolina
Senator Frank Graham and Jacob Coxey of 1894 Coxey's Army fame. Indeed, the
publicity was so massive that Eddy wrote to Franklin in 1939, "We have received more
publicity than we deserved. When our American Seminar saw [Louis] Brandeis, after an
hour with him in his home he said, 'I did not want to talk with you about these things, I
wanted to spend the time asking you about your cooperative farms in Mississippi.'"33 Not
all the publicity was positive. Writer Jonathan Daniels argued that the farm was living on
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charity, an accusation that Amberson would second along with dishonesty and
paternalism before the decade was out.34
Ostensibly, the management of the farm was delegated to a council of five
members, no more than three of each race, elected by the membership. This council
made the decisions regarding agricultural operations, logging operations, design and
construction of farm structures, and matters of discipline. The council had the authority
to remove families or individuals from cooperative membership, but all council decisions
were subject to veto by Sam Franklin. The first significant decision of the council was
the placement of family houses. The council decided that all families would reside in
relatively close proximity to each other, and that the black and white residences would be
placed facing each other, separated by the main road.35
Gradually, residents and friends of the cooperative began to call the entire
operation by the name of its consumers' cooperative, Rochdale. In 1937, the Postal
Service established a new post office, Rochdale, and named newly-arrived Alan Eugene
(Gene) Cox Postmaster. People soon began to refer to the Delta Cooperative Farm by
different labels; Rochdale, Delta Cooperative Farm, Sherwood Eddy's operation, or the
Union Farm.36
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Medical attention for newly arrived sharecroppers, and indeed for the families in
the community, was almost non-existent. During the early days of the cooperative,
Amberson prevailed on a physician friend, Dr. Garland Weidner, to drive down from
Memphis on Sundays and conduct a clinic. Memphis was 100 miles from the farm and
Weidner was no help in case of an emergency. Dr. Etta Vaughn a retired Osteopath
volunteered her services and conducted clinics on a part-time basis. She returned to her
native California in the summer of 1937. Lindsey Hail, the child of missionaries who had
served in Japan, became acquainted with the Franklins and, upon completion of her R.N.
training at Massachusetts General Hospital, accepted Franklin's offer to provide medical
services to the farm and community. Although Franklin could not guarantee her a salary,
and even though she had never been in the South, she came to Delta Cooperative Farm.
Nine months later, she married A. E. Cox.37
Franklin and Eddy realized that the services of one nurse, no matter how
dedicated, could not meet the needs of the farm or of the rural community. In 1938,
Franklin proposed that David Minter, recently graduated from the University of
Pennsylvania Medical School, come to serve at Delta Cooperative Farm. Minter's father
was a minister and his brother a missionary. Dr. Minter, in effect, became a missionary
too. He agreed to open his practice at Rochdale for a salary of $1,000 a year plus any fees
he could collect from the community. In 1939, Dr. Minter met one of the college summer
volunteers sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, Sue Wooten, and they
married in 1940.38
Delta Cooperative Farm experimented. In addition to cotton, members began
raising alfalfa. The producers' cooperative began poultry, hog, beef, and dairying
37
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operations. The saw mill continued to provide a steady stream of income and members
irrigated the cooperative garden. Members generally were able to improve and add
variety to their diets. The consumer cooperative provided products without the usurious
interest rates that the former sharecroppers had experienced in cotton baron
commissaries.
The producers' cooperative compensated workers on a graded and somewhat
complicated scale. Members fell into one of eleven work-scale classifications according
to the skill level required for the job. Each job carried specific credits and the credits
determined the distribution from the profits of the enterprises. The system also gave
members credit for "non-productive" work. Such work included clearing new ground,
building community facilities, ditching, and fencing. For these labors the members were
paid in certificates, redeemable at the cooperative store.39
At the suggestion of white members, the cooperative established a school for the
black children of the farm and the nearby community. At the time, the state of
Mississippi provided white children eight months of education but only four and one-half
months for black children. Seeing a basic injustice in the state's educational system, a
majority of the white members petitioned the council to establish such a school. The
cooperative received financial contributions from various black and interracial groups to
fund the teacher's salary for an additional four months of school.40
The Cooperative Farm's goals were ambitious. Franklin, some said unwisely, put
as much time and effort into achieving spiritual, social, and educational goals as he did to
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achieving economic ones. Franklin conducted church services every Sunday. Only
occasionally did black and white meet together. Franklin recognized the wisdom in
yielding to some of the more adamant regional customs. Speakers, sometimes very
prominent ones, including Arthur Raper and Bishop William Scarlett, came to the Farm.
Lessons in home economics, book reviews, and, with the gift of a projector, movies,
became part of the regular fare in the community building.
Beginning in the summer of 1937, college students, both black and white, came to
the farm for volunteer work. The YMCA, YWCA, and the Quakers' American Friends
Service Committee were most instrumental in student recruitment. These volunteers built
bridges, cared for children, cleared fields, chopped cotton, cooked, and fell in love.
Franklin and Cox recall several marriages between sons and daughters of members and
among the summer college volunteers. Minter and Cox both met their spouses during
service at the Farm.
The American Friends Service Committee expected that the young people sent to
the Farm would not only labor and serve; they would also learn. Part of Sam Franklin's
reciprocal responsibility was to expose the volunteers to some of the people and
peculiarities of the Delta. W.A. Percy's secretary sent Mr. Percy's regrets. Mr. Percy
was abroad on vacation, he said. There is no record of Oscar G. Johnston's response to
Franklin's invitation to come down to the Farm and talk to the young people about the
cotton industry. Even without the services of two of the Delta's most luminous
personalities, Franklin was able to provide an impressive lecture lineup. Norman
Thomas, Miles Horton, Charles Johnson, Sherwood Eddy, Jacob Coxey, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and the occasional journalist came to the Farm to speak to the volunteers. The
visitors also served a valuable purpose in that their presence often drew local white
people to visit the Farm. Such familiarity, so the Board expected, would create and
maintain good will with the community. People from all stations in life, it seemed,
wanted to visit the Farm and many of them offered their volunteer services. Except for an

exceptional few, Sam Franklin asked, instead, for money. Among the remarkable people
to offer services to Delta Cooperative Farm were the merely famous, the widely
influential, and the truly extraordinary.41
A. James McDonald ultimately proved too good to be true from Sam Franklin's
perspective. McDonald, a lawyer admitted to practice in Louisiana was awaiting the
disposition of his "case" as he corresponded with William Amberson. McDonald lived in
a ten by ten addition to a sharecropper's cabin, but he did have access to electricity. He
delicately balanced a substantial library, portable typewriter, hot plate, and his meager
personal items between a cot and overstuffed chair. The lawyer was a member of the
Llano Colony and was awaiting some sort of legal adjudication; he was, he told
Amberson, "marking time." He advised Amberson based on his Llano experiences and in
early 1938, he arrived at Delta Cooperative Farm and assumed responsibilities as the
Farm Secretary. McDonald organized the files, wrote a column for the Farm's
Newsletter, "The Co-Op Call," and was an effective apologist for the Socialist Party of
America, He was also a competent stenographer; he took shorthand. When in 1939 the
Cooperators held a meeting at which they were encouraged to express their opinions
without the intimidation of the management staff, McDonald recorded and transcribed
into type the proceedings. The evidence of what the members actually thought revealed
Sam Franklin's dictatorial and insensitive farm management.42
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Constance H. Rumbough was truly extraordinary. Her life seems to have been
segmented; few of her acquaintances in a particular segment of her variegated life seem to
know the Constance Rumbough of the others. Sam Franklin announced the new addition
to the staff with a flourish,
A recent edition to the staff members of the Farm is Miss
Constance Rumbough, formerly a missionery (sic) of the Methodist
Church, South, and more recently connected with the Emergency Peace
Campaign. Miss Rumbough is from Virginia and is a blood relative of
General Robert E. Lee. Her coming to the Farm is, I think, symbolical of
the growing interest in our enterprise on the part of the best type of
Southerners.43
Ms Rumbough's Virginia illustrious ancestry notwithstanding, she proved to be a
versatile and effective staffer during her tenure at Delta Cooperative Farm from the spring
of 1937 through at least November. At first, Franklin assigned the forty-three year old
Longwood College alumna to answer correspondence. She worked in the Rochdale
Cooperative Store and won praise from the manager for her industry and diligence. She
did irritate some of the customers by writing their names on paper cups used at the water
bucket. She assigned a place on a shelf for each Cooperator's cup. She could not abide,
she said, the waste of throwing away perfectly good paper cups. She taught the black
Sunday school and in desperation Sam Franklin assigned her to the poultry operation.
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She cleaned the roosting areas, gathered and cleaned the eggs, and watered and fed the
chickens. According to Franklin, she put the poultry operation back in order.44
Rumbough used her extensive connections gained by missionary work to develop
contributions to the Farm and gather advice for a project inspired by the Delta
Cooperative Farm. Apparently, Rumbough moved to 501 Hooker Street, Jackson,
Mississippi in early 1938 and began another segment in her variegated life. Using her
Methodist connections, alliances earned as part of her service with the Fellowship of
Reconciliation, and her formidable letter writing skills Rumbough promptly formed
Mississippi Farms Incorporated. The Board of Directors included a remarkable number
of the small universe of Mississippians of the wealth and worldview required for
Rumbough's purposes. The directors of Mississippi Farms, including Constance
Rumbough, Secretary, were prominent Mississippians, A.S. Cody, Jr., Owen Cooper, and
Paul Ramsey. Non-director Stockholders included Mrs. W. L. Alford, Dr. Henry M.
Bullock, and Will Watkins, Sr. Rumbough's vision and her will were impressive.
Mississippi Farms bought almost 1,000, at $5.00 per acre, acres of land near Hattiesburg,
and began operations. Mississippi Farms was to have been the first in a series of farms
sponsored by, possibly, the Methodist Missionary effort. The farms were to be sold to
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white and black small farmers, the payments used to purchase other plots for other
farmers. Mississippi Farms resembled the organization of the Delta Cooperative Farm,
but it was much more emphatic it its insistence that its clients don the role and
responsibilities of ownership immediately. There would be no "probationary periods" at
Mississippi Farms. It became apparent very quickly that the Mississippi Farm would be a
failure, and Constance Rumbough refused to accept that consequence. Rumbough
enlisted the aid of the Delta Farm Cooperative Store Manager, the Quaker Art Landes,
and her older sister. The three of them repaid other investors and sold the farm on long
terms to the best of their clients. The black farmer paid the full price over time, and
raised five children, all of whom graduated from college. The Rumbough sisters and
Landes did not sell the mineral rights. A few years later natural gas from the property
provided a small monthly income for the trio of investors and the new owner.45
Constance H. Rumbough rejoined the Fellowship of Reconciliation in the 1940s.
She was also active in the movement to protect the rights of conscientious objectors. In
the early 1950s, Constance Rumbough moved back to her hometown. Although born in
Lynchburg, Rumbough's family moved to Danville, Virginia, when Constance was about
five. She moved back to Danville to be the Director of Religious Education for the
Danville School System and to take care of her aging mother. Constance Rumbough
taught in the Jr. High and High Schools in Danville; she taught, at one time or another,
almost all the Danville public school students from the early 1950s until at least 1977.
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Hundreds of Danville residents remember Miss Constance Rumbough. They remember
her as a tall, angular, white-haired lady who taught them about the history of the Children
of Israel. Gary Grant, Danville businessman and regional historian, knew Rumbough and
he remembers her distinctly and specifically with regard to one incident and one idea.
Rumbough delivered the news of President John F. Kennedy's assassination to Grant's
seventh grade class. Her solemnity, yet serenity and compassion in relating the news has
been, says Grant, a model he has tried to implement on similar occasions. He also
remembers that he first heard of and understood the notion of "progressive revelation"
under the tutelage of Ms Rumbough. The Danville Library vertical file has no sources on
Constance H. Rumbough. The history of Mt. Vernon Methodist Church makes no
mention of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Emergency Peace Campaign, work with
conscientious objectors, or her work at Delta Cooperative Farm. People were surprised to
know that the Misses Rumbough ever financed a bi-racial Mississippi cotton farm.
Constance Rumbough seems to have been a most modest person."46
Despite the glowing reports in magazines and the status as a "pet" of liberals,
things were not going as well as they seemed down on the farm. Slowly, but inexorably,
the true financial condition of the Delta Cooperative Farm manifested itself. The
"buckshot" soil of the farm, thick and rich, was difficult to cultivate. It cracked in the hot
summer sun and became impenetrable mud in rain. It was conducive only for cotton
production. One of the farm's goals was to demonstrate the superiority of diversified
farming. By 1937, the farm was losing money, and at the end of that year it faced a large
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operating deficit, met only by charitable contributions from individuals, churches, and
foundations. Jonathan Daniels claimed that the farm's best crop was Yankee
benevolence, not its produce. None of the financial reports issued to the members and
trustees by Ellis and Hirsberg, Certified Public Accountants, noted any contributions.
Unwisely, Franklin invested some of the reserves in a fanciful effort to establish a pecan
grove. Amberson's advice notwithstanding, Franklin used the alleged dividends to shore
up members' income rather than to accommodate new families. Amberson suggested that
an investment in new members would result in more production and thus increased
profits. None of these financial matters were communicated to the members. The only
way a trustee, other than Franklin and Eddy, could know the true financial picture was to
ask. The questioners had to be very direct and forceful.47
The racial harmony so lauded by Eddy, Niebuhr, and Franklin also became
severely strained or, perhaps, it had never existed in the first place. Even while Franklin
praised the surrounding community for its tolerance of this unusual cooperative
experiment, the farm became the object of mistrust and fear for a large segment of the
white community. A rumor circulated around Hill House. They were "'misterin' those
niggers out there."48 H.L. Mitchell advised Franklin at the onset of operations that
honorifics would cause trouble. It was a violation of local mores for whites to address
blacks with titles of respect. He suggested that all personnel, including the staff, be
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referred to on a first name basis, or addressed as "Sister," "Brother," or "Comrade."
Amberson concurred with Mitchell's views. Franklin's speech to the Cleveland,
Mississippi Rotary Club concerning the Farm caused some concern in the community.
W. M. Kethley, President of Delta State Teachers College, read an article in the local
newspaper and wrote his friend, Mississippi native Francis Harmon, General Secretary of
the YMCA, to warn him about the activities of Franklin, one of his former staffers.
According to Kethley, Franklin advocated "the organization of labor." Kethley also
added, "The attendant loose talk also runs along bad lines: social equality and what have
you. If I were in your place and could afford to do so, I would take a vacation [of a few
days {hand-written addition}] and spend some of my time at Hillhouse." Kethley
softened his letter with a hand written post-script: 'Nothing so urgent and serious as to
cause you loss of sleep - but you ought to get hold of this soon -"49
Amberson, Mitchell, Eddy, and Franklin had all envisioned a series of cooperative
farms, whose success, they hoped, would actuate a change from cotton tenancy to largescale cooperatives. In 1938, Cooperative Farms Incorporated purchased 2,880 acres in
Holmes County, about eighty miles from Delta Cooperative Farm. The Holmes County
purchase was consistent with that vision. The farm had been called "Providence" by its
former owners, and the name remained. Sam and Dorothy Franklin moved to Providence
while Blaine Treadway and Gene Cox stayed at Delta. Dr. Minter and Lindsey Cox made
weekly trips to Providence and conducted clinics for members and for anyone else
desiring their services. Significantly, Amberson abstained during the trustees' vote to buy
another farm.50
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The Schism between Ecclesiastical and Scientific Socialists
The veiled information given in Niebuhr's Christian Century article indicated that all was
not well. To the outside world, the Cooperative Farms presented a model of racial
harmony, liberal society, economic success, and potential solution to the evils of farm
tenancy. Archival evidence indicates that, in all of the areas mentioned above, there
existed conflict, contradictions, paternalism, and subterfuge. The Delta and Providence
Cooperative Farms were created with contradictory ideals and operational philosophies.
By accepting funding from Sherwood Eddy, the Socialist Party lost any chance of
becoming the dominant ideological partner. William Amberson, however, was an idealist
with a broad streak of pragmatism. Recognizing that identification with Niebuhr, Eddy,
and the liberal Christian community they represented placed the Cooperative Farms in a
position to gain political and economic support from people who viewed the SFTU as
anathema, he was content to allow the Cooperative Farms to be associated with liberal
Christianity. Consequently, in only one of the articles extolling the success and virtues of
the cooperative effort was there any mention that the farms were originally the brain-child
and "arm" of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Even Amberson, in an article in The
Christian Register, referred to the farm as Eddy's effort.51
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The Socialist Party of America, while rigorously publicizing its critique of
American capitalism and aggressively promoting its political candidates, understood that
some of its humanitarian and social efforts suffered by identification with the party.
Indeed, the party was so sensitive to the deleterious effects of association with Marxist
ideology that spokesmen often aggressively denied any such connection. H. L Mitchell
repeatedly denied in public that the STFU was in any way connected with the Socialist
Party. STFU spokesman Howard "Buck" Kester, in his highly emotional and effective
book, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, wrote: "It should be said furthermore, that the
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union is not, nor ever has been, an adjunct or organ of either
the Socialist Party or the Communist Party." H.L. Mitchell advised STFU leadership that
they should "appear as gentle as lambs," but he privately wrote to Kester, "If we can build
the union, we will take over all the damn plantations " and he hoped that the whole South
would "come under the collectivist farm system."52
That the STFU was organized as an arm of the Socialist Party is beyond
reasonable doubt. The archival evidence strongly suggests that the Socialist Party, under
the direction of Amberson, originated the efforts which resulted in the Delta Cooperative
Farm. Internal communications of the STFU and scattered papers of the Socialist Party
of America clearly indicate that the party leadership considered the Delta Cooperative
Farm as much an arm of the Socialist Party as the STFU itself. The STFU office
manager, Evelyn Smith, in particular, co-identified the STFU, Delta Cooperative Farm,
and the Socialist Party of America. Amberson was quite willing to allow Eddy, Franklin,
and Niebuhr to serve as the "mouthpiece" for the Delta Cooperative Farm.53
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Franklin gave some support to Socialist distinctions. Franklin began his letters to
certain correspondents with greetings to his "Dear Comrade." At Amberson's insistence,
he joined the Socialist Party of America and helped conduct a labor school under
Socialist Party auspices in the summer of 1937. Despite these favors and despite
Franklin's assurances that all the residents of Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms
would be strongly encouraged to maintain membership in the STFU, the Socialist Party
lost all control and most of its influence over the management and development of the
cooperative farms. Christian Socialists inexorably eradicated Socialist Party influence
and stymied Amberson's hope for a vibrant and self-disciplined political action group.
The story presented by the Delta Cooperative Farm management to America was
misleading, and at, times mendacious.54
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In his Christian Century article, Sherwood Eddy proclaimed that, after the first
year, the trustees owned a "$30,000 farm fully paid for and free from debt." This
statement was misleading at best. He implied that farm revenue had paid for the farm,
and made no mention of the charitable contribution that had funded the purchase.
Second, there is little to support the assertion that the farm was worm $30,000 after its
first year in operation. Third, the "dividends" (which generated the cash income to the
tenants) were not paid from current earnings, but from contributions not included on the
farm's balance sheet.
William Amberson became even more critical of the farm's policy and
management. He deplored Sam Franklin's refusal to accept the decision of the council in
disciplinary matters, and he was appalled at the inactivity of the local chapter of the
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Of the 35,000 alleged members of the STFU, only 125
were in Mississippi. The union had almost no success in organizing sharecroppers in
Mississippi. The Socialist Party and the STFU expected the locals at Delta and
Providence to be the vanguard of sharecropper organization, but Franklin repeatedly
ignored the union's views and frequently overturned decisions of the farm council.
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Furthermore, Franklin attempted to keep the news of an "indignation meeting"
held by Delta Farm blacks from the trustees. Loyalty to the cooperative among the
members was diminishing. Beginning with the harvest of 1937, many of the black
women of the cooperative hired themselves out as day laborers to adjacent planters,
leaving husbands and children to gather the cooperative's crop. Franklin berated the
women and refused to allow the council to consider the issue. He imposed a penalty on
the women's work accounts, thus reducing their cash distributions. In response the black
members of the cooperative held a meeting at which they expressed their indignation at
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Franklin's tyrannical actions and his intemperate language, as well as perceived
discrimination in favor of the white members. Franklin instructed the staff to make no
mention of the meeting or the issues raised to the board. Amberson's tolerance reached
the breaking point when, in 1939, the Board of Trustees sent a draft of another fundraising letter to the trustees for approval. The appeal, Amberson believed, was based on a
deliberate misstatement of the cooperatives' finances.56
In February 1939, Amberson resigned from the board. In his resignation
statement, he claimed that, despite public announcements to the contrary, the farm had
actually lost money in every year of its existence. Both Amberson and Blaine Treadway
viewed the statements regarding farm income in the various public appeal letters as
deliberate misstatements designed to induce continuing financial contributions.57
Indeed, Blaine Treadway became so concerned with what he saw as financial
reporting irregularities that he requested that the STFU conduct an audit of the farms.
Amberson strongly advised against such an audit, claiming that Franklin would
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deliberately confuse the records and that the trustees would see to it that the farm was
exonerated and would then use the "manipulated" report as evidence of its fiduciary
integrity. Amberson was correct at least as far as the composition of the audit committee
was concerned. Only two members of the STFU office were included on the committee,
and the report was hailed by Franklin as proof that even the most vocal critics of the
farms could find no malfeasance. It is interesting to note that, by the time of the 1939
audit, Franklin referred to the STFU as "critics" of the cooperative farm.58
There were other ways in which Amberson believed that the farms had abandoned
the original socialist motivations. Franklin, he charged, was acting in the manner of a
paternalistic despot. He had made no attempt to allow true democratic decision making
and he had invested no time and effort in raising up indigenous leadership. Furthermore,
Amberson alleged, the cooperative members were deliberately being kept uninformed as
to business decisions and their overall economic status. In addition, Amberson asserted
that Franklin, Eddy, and Niebuhr had abandoned all intentions of ever allowing the
cooperative membership a way of actually owning the farms. Finally, Amberson claimed
that a fund-raising appeal sent out over the signature of the directors contained
deliberately misstated financial information. In his resignation statement, Dr. Amberson
concluded:
I shall struggle no more with that dark spirit of untruth which is blighting
every chance we ever had to make a success of this work. I cannot
maintain the pace of your frenzied philanthropy. Never before have I seen
with such blinding clarity the essential and irreconcilable conflict between
the scientific and the ecclesiastical approach to social problems. Never
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before have I become so deeply committed to the scientific search for
knowledge as opposed to all other methods.59
The Death of a Vision
In 1942, the trustees sold Delta Cooperative Farm in order to concentrate their
activities at Providence. War-time job opportunities lured many sharecroppers from the
Mississippi Delta and farm mechanization made farm laborers expendable. The
incidence of sharecropping in the Mississippi Delta decreased. Delta Cooperative Farm
had never been self-supporting despite the publicity to the contrary. Cooperative Farms,
Incorporated received $34,600 for the Delta farm which had cost $17,500. By 1942, the
improvements made to the farm were significant. All the cabins had sanitary outhouses,
and screens. A large community structure and attendant sheds and storage facilities had
added considerable value to the original investment. But Franklin and Eddy, anxious to
concentrate efforts at Providence, sold it too quickly. Two months later the new owner
resold the farm to a levee contractor for $47,000.60
War service claimed Dr. Minter and Sam Franklin. Franklin only returned to
Mississippi for brief visits. Minter, after a refresher course at the University of
Pennsylvania Medical School, eventually came back to Providence. Gene Cox attempted
to run Providence on a sound fiscal basis without sacrificing the cooperative's spiritual,
educational, and medical missions. The cooperative bought a creamery and sent for
Blaine Treadway to operate it. It failed, through no fault of the cooperative. The dairy's
largest customer defaulted on its debt to the cooperative. Gradually, war industry
opportunities siphoned off the members. Cox, Minter, and two or three families stayed
on. After the war, Providence Farm was home to only two or three tenant families at a
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time. Cox devoted himself to providing Christian education and social activities for the
community while Dr. Minter conducted his clinic. The Providence farm relied on
contributions, not production for its sustenance
The dream of William R. Amberson, who was by now disillusioned with the
advocates of "practical Christianity" and the social gospel, met an ignominious end. In
1955, a teen-aged white girl told her school-bus driver that some black boys had whistled
at her while she was waiting on the bus. The bus driver quickly informed the Holmes
County Sheriff and the four young black boys were brought in for questioning. The
questions had less to do with whistling at the girl than they did with the activities down
there at Providence Farm. Intimidated and terrified (Emmet Till had just been found
murdered not far away) the boys' answers to extremely prejudicial and leading questions
were recorded on tape. Because the tape-recorded answers "proved" that the people at
Providence were promoting social equality, advocating racial integration, and
countenanced interracial swimming, the community leaders, especially the local
prosecutor, state representative, and the White Citizens Council, felt that the community
should be made aware of such "goings on."
On a September evening a large crowd of Holmes County citizens met at the
Tchula school to hear the taped "confessions." The citizens of Tchula, guided by the
White Citizens Council, decided that Providence Cooperative Farm exerted a dangerous
and unwholesome influence on the community in general and upon blacks in particular.
The throng voted, near unanimously, that Gene Cox, the soul of propriety and
compassion, advocate of the downtrodden, and almost (unlike Franklin) devoid of
arrogance, leave the county. The vote also applied to David Minter. The one person
who defended them before the crowd, sixty-year-old Presbyterian Minister Marsh
Callaway of Durant, was soon asked by the Session of his church to leave. David Minter

moved to Arizona. Gene Cox moved to Memphis and continued his work with the Delta
Foundation, a non-profit corporation established by the Coxes and Minters.61
On October 12,1956, the Stockholders and Directors of Cooperative Farms, Inc.,
voted to sell Providence Farm to the Delta Foundation for "$1.00 in cash and other
considerations."62 Will Campbell, author of the novel, Providence, said that the farm was
eventually sold to private interests by the Delta Foundation. The cooperative farms did
not achieve their goals, the Christian Socialists did not usher in an age of social justice
and economic success, the Socialist Party did not transform sharecroppers of the
Mississippi Delta to a rural socialist-vanguard, and Dr. Amberson's vision died.63
Discussion of the failures of the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms must
begin with the single most important fact relative to the creation of these farms, the
acreage reduction programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. AAA
administrators were fully aware of the effect of their policies on sharecroppers in the
Mississippi Delta.
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In their highly sympathetic treatment of Cully Cobb, Professors Roy Scott and J.
G. Shoalmire dismiss, in a very few words, Cobb's responsibility for the almost
unbelievable horrors inflicted on sharecroppers. Scott and Shoalmire inform us that Cobb
simply did not see social problems as part of his job. This occluded vision on the part of
Cobb is difficult to accept in view of the fact that the sole purpose of the cotton acreage
reduction contracts was to preserve the South's cotton middle class. It is apparent that
Cobb believed that the ends justified the means. With a phalanx of county extension
agents serving as staff for the county production committees, adjudicating planter/cropper
disputes, and reporting directly to him, Cobb must have known what was occurring in the
Mississippi Delta. William Amberson informed Cobb of the evictions occurring in
Arkansas, and he reprinted a portion of Cobb's response: "No case of eviction has come
to our attention that in any way involved our contract, or has been caused of (sic) the
contract, and we have no evidence of wholesale eviction for cause anywhere." By the
time Cobb received Amberson's complaints, word from the AAA's own investigators had
reached Washington; it confirmed Amberson's claims.64
When Amberson resigned from the Board of Trustees of Delta and Providence
Cooperative Farms, he included in his statement a passage from Reinhold Niebuhr's
Moral Man and Immoral Society:
The most common form of hypocrisy among the privileged class is
to assume that their privileges are the just payments with which society
rewards especially useful or meritorious functions
it must be proved
or assumed that the underprivileged classes would not have the capacity of
rendering the same service if given the same opportunity. This assumption
64

Roy V. Scott and J. G. Shoalmire, The Public Career of Cully A. Cobb: A Study in
Agricultural Leadership, (Jackson, MS: College and University Press of Mississippi,
1973), passim. Norman Thomas, The Plight of the Sharecropper (includes "Report of
Survey" made by the Memphis Chapter L.I.D. and the Tyronza Socialist Party under the
direction of William R. Amberson) (New York: The League for Industrial Democracy,
1934), 27; Grubbs, 32-38; 39-54.

256
is invariably made by privileged classes. The educational advantages
which privilege buys, and the opportunities for the exercise of authority
which come with privileged social position, develop capacities which are
easily attributed to innate endowment. The presence of able men among
the privileged is allowed to obscure the number of instances in which
hereditary privilege is associated with knavery and incompetence. It has
always been the habit of privileged groups to deny the oppressed classes
every opportunity for the cultivation of innate capacities and then to
accuse them of lacking what they have been denied the right to acquire.65
Amber son used this passage to complain about Franklin's paternalistic
management of the farms and his lack of effort in developing indigenous leadership.
Amberson was giving voice to a problem consistently extant among leftist groups,
reliance upon leadership from the elitist classes. Amberson and others believed that the
farms were deliberately presenting a false financial face to potential donors. Amberson
continued his diatribe against Sherwood Eddy until the end of his life. He triumphantly
reported to Gene Cox in 1973 that he had met Eddy's grandson and that the grandson
admitted Eddy's propensity to stretch the truth. However, Amberson never once accused
Eddy of dishonesty for personal financial gain. Sam Franklin, in his account of the Delta
and Providence Cooperative Farms, took a measured and thoughtful account of
Amberson's various accusations. He concluded that the accusations were made with
some basis in fact.66
Why did the farms fail? One obvious reason is that the farm managers simply
were terrible businessmen. Other planters made money (or at least survived) using the
same farming techniques and growing the same crops. And few, if any, other planters
were in a position to garner financial contributions and free labor from summer
volunteers. Of course, few planters were interested in the physical, educational, or moral
development of their sharecroppers. As much as the trustees would deny it, and as harsh
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as it would have sounded to them, the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms were
examples of the very institution they hated. The farms were paternalistic plantations
worked by sharecroppers.
The nature of cotton agriculture was changing. Technology, expensive at first but
far more economical than human labor in the long run, was becoming a necessary part of
profitable cotton production. Even while the Farm Security Administration was settling
farmers on more productive land, the likelihood of success for "family sized" farms
diminished. Efficient use of expensive technology required much larger acreage.
William Amberson and the Socialist Party of America must share part of the
blame. By allowing the farms to come completely under control of the Christian
Socialists, they lost any prospect of developing leadership and affecting a classconsciousness-driven economic and social revolution. However, the Socialist Party of
America had trouble enough just surviving without expending the enormous resources
and energy required to develop fully an agricultural proletariat. The "agrarian" problem
has perplexed Marxists of all stripes, in all places, and at all times. Mississippi agrarian
Marxists remained perplexed.
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CHAPTER VII
SHADOWS OVER GOSHEN
It will be the central point - the garden spot of the North American Continent - where
wealth and prosperity culminate. E.N. Lowe, Mississippi State Arckeologisi, 1857.
The country needs ...the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is
common sense to take a method and try it: If itfails, admit Ufrankly and try another.
But above all, try something. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 6 June 1933.
President Clinton has sent Congress a proposal to establish a Delta Regional
Commission... designed to strengthen the economic development of the chronically
impoverished lower Mississippi River area. Memphis Business Journal, 9 February
1998.
Ten years have passed since Congress established the Delta Regional Authority,
seventy-five years since New Dealers began experimentation, and 150 since E.N. Lowe
rhapsodized over the potential of the Delta to create wealth and prosperity. Perhaps only
the lessons forgotten are more egregious than those not learned. With the luxury of time
and die clarifying light that comes with time and scholarship, the reasons for the failure
of the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and the Delta Cooperative Farm are obvious;
whether or not they actually failed is not.
All three projects were experiments; they were built to test possible responses to
real or hypothetical economic realities. Success for all three projects would be
determined, in large part, by the ability of the clients to forego voluntarily some of the
privileges and rights associated with American individualism. In all three projects
success depended on the economic cooperation of the clients. The Tupelo Homesteads
were designed to meet the requirements of a pleasure economy and radically different
manufacturing world. Dyess Colony was an attempt to create infleshand blood an
American myth, a robust class of independent and disinterested yeoman farmers. Delta
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Cooperative Farm was supposed to give the means of production to the people and to turn
the hearts of man to God. To say categorically that these projects failed is to ignore the
primary purpose of experimentation. Arguably, the greatest benefit from experimentation
is falsification of theory. Two of the communities, the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess
Colony, were certain to be failures from the very beginning. The failure of the Delta
Cooperative Farm was self-inflicted by its leadership.
The Tupelo Homesteads
The Tupelo Homesteads were to point the way to a permanent solution to the
problems necessarily associated with a pleasure economy and a decentralization of
industry. The Division of Subsistence Homesteads could have been successful by its own
definition only if the U.S. and world economies got markedly worse or got miraculously
better. Should the depression continue its erosion of the manufacturing segment, should
the nation's standards of living regress, and should the urban squalor require a
redistribution of the population, the Tupelo Homesteads might have been efficacious.
Should the planning envisioned by Tugwell, and others, result in a rational economy that
allowed a more fulsome distribution of wealth and depended more on die brawn of
technology than human muscles or brain power, then the Tupelo Homesteads might have
indeed, provided one model of how one might occupy time in a pleasure economy. In the
sense that the Tupelo Homesteads were created to respond to specific hypothetical
problems and since those problems failed to materialize, there is nothing in the Tupelo
Homesteads to falsify.
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Neither the continued deterioration of the economy nor the blessings of a pleasure
economy emerged. The sense of urgency mat had allowed President Roosevelt amazing
license in the early depression days gave way to a calmer consideration by politicians and
policy makers. As people endured the Great Depression, they became less convinced of
the necessity of bold, repetitive experimentation. It was no longer enough by, 1937, to
"try something." Without either of the two supposed justifications for the development
of part-time subsistence gardening, the purpose of the Tupelo Homesteads and the
proposed benefits to society and economy became problematic.
Despite the vision of M.L. Wilson and Rexford Tugwell, the Tupelo Homesteads,
by far the most successful of the DSH projects, became a place for middle-class people
who were experiencing economic turmoil to recover. The original justification for
funding was the need to demonstrate a way that people with part-time employment could
maintain a healthy and decent lifestyle by incorporating subsistence gardening. The
Tupelo Homesteaders worked every hour they could and, as evidenced by their incomes,
they worked full-time. Kathleen Perkins remembered that all heads of households at
Tupelo Homesteads held full-time jobs. Bearing in mind the President's assurance that
the subsistence homesteads project was not a relief effort, and that the homesteaders were
to be financially able to pay mortgages or rents, the local, state, and national screening
committees made sure that the Tupelo Homesteaders were competent, responsible, and
ambitious. Such people were not content to exist in bare subsistence. The Tupelo
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Homesteaders were all employed, they all appeared to be resourceful, and all of them
declined to purchase a Tupelo Homestead.
Tupelo, unlike the Delta, was a place of increasing labor demands. It is true that
many hill-farmers moved to the Delta when they began to lose their farms during the
agricultural depression, but it is also true that growing industrial centers such as New
Albany, Amory, and Tupelo drew a large number to town. Northeast Mississippi was
diversifying and developing a light-industrial base; the Delta still grappled with monocrop agriculture and an antiquated labor system. When the Tupelo Homesteaders made
economic gains, if their job began to provide more hours, if they were successful in
saving money, they found that they had options far more attractive than the subsistence
homesteads.
The original Tupelo Homesteaders were in an envious place. They were able to
rent what were, for the day, marginally acceptable middle class quarters while they
managed their finances, increased their earnings, and considered the government's
proposition They found that the benefits of wholesale financing were not sufficient to
compensate for missing an opportunity to provide better quarters of their own choosing.
The Tupelo Homesteaders made the rational decision. They were confident both in fee
ultimate fate of fee American Economy and in their own ability to make their way. They
were correct. In fee final analysis, fee Tupelo Homesteads simply provided a safe place
for ambitious and competent middle class Americans to weather fee storms of fee
depression and temporary financial reversals. The Tupelo Homesteaders were not willing
to trade their perceived birthright, feat of fee pursuit of happiness, for fee privilege of
1
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being in debt for thirty years, their integrity dependent on others, in order to purchase a
home that was at the bottom tier of white respectability.
The New Deal, in describing the anticipated homesteader, spoke of a new
economic entity. The homesteads would produce a new consumer/producer entity.
However, this concept was not new for Tupelo or any of the "New South" cities. The
efficient coordination between industrial employment and subsistence gardening had
been a key reason for Tupelo's phenomenal success. By 1934, growing most of one's
food was simply a normal part of life, even for those holding full-time jobs. Only the
aged, infirm, or incompetent ("sorry" in the vernacular of the area) did not have sizable
gardens. Lorena Hickok, on one of her information seeking tours, commented on a
phenomenon she observed at Tupelo. Mentioning the Tupelo Homesteads, she told Harry
Hopkins of interviewing a young textile worker. The young man lived about three miles
from Tupelo and drove to work every day. He told Hickock that he thought of his wages
as "net profit" since he raised almost all of what he needed back on his place. It was this
profit that allowed him to buy the automobile he was driving. Wage-work and
subsistence farming already seemed to be a very common way of life in Tupelo, said
Hickok.2
Hickok told Hopkins that Tupelo's experience with subsistence gardening and
wage work began in 1923 when a local textile factory manager decided to hire only those
who lived in the country and owned their own farms. Of the 2,000 industrial employees,
only 700 to 800 actually lived in the city. School buses performed double duty. The
buses picked up and returned workers to die city factories and children to the city
2
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schools. The Tupelo Homesteaders had no particular economic factor in common. The
notion that people would work and raise most of their vegetables, eggs, and milk was not
a new notion in Tupelo.
There were no community specific institutions or activities through which notions
of community emerged. They did not practice the same trade, work for the same
organization, or depend on any single commodity or product for their livelihoods. The
Tupelo Homesteaders sent their children to Tupelo Schools, went to church in Tupelo,
bought their groceries in Tupelo, and for the most part, worked in Tupelo. They
maintained their previous social, religious, and family associations. There was no central
principle or activity around which to build a community. The limited duress that the New
Dealers applied to encourage cooperation among the Tupelo Homesteaders was not
sufficient to disincline mem from pursuing the honored American goals of acquisition
and intra-class advancement.
The Tupelo Homesteaders were offered opportunity to enter into a thirty-year
indenture, at the end of their term they would have a small plot of ground and a very
modest home. The Tupelo Homesteaders figured they could do better. They were
correct.
Dyess Colony
The Colonists at Dyess were on relief. Indeed, the first requirement was that one
be on relief and be among the most successful. There was no possibility that the Dyess
Colony could produce a community of small yeoman farmers. The plan of incubating a
community of 500 or so yeoman farmer families on twenty to forty acre farms was
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impossible to execute. The false assumptions that made it impossible for the Dyess
Colonists to meet the expectations of the bosses are of two types.
The investigative work of Howard Odom and his associates and proteges revealed
some apparent physical reasons for the anemic condition of most of the rural citizens of
the cotton South. Arthur F. Raper's classic work on two Georgia counties revealed some
debilitating physical reasons that small cotton cultivators could no longer flourish or even
survive in parts of the eastern cotton belt. Added to the gashing erosion, thin soil and the
boll weevil, the ruinous crop financing system put small cotton growers in debt and kept
them mere. Raper was convincing; his narration gave nuance and depth to the raw
statistics. If the three physical problems did not exist, if there was a rational and fair
system of crop financing, then perhaps the South' s over eight million destitute might find
a way out of debilitating poverty.4
Dyess Colony did not have any of the physical problems that plagued Raper's two
Georgia counties, and the U.S. Government provided the financing and furnish functions
heretofore dominated by the cotton aristocracy. Dyess was located in the heart of the
Great American Delta. The topsoil was from 40 to 100 feet deep as actually measured on
the property. The erosion that occurs in the Delta is "sheet erosion." It occurs along the
ridge lands and riverbanks and the soil exposed by erosion is richer than that sloughed
off. The boll weevil, so devastating to the cotton areas east of the Delta was, to Delta
farmers, a momentary chastisement for lack of diligence, rather than potential and actual
disaster. Part of the Delta's relative resistance to the boll weevil was the preferences of
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the weevil and part was due to the experiments at the Delta Experiment Station. Boll
weevils prefer to winter in pine litter, and they generally prefer hilly terrain. If given his
preferences, the boll weevil would prefer to live in cotton areas other than the Delta. The
scientists at Delta Experiment Station discovered that the application of fertilizer to
cotton resulted in a surprising benefit. Agriculturalists had only recently introduced
fertilizer to the Delta. Generally, Delta cotton barons elected to save the cost of fertilizer
given the minimum increase in yields. However, the application of fertilizer caused
cotton to grow more rapidly. By the time each spring that boll weevils began their
ravenous raids on cotton fields, cotton in the Delta had already grown beyond the point
where the cotton plants were most attractive to the boll weevil. They tended to pass the
Delta cotton, to find more appealing cotton plants in the South. Whenever rain or human
laziness delayed planting and the application of fertilizer, the boll weevil devastated
Delta cotton fields. In the Delta, control of the weevil was relegated to planting and
applying fertilizer early in the crop year.5
Even with solution to the physical deficiencies that plagued much of the cotton
South, and with financing, administration, and management provided by the U.S.
Government, the cotton culture was unable to support a class of yeoman cotton farmers.
There was something fundamentally wrong with the cotton culture. Even after the
obvious problems with land and weevils were resolved, the cotton culture of the South
was incapable of supporting a population of yeomen.
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The second assumption held that families on small, yet diversified, farms could
earn enough cash from a cotton crop to meet their cash needs; their nutritional
requirements, for the most part, would come from vegetable and animal husbandry. By
1930, the ability of families to sustain a decent standard of living from a family sized
cotton farm was a statistical and physical impossibility. In 1931, Agriculturalists M. G.
Vaiden, J.O. Smith, and W. E. Ayers of the Delta Experiment Station in Stoneville,
Mississippi published a remarkable bulletin that clearly proved that a traditional familysized cotton farm could never provide an acceptable standard of living.6
Using production figures, costs, and prices received, the Delta Experiment Station
Bulletin demonstrated that even in the best of circumstances a family could not survive at
a level approaching decent conditions on fifteen acres of cotton production. The Dyess
Homesteaders were limited by the AAA to eight acres of cotton per twenty-acre farm.
Even those Colonists who had been able to procure forty acres at Dyess would not be
able to achieve a middle class level of living based on the cotton acreage allowed.
"Making Cotton Cheaper" drove home one unalterable conclusion. Profit from cotton
cultivation depended on reducing costs; the most dramatic cost reducing element was the
addition of technology in terms of increased animal or machine power. It cost a farmer
using one mule and its equipment $13.09 to cultivate and harvest one acre of cotton.
With a two-mule system and implements, the costs per acre fell to $8.09; the addition of
four-row tractor cultivation reduced the per acre cost to $5.24. The economies of scale,
however, required fields much larger than those at Dyess. Dyess Colonists could finance
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one or two mules, but there was no provision in the original plans for the purchase of
tractors or for cotton fields large enough to justify their use. The Colonists at Dyess were
expected to achieve yeoman status on plots far too small to generate the required income
and without access to truly efficient technology. Vaiden, Smith, and Ayres did not deny
that some people lived on the proceeds of small plots farmed on halves; they firmly
asserted that people would not continue to do so.7
Even if the cooperative associations at Dyess gained the loyalty and support of all
the Colonists, even if the Colonists abided by expert advice, and even if the weather and
the river behaved, the Colonists had absolutely no chance of attaining the goals of
William R. Dyess or Floyd Sharp. The tragedy of Dyess is that no one listened to the real
experts on cotton production economics.
Delta Cooperative Farm
Of the three communities in this study, the Delta Cooperative Farm was the most
heroic, radical, romantic, and rational. Its demise and failure is also the most shameful.
One would think that the leaders of liberal socially conscious Christianity and the
Socialist Party of America would champion the cause of the dispossessed. One would
think that both lines of progressive thought would have honored the worker, shown
respect for latent, though undeveloped, abilities and promoted dignity and self-respect.
They did not.
When A. James McDonald came to Delta and assumed responsibilities of Office
Secretary, he immediately received permission from Sam Franklin to express his opinion
about the Farm operation and management. He received permission from Franklin to
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read the Colony mail and to converse with other staff and Board of Trustee Members
about conditions on the Farm. What McDonald found disturbed him. At the intense
displeasure of the Cooperators, Sam Franklin insisted on retaining the services of Mr.
Alvin Day, the Farm Manager. Mr. Day was, in the minds of the members of the Farm,
nothing more than a recreation of a planter's "riding boss." Day interfered in all of the
departments at the Delta Cooperative Farm and his manner was curt and obnoxious. 8
The complaints about Day and indeed, about a whole lot of what was going down
on the Farm were first articulated in a meeting of the membership called by McDonald.
Sam Franklin was in New York getting ready for the Cooperative Farms Incorporated
Trustee Meeting in February of 1939. In his absence and the absence of any other
trustees, McDonald invited the members to a meeting where they could express openly
and without the intimidation of Franklin, their opinions about Farm operations.
At the 6 February meeting of the members, McDonald told the members that he
would transcribe their words and send a copy to Franklin and the Board in New York in
time for their 22 February meeting. Anyone who wished could have remarks omitted;
likewise, McDonald would take dictation from any member who wished to add fuller
comments in a separate addendum. What occurred at the meeting was no surprise to
McDonald. The hand-written minutes of the council meetings of Delta Cooperative Farm
illustrate the autocratic manner in which Sam Franklin operated the Farms. George
Smith, a black member of the Council and considered the Farm's best farmer, kept
handwritten minutes of the meetings beginning in April 1936. Smith was meticulous in
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recording the actual language of motions presented to the Council. Time after time, the
members would pass a measure only to have Franklin ask them to reconsider. After
telling the cooperatives his notions, invariably the membership repealed their just passed
motions and passed one according to Franklin's wishes. The membership council was
advertised to Delta supporters and to the public as being run by decisions made by the
members. That was true only for inconsequential matters or items for which Franklin had
no preferences.
For some time prior to the February 1939 Trustees Meeting, the membership at
Delta Cooperative Farm believed that support for the Farm was rapidly diminishing.
Franklin complained about costs and warned of the need of increased production. The
members at Dyess were no longer confident in ever owning the operation. Indeed, a
1938 re-organization of the Delta Cooperative Farm dropped any notion of the farm ever
being transferred to the membership.
At the 22 February meeting of the Trustees, William Amberson presented the
cold, hard and unchallenged facts regarding misleading publicity and outright lies to
supporters. The Farms had consistently misrepresented their true financial condition to
donors and Franklin and Eddy ruled the sharecroppers at Delta Cooperative Farm with a
disdain and arrogance rarely encountered even among the most refined of the Delta
cotton barons. They were also horrible managers.10
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The epistle from the Cooperators to the Trustees, the statements of actual workers
was a blistering indictment of the churchmen. Assuming superior management ability,
the trustees had made a mess of every operation that they managed. The operations left
to the management of the members, at the same time, were the only operations that
showed any profit. The Rochdale community store made money every year; a
Cooperator managed it. The sawmill was also managed by Cooperators and it too
showed a substantial profit. All the other areas, the areas in which the trustees tried to
manage from afar or the ones for which "expert" staff was employed suffered continuing
and serious deficits and losses. Indeed, profits from the store and sawmill operations
often went to pay obligations from other departments rather than as dividends to the
members. The members suggested that the paid managers be removed, their positions
assumed by Cooperators.11
William Amberson had written to Trustees Charles Embry and Arthur Raper prior
to the New York meeting to try to inform mem of the true condition of the Farms and to
enlist their aid in requiring both transparency with the public and true self-management
among the cooperators. Both were cautious in their response. At the New York meeting,
Amberson recounted years of arrogant paternalistic treatment of the Cooperators at the
hands of the Trustees, pointed out blatant misstatements in the summary of financial
conditions at the Farm, and charged that the Farm's Trustees had violated the very
premise of opening the Farm in the first place. The Trustees, particularly Eddy and
Franklin, said Amberson, were dishonest, manipulative, and more interested in personal
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aggrandizement and the praise of uninformed liberals that in helping the workers gain
control of the means of production. Amberson's charges were irrefutable.
Amberson resigned at that meeting and the response of Sam Franklin and
Sherwood Eddy would be pitiful if it were not so tragic. Franklin immediately began to
devise ways of keeping A. James McDonald from seeing any office correspondence. He
arranged for "Mac" to be away from the Farm whenever he was absent, or he arranged to
have a volunteer handle the mail. Franklin was more interested in seeing that no negative
information made its way to the public.
Franklin and Eddy grew tired of their liberal plaything it seems. They wearied of
being the courageous missionaries and the acclaim they received from the uninformed
public. They sold the farm, thereby ridding themselves of the problems of poor folks
who were just trying to make a living.
So What?
One common assumption guided all three of the depression communities. The
ability of Homesteaders, Colonists, and Cooperators to improve their financial prospects
and living conditions depended on the practical cooperation of the participants. All of the
projects claimed that decisions would be made by the members and that innate abilities in
the individual would redound to the benefit of the entire community. In all three
communities the bosses tried to force cooperation, in all three communities the members
refused to be coerced. In all three communities the clients were denied meaningful
participation in management.
The current economic troubles of the United States, as evidenced by the
continuing problem in the Great American Delta, are often met with ideas that require the
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cooperation of various entities. Without transparency of motives, without a clear and full
revelation of the status and condition of social and economic efforts, it is unlikely that
Americans will ever combine their efforts in a cooperative effort. If a housing project is
going to be a safe and pleasant home to residents, the residents must have authority to
manage and operate it. They must be entrusted with difficult decisions and when
decisions turn out to be ill-advised, they must be allowed to continue their participation.
The rapid deterioration of public housing and of community economic endeavors is due,
in large measure, to Americans unwillingness to forego the pleasures and prestige of
paternalism, a lesson American society has yet to learn.
Americans must learn also that a particularly egregious form of arrogance often
colors projects designed for the public good. This arrogance was manifested in the three
communities in ways that find resemblance in contemporary affairs. The class status of
clients was determined by the opinion of those who deemed themselves competent to
make such judgments and able to decide at what level a specific class should be satisfied.
It mirrors the complaints of some cotton barons about the overly generous subsistence
provided by the Red Cross in the flood or the New Deal in the depression. Black folks,
alleged the cotton aristocracy, just did not need as much money or comfort as white
folks. Likewise, the failed sharecroppers at Dyess would or should be contented, and
grateful for amenities much less comfortable than those provided for the middle-class
white people at Tupelo.
Another way in which this insufferable and egregious arrogance is communicated
is by the aspirations allowed various classes. Every year the Colonists at Dyess were told
that their modest homes, their chickens, and milch cows, and vegetable gardens would
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provide more security for them than any job or profession. They should glory in the
security offered by a subsistence farm; they should not aspire to greater economic status.
The bosses discouraged client aspirations of becoming wealthy or significant. Even
President Roosevelt on occasion suggested that people be satisfied with "a competence"
and eschew notions of becoming wealthy.
Whatever form the Delta Regional Commission takes, whatever programs it
institutes to deal with the crushing poverty that has historically plagued the rich land, the
history of the three communities suggests that success will not come if the participants
are marginalized, judged, and treated with contempt. The concept of cooperation for the
greater good has yet to be fairly tried among this nation's poor and marginalized.
Tupelo, Dyess, and Delta were not fair attempts. In that sense all three experiments were
indeed successful. They have taught a stern lesson about how arrogance and paternalism
can destroy a vision. However, the most egregious misapplication of any education is
that of lessons not remembered.
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